Source:
Susan Wolf, (2005) “Freedom within Reason”, Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy, James Stacey Taylor (eds.), (
1 主要目標：
1.1 論証人需要為自己的行負責，不一定須要假設人有自由意志．
1.1.1 We have reason to hope, that is, that the metaphysical truth about the world and our relation to it is not such as to imply that we are not responsible beings.[1]
1.2 解釋三種討論“責任”之基礎及其來源的觀點：Autonomy View，Real Self View和Reason View．
2 傳統觀點中的憂慮：
2.1 要為Freewill辨護，似乎一直是一個艱鉅的難題．不只是現代，其實由古至今，對於人有否自由意志這課題，我們總是悲觀的．Wolf舉出了三個常見的版本，它分別是與自由意志不相容的理論或想法．
2.1.1 Free will seems to be threatened not only by what may be called divine determinism, but also psychological determinism – that is, by the view of human psychology that holds that one’s interests and beliefs and values, and consequently one’s decisions for action, are wholly a product of one’s heredity and environment. Moreover, […] agents whose thoughts, desires, and wills are effective in guiding our behavior can called into question by the scientific perspective that views human beings as wholly physical creatures, […], can be completely explained in terms of the interaction of atomic or subatomic particles. [2]（粗體為筆者所加．）這三個版本即是：有神論，心理學和物理學．
2.2 為何怕喪失自由意志：
2.2.1 由於我們常常假設了人有自由意志，所以，喪失自由意志將使人類的生活彷彿變成幻像．
2.2.1.1 …in ordinary day-to-day life we assume that we do have free will, and the recognition that we might be wrong about this would imply that we are living an illusion.[3]
2.2.2 再者，我們也害怕面對，我們其實不能掌握生命，喪失對行動的決定權．
2.2.2.1 They fear the absence of power and of ultimate control.[4]
2.2.3 但Wolf最擔心的是責任課題．喪失自由意志似乎會使行動者不能再為他的行為負責．
2.2.3.1 My own concern, […], has to do with issues of responsibility.[5]
3 Autonomy View（自主觀）
3.1 總之，我們認為人有自由意志，就可以“自己話事”．這種想法與“自律”（autonomy）的觀點有關．我們似乎直覺地認同，對一個自律的行為，我們才能談及責任．
3.2 什麼是autonomy
3.2.1 For autonomy requires that our actions be governed by our selves and that our selves not be governed by anything beyond our control.[6]
3.3 困難一（與經驗不乎）：
3.3.1 就算是自律的行動者，也很難避免受外在因素影響行動．
3.3.1.1 Though the factors that shape who are and what we value, and consequently that shape how we respond to the circumstances that confronts, […], it is plausible that such factors are always operative nonetheless, calling into doubt the assumption that even the strongest candidates for autonomous action really are as autonomous as they appear.[7]
3.3.2 在德道運氣的課題中，我們也會面對這種擔憂．似乎（除了被人拿鎗指頭之外，）大部份的行動也是有行動者的背景的．我們很難明確地分辨背景對人的行動的影響．
3.4 困難二：
3.4.1 就算我們有自由意志，是自律的個體，又何以見得因為能夠自律，就要負責任？
3.4.1.1 But if being autonomous means that instead on one’s self being a product of external forces, one’s self is a spontaneous, undetermined entity, it is hard to see why one should be any more responsible for the decisions, choices, and actions that flow out of that.[8]
4 Real Self View（真我觀）
4.1 由於自由意志並不能解決責任的難題，我們可以轉移到Real Self View，即我們把責任的基礎來滅歸結於行動者是否真確地認同自己的行為．
4.2 The kind of freedom necessary for responsibility, it might be suggested, is the freedom to do what one really wants – that is, the freedom to do what one’s core, deep, or real self wants, which may be different from what one’s strongest desires would urge upon one.[9]
4.3 換句話說，我們把行動者的責任歸結於行動者是否真誠地認同兼且認為其行為是有價值的．
4.4 即倘若行動者對其他動有第二序欲望，我們便可以對其提出責任要求．
4.4.1 (A pref ~A) pref (~A pref A)
4.5 困難：
4.5.1 就算一個行動是行動者的自我認同的行為，也不足以一定證明行者須要為其行動負責．因為，雖然行動者可以是自願的，也不一定是有得選擇．
4.5.1.1 例如：電影《紫雨風暴》（1999）中的吳彥祖的角色（多特），他是一個自小便被赤柬收養，並訓練成遊擊隊隊員的人．他沒有其他選擇，他一定要成為赤柬，而他認同他是赤柬遊擊隊的身份．
4.5.1.2 又例如：一個種族者主義者，可能是因為他的成長背景使沒有不成為種族主義者的可能性．[10]
4.5.1.3 這例子同樣可以用於納粹主義者等．
4.5.2 就算是第二序欲望也不一定是獨立自主的．一個人的第二序欲望、意願或價值取向，都可以受環境或受因果律則影響的．
4.5.2.1 In fact, the man’s racist values are part of his real self. […] For although these activity are governed by his values, his life … had no room in it for questioning, for coming to see the reasons why racism is wrong. He didn’t have a chance to not be a racist, and so it seems unfair to blame him for acting out and expressing a racism he had no choice but to have.[11]
4.5.2.2 I believe that suggestion (RSV) is mistaken. There is no such ultrareal or superdeep self, independent of all external influences, arising from nothing; and even if there were, it is hard to see why a being with such a self would be any more responsible than a being without it.[12]
5 Wolf的版本：Reason View（理據觀）：惡行免責論
5.1 似乎，就算是RSV也會面對一個AV的要求．如果一個RSV不是獨立真誠地自主，我們亦會十分懷疑這個RSV的責任．如果RSV不比AV好．我們似乎對一個兩難．我們以乎要退回AV．
5.2 不過，Susan Wolf認為：我們不能要求行動者對其行動負責，亦不可以怪責．
5.2.1 Reflecting on the supposition that they could not help but have those values, then, inclines us to exempt them not just of responsibility, but of blame.[13]
5.2.2 It might be noted that when we look at cases of bad-acting agents, our tendency to exempt them from responsibility (and thus from blame) rests heavily on our imagining cases in which it is posited that the agent could not but have become vicious or disturbed.[14]（粗體為筆者所加．）
5.3 相反，行善的人則可以擔起他們的善行的責任，接受贊賞．
5.3.1 We do not exempt the good acting agent because we covertly, perhaps even unconsciously, imagine the agent as one who was encouraged by good influences, but who was not compelled to become good. Rather, we assume that decision to accept these influences was more truly up to him.[15]（粗體為筆者所加．）
5.3.2 當然，我們可見Wolf所指的“truly”，不一定指“真實地”，而是“assumed as if truth”，即“假設／看待成真”
6 釐清：
6.1 Disanalogy between good-acting and bad-acting
6.1.1 Wolf好在意這個概念．因為她認為這是她的Reason View的核心．
6.1.1.1 The development of my view about responsibility laid stress on a disanalogy between good-acting and bad-acting agents.[16]
6.1.2 何謂“disanalogy”？
6.1.2.1 …the disanalogy is quite specific: It is that a good-acting agent may have been irresistibly drawn to accept good values as a result of the exercise of good reason, whereas this can never be said of the agent who acts in a blameworthy way.[17]
6.1.2.2 換句話說，責任的基礎就是來自“理據”．
6.1.3 她舉出了一些處境，幫助闡明，指出一個行善的人，其實是有機會不值得被贊賞或怪責．一個行惡的人，亦不一定不須要負責．
6.1.3.1 例如：If a person acts badly despite his ability to appreciate the reasons for acting better, then he is fully responsible and blameworthy for his choice.[18]
6.1.3.2 但筆者認為，這可能性和她的理論有不一致的地方．因為她似乎認為我們沒有理由可以行惡．所有的惡行都是因為不了解和缺乏選擇的結果．因為我們總可以把行惡者描述成受環境限制．
6.1.3.2.1 所以她在“If a person […] for his choice. [19]”這句之前，加上一句：“But it is a real and difficult question how often such cases occur.[20]”
6.1.3.2.2 亦有這句：But if a man irresistibly led to affirm bad values, this can only be because he was deprived of the ability to appreciate the reasons why those values are bad.[21]
6.1.3.2.3 換句話說，她自己很懷疑我們能否有效証明一個人可以充份地、了解地和可選擇地行惡．
6.1.3.3 真相究竟是如何，則可能要返回自由意志的討論．但不論形上真相為何，我們都可以贊同Wolf的觀點．
6.2 Reason View的精神在於把責任的基礎歸結為規範性和指導性的概念，而不是一個形上理論的結果：the difference between responsible and nonresponsible agents is not fundamentally metaphysical – it is normative. What we need in order to be responsible is not the power to form and revise our values independently of the world, but rather the power to form and revise our values well rather than badly, in light of an understanding of the world and of what is important and worthwhile in it.[22]（粗體為筆者所加．）
7 問題及回應：
7.1 一：
7.1.1 與其說RSV中的Real是等同“真我”．倒不如說Real Self是Ideal Self“理想我”或Role model“典範我”，因為Wolf在論証中，隱含了她對人性的觀點．如中國哲學一樣，她似乎認為人是必須亦必然是性善的．要不然，為惡的行動者都必然不是以受他的真我驅使以行惡．她一早就排除了人是性惡的可能性．所以她亦說這是“heavily on our imaging cases”．
7.1.1.1 …, we imagined people who could not but have acquired bad values or false beliefs and so could not but have made bad decisions on the basis of them.[23] （粗體為筆者所加．）
7.1.1.2 We do not exempt the good acting agent because we covertly, perhaps even unconsciously, imagine the agent as one who was encouraged by good influences, but who was not compelled to become good. Rather, we assume that decision to accept these influences was more truly up to him.[24] （粗體為筆者所加．）
7.1.2 可見她很想保護日常直覺：認為人是（最少是傾向）善的．
7.1.3 當然，說她與中國哲學可相通，可能言之過早．我們亦可以說她的理論，與亞里士多德的perfectionism相通．不過，大致上，不論是Wolf，Aristotle或者是各儒者，都是向共同目標進發──為人確立行善的基礎及方向．
7.1.4 倘若她的論點是發生在一個邪惡的可能世界，我們可以對她構想的種族主義者，給予另一翻的描述．
7.2 二：
7.2.1 不過，她的觀點有一個好處．我們對待惡行時，可以更寬宏．因為我們總是可以認為惡行是身不由己．[25]行惡的人是需要幫助，而不是需要被怪責．
7.2.2 蘇格拉底把惡行看待成如無知的行為；而Wolf則把惡行看待成身不由己的行為．兩者均重視啟導和教化，多於怪責．這種扶持他人的精神是一種比較正面的和關懷的精神．
7.3 三：
7.3.1 Wolf的觀點其實可以有利把責任轉變成一個程度性的概念，這亦脗合我們的日常經驗．例如：蜘蛛俠中常常有句“能力越大，責任越大”．而我們日常亦彷彿認為聖賢有需要開化民智，就如父母有需要教育子女明白做人道理．
7.3.2 如果我們僅以AV來劃定責任，我們便很大機會使責任變成非有即無的概念．要麼行動者有自由意志，所以要為一切自律行為負上全面的責任；要麼行動者沒有自由意志，所以對其行動可以全不負責．
7.3.3 相反，Wolf的理論則可以同時考慮行動的處境和自身信念．如果行動者有很合理的理由和充分地了解處境，他則有較大的責任．如果行動者受環境的影響較多，或對自我的欲望及信念理解較少，他則有較少的責任．
7.3.4 這亦可以幫助我們理解，當我們怪責他們逃避責任時，為何往往我們是在怪責他人故意地不去了解他應所了解的處境．
7.3.5 她似乎亦會贊同這個理解：The more we are able to understand and correctly and sensitively evaluate our world, the more responsible we are able to be in acting within and upon it.[26]
7.4 倘若天命不能違．由不朽的觀看，命運總是播弄或特別照顧某些人，使他們對生命有更多的了解，擁有更大的責任．由有朽的觀看，有人類會努力獲得更多的自由，肩負更多的責任；亦有人認為自由是“生命中不能承受之輕”，努力逃避責任．
[1] P259.9
[2] P258.5 – 258.7
[3] P258.10 – 258.1
[4] P259.3
[5] P259.4
[6] P261.5
[7] P261.7
[8] P262.2
[9] P265.4
[10] Wolf於文章中的例子．
[11] P266.4 – 266.5
[12] P269.3
[13] P267.7
[14] P268.6
[15] P268.10 – 269.1
[16] P271.4
[17] P271.9
[18] P272.6
[19] P272.6
[20] P272.5
[21] P271.10 – 272.1
[22] P273.6
[23] P272.5
[24] P268.10 – 269.1
[25] 換了筆者的語言：“我們總可以說某人行惡，是因為他有心理鬱結，而非自願，亦非能自控的．”
[26] P274.3
