Wang Yangming on the Innate Moral Knowledge (Liangzhi)筆記
Yong Huang, "A Neo-Confucian conception of wisdom: Wang Yangming on the Innate Moral Knowledge (Liangzhi)", in Journal of Chinese Philosophy, vol33, no.3, pp.393 - 408,Sept., 2006
（頁ｘ）是指王陽明全集（紅旗出版社）中的頁數
（陳榮捷§ｘ）當然是指陳榮捷編譯的傳習錄中的節數）
1 目標：
1.1 「Examine Wang’s idea of Liangzhi as moral knowledge innate in everyone;」
1.2 「Analyze Wang’s view of distinction between sages and common people despite the fact that moral knowledge is innate in both;」
1.3 Huang主要想回答，於王陽明的哲學系統中，良知究竟有幾可信．這回答主要透過一條問題展現：「如果良知必然有能力且保証道德行為的發生，為什麼人類又會有惡行？」
1.3.1 「Explore the issue of the credibility of Wang’s conception of moral knowledge.」[1]
1.3.2 「In this view, to have moral knowledge and yet be unable to act morally is a self-contradiction, for knowledge and action are one and the same thing.」[2]
2 兩種「知」
2.1 良知
2.1.1 不學而能，不學而知．（盡心上）
2.1.2 「心之本體」（陳榮捷§８）
2.1.3 「不假外求」（陳榮捷§８）
2.1.4 「…naturally urge us to search for such knowledge.」
2.2 知識（見聞之知）
2.2.1 因應實際處境而應變的知識．
2.2.2 沒有獨立地位的．
2.2.2.1 勞思光（Lao Si-guang）「…Wangs says that nonmoral knowledge should not be sought after if it is not useful for moral knowledge and therefore does not have an independent role.」[3]
2.2.2.2 「…all non moral knowledge that we think we should pursue, including the sciences, medicine arts, history, and literature, is necessary for the moral knowledge to function.」[4]
2.2.3 如果缺乏良知的引導，見聞之知的增長，不一定是好事．因為見聞之知有可能只是令人更貪婪．
2.2.3.1 「後世不知作聖人本是純乎天理，却專去知識才能上求聖人．以為聖人無所不知，無所不能，我須是將聖人許多知識才能逐一理會始得．故不務去天理上着工夫，徒弊精竭力，從冊子上鑽研，名物上考索，形跡上比拟，知識愈廣而人欲愈滋，才力愈多，而天理愈蔽．」（頁２９；陳榮捷§９９）
2.2.4 （頁１１４）
3 「惡」又是什麼？
3.1 「惡」從何來？[5]
3.1.1 「惡」只是私欲．[6]
3.1.2 類比：如雲敝日；如塵蓋鏡．[7]
3.2 P J Ivanhoe：
3.2.1 氣之清濁：「qi naturally occurs in varying degrees of “coarseness” or “turbidity” and that the quality of the qi, which different people receive at birth.」[8]
3.2.2 「… the innate moral knowledge is originally transparent. Those whose physical qi (qizhi) is not excellent are not easily enlightened to it because of the large amount of dregs and heavy layer of obscuration. Those whose physical qi excellent have few dregs and little obscuration. Thus with a little effort to regain the sight of the innate moral knowledge, this innate moral knowledge becomes transparent to them.」（頁７０）
3.2.3 中譯：「良知本來自明．氣質不美者，渣滓多，障蔽厚，不易開明．質美者渣滓少，無多障蔽，略加致知之功，此良知便自瑩徹，．．．」
3.2.4 中譯：陳榮捷§１６４．
3.2.5 「… the physical qi (qizhi) is what both houses and obscuresn the human nature (xing). The physical qi varies and the human nature follows. Human nature is like a ball. It is bright when falling into a clear pool, becomes blurred when falling into turbid water, and becomes filthy if falling into filthy water. The wise people are in the clear pool, common people are in the turbid water, and stupid people below are in the filthy water.」（頁１０３５－３６）
3.2.6 中譯：「氣質者，性之所寓也，亦性之所由蔽也．氣質異而性隨之．譬之珠焉，墮於澄淵則明，墮於濁水則昏，墮於污穢則穢．澄淵，上智也；濁水，凡庶也；污穢，下愚也．」
3.3 氣是人的媒介，如果沒有氣，性也不能顯露．
3.3.1 「…the good human nature can only be seen from qi. Without qi, good human nature cannot be seen. Feelings of commiseration, shame and dislike, deference and compliance, and right and wrong are all qi」
3.3.2 「然性善之端須在氣上始見得，若無氣亦無可見矣．」（頁６３）
3.3.3 「… human nature is qi, and qi is human nature. Originally there is no distinction between human nature and qi.」（頁６３－６４）
3.3.4 中譯：「．．．氣即是性，性即是氣，原無性氣之可分也．」
3.3.5 二程：「… to talk about human nature without talking about qi is not complete, and to talk about qi without talking about human nature is not illuminating.」[9]
3.3.6 這解釋會使問題轉向了：惡如何和「氣」中生成？
3.3.7 為何性是善的，而氣則是惡的？
4 二氣說
4.1 有形之氣「qi constitutive of human beings as beings with shape (you xing).」[10]
4.1.1 人之所以為人之氣──主氣（host qi）．
4.1.2 這種氣是不能產生惡的．
4.2 客氣（ke qi）
4.2.1 又作「alien qi」（異氣）或「guest qi」（客氣）．
4.2.1.1 「性一而已，仁義禮智，性之『性』也；聰明睿知，性之質也；喜怒哀樂，性之『情』也；私欲客氣，性之『蔽』也．『質』有清濁，故」情有過不及，而『蔽』有淺深也．私欲客氣，一病兩痛．非二物也，張、黃、諸葛及韓、范諸公，皆天質之美，自多暗合道妙；雖未可盡謂之學，盡謂之聞道，然亦自其有學，違道不遠者也．使其聞學知道，即伊、傳、周、召矣．若文中子則又不可謂之不知學者，其書雖多出於其徒．
4.2.1.2 陳榮捷§１６５
4.2.2 但陽明其實沒有處理何為客氣，Yong Huang援引張載和朱熹的話
4.2.2.1 「… the principle of rightness (yili) and the alien qi conquer each other frequently. The distinction between superior persons (junzi) and inferior persons (xiaoren) is made according to the degree of the one being conquered by another. The more the principle of rightness gains the upper hand.. the more the alien qi is extinguished.」[11]
4.2.2.2 朱熹的「外氣」：「… is not mixed with external qi (wai qi), but absorbs nourishment from the external qi. Let us take the fish in water as an analogy. The life of fish is not caused by water. However, only by absorbing nourishment from water can fish live. Human beings live between heaven and earh n the same way as fish live in water. The nourishment humans receive from drinking and food is all from external qi.」[12]
4.2.2.3 由此可見，「the qi of genuine origin is not mixed with the external qi but depends upon the latter for nourishment. Thus, if the external qi is turbid, it may contaminate the internal qi by causing it to have inappropriate material desires (wu yu，物欲)」[13]
5 二氣說之困難
5.1 缺乏文獻根據：沒有正直的文獻証據表示，王陽明有解釋過「客氣」等概念為何．
5.1.1 但說王陽明有精讀過二程的理論，也不是一個離譜的想法．
5.2 間接考証：
5.2.1 王陽明有把良知和夜氣作比較．
5.2.2 「孟子曰：「牛山之木嘗美矣。以其郊於大國也，斧斤伐之，可以為美乎﹖是其日夜之所息，雨露之所潤，非無萌蘗之生焉，牛羊又從而牧之，是以若彼濯濯也。人見其濯濯也，以為未嘗有材焉，此豈山之性也哉﹖雖存乎人者，豈無仁義之心哉﹖其所以放其良心者，亦猶斧斤之於木也。旦旦而伐之，可以為美乎﹖其日夜之所息，平旦之氣，其好惡與人相近也者幾希，則其旦晝之所為，有梏亡之矣。梏之反覆，則其夜氣不足以存。夜氣不足以存，則其違禽獸不遠矣。人見其禽獸也，而以為未嘗有才焉者，是豈人之情也哉﹖故苟得其養，無物不長；苟失其養，無物不消。孔子曰：『操則存，舍則亡。出入無時，莫知其鄉。』惟心之謂與！」」（孟子告子上；中華書局印，頁３３０）
5.2.3 「又曰：『良知在夜氣發的，方是本體，以其無物欲之雜也．學者要使事物紛擾之時，常如夜氣一般，就是通乎昼夜之道而知』．」（頁１１１；陳榮捷§２６８）
6 去除私欲的法門：
6.1 以良知控制異氣
6.1.1 不是要除掉異氣，而是要不受異氣影響
6.1.2 「After all, what is important is not to live in separation from the alien qi, but to get nourishment from and yet not be controlled by it. Living in complete separation from the alien qi, we will of course not have any selfish desires, but then we will have nowhere to get nourishment from either.」[14]
6.2 立志
6.2.1 問志至氣次：先生日：「『志之所至，氣亦至焉』之謂，非極至次貳之謂．持其志則養氣在其中，無暴其氣則亦持其志矣．孟子救告子之偏，故如此夾持說．」（頁２４）
6.2.2 「The will is the commander over qi, the life of a person, the root of a tree, and the source of water. When the source is blocked, water will cease to flow; when the root is not planted, a tree will wither; when the life is not continued, a person will die, and when the will is not established, the qi will make one lose consciousness…. Therefore, as soon as a slight selfish desire arises, immediately blame the non-establishment of the will and then private desires will recede; as soon as a slight alien qi is heard moving, immediately blame the non-establishment of the will and the alien qi will be gone.」（頁８９１）
7 對良知學說的可能反對：
7.1 良知學說其實包括了兩個對人性的形上學假設
7.1.1 普遍性原則：「…the strongest support for the theory of innate knowledge is that such knowledge is universally held.」[15]
7.1.2 內在原則：望文生義地，我們一般也把良知翻譯成「innate knowledge」．
7.2 John Locke式的反對：
7.2.1 普遍性與內在性的不必然：
7.2.1.1 我們就算同意「良知」是普遍的人性，也不能夠因此推出「良知」是內在的：「however, even if universal consensus indeed exists on such matters, it cannot be directly counted as a proof for their being innate, 「…if there can be any other way shown, how men may come to that universal agreement in the things they do consent in, which I presume may be done.」」[16]
7.2.2 由經驗觀察上証明不了良知是普遍的．例如：社會有打老豆；推老母落街；擲小孩落樓；兄弟不和．
7.3 Lockean的追擊：
7.3.1 「…by this they [innate ideas] are not distinguishable from other knowable truths.」[17]
7.4 Yong Huang的辯護：
7.4.1 所謂「內在」和「普遍」是一種形上學的預設，我們不應以經驗驗察作準．Richard Rorty：「…we can never know ourselves to have reached, and which we can never know we are closing in on rather than veering off from.」[18]
7.4.2 換句話說，Yong Huang贊成「良知學說」是一種道德理想，指導人應該住什麼方向走，才算得上是一個人．這形上學觀點為我們設定人是所以為人（human qua human）的界線．
8 知行合一
8.1 Huang認為「良知」是行德行必須要有的「Faith」．當我們行德時，便會反過來証明這個faith為真．
8.1.1 「One cannot have such a faith in human perfectibility unless one also believes in the original goodness of human heart/mind.」[19]
8.1.2 援引Nivison的觀點：「For to respond to the lesson the student must see it as a lesson to be learned; and if the student sees that, he or she is already moral.」
8.1.3 「So the object of moral belief is not something that exists prior to our action according to this belief; it is rather the effect of such an action. […] Now, in Wang’s view, if we have the belief or faith in the innate moral knowledge and act according to this faith, we will see this faith is true, for one will be a moral person.」[20]
8.2 但Nivison觀點似乎混淆是「道德觀念」（moral concept）、「德行」和「道德感」（moral sense）和之間的分別．一個可以學習道德觀念的人，當然需要有「道德感」．但有「道德感」和能夠學習「道德觀念」的人，卻不一定已經是一個有德行或道德的人．
8.2.1 例如，小明上德育課，他有能力學習為謂道德．他當要有道德感（有良知）．但這不代表，小明已經是一個有道德人．這是兩個不同層面的問題．
8.2.2 因為有德之人不等同性善之人．如Huang自己所說，良知和性善是一個形上理想．但現實上是否一個有德之人，還得看是否有德行．
8.3 再者，我們亦不能由德行去反証道德信念（如良知）為真．因為這混淆了因果關係．說「we will see this faith is true」是一種是不明確的說法．
8.4 就算引康德[21]也解釋不了，反而增加了乞題的嫌疑．因為康德的觀點是先假設了自由意志為可能．但這和Huang想証明的東西（道德行動証明良知或道德理想為真）沒有多大的關係．
9 「性」「才」之別
9.1 在這筆記中，不贅歸納．因為在很多的文章中，也有解王陽明的「金喻」．「金喻」不難理解．
10 體認
10.1 Yong Huang提到一點她還未處理的問題，頗值得我們留意．
10.2 她說在王陽明的哲學中，有一個「體認」的概念．她認為這概念等同於innate experience．究竟這個說法合理嗎？
10.3 體認（根據Huang）有以下特性：
10.3.1 第一，它不屬於智性的範疇（intellectual enterprise）．
10.3.2 第二，這是一種「自得」的狀態．「自得」是一種感到道德如悅的心理狀態．「The second is his idea of joy in acting according to one’s moral knowledge.」[22]
10.3.3 我認為，如果以「體認」去理解「如惡惡臭，如好好色」，或許可以比Cua[23]的心理類比更好．
[1] P393.8
[2] P396.8
[3] p395.7 or endnote 10
[4] p395.8
[5] P397.4
[6] P397.2
[7] P397.3
[8] P397.8; endnote 16
[9] P398.5
[10] P398.8
[11] P399.5
[12] P399.7
[13] P399.10
[14] P400.7
[15] P401.3
[16] P401.5
[17] P402.3; endnote 27
[18] P402.7; endnote 29
[19] P402.8
[20] P403.6
[21] P403.5
[22] P405.8
[23] A.S. Cua , The unity of knowledge and action : a study in Wang Yang-ming's moral psychology, (Honolulu : University Press of Hawaii), 1982
2007年8月14日星期二
The idea of life plan 筆記
The idea of life plan 筆記
1 主要目標：
1.1 論証一個理性的人生計劃（Rational Life Plan ）不能為人類定義出何為美滿人生（Good Life ）或善（Good）．
1.2 人沒有能力全面地把握和定義個人的善． [1]
2 歷史起源
2.1 蘇格拉底：The unexamined life is not worth living ． [2]
2.1.1 仿彿這是真理一樣．"The idea … may seem little better than truism "． [3]
2.2 拍拉圖：Er at the end of Plato's Republic ． [4]
2.3 亞里士多德：Book 1, ch.2, 1214b7-13 ． [5]
2.4 兩個Underlying assumptions:
2.4.1 我們把人生看待成單單只是同一個整體，而不是一種不斷的活動．"The most obvious among its key elements is the conviction that a life as a whole, and not simply this course of action or that trait of character, can become the object of ethical evaluation. [6]"
2.4.2 我們想以一種局外人的觀點去評鑑人生．"It is that in reflecting upon our life as a whole we are to look at it from the outside – timelessly, as it were. " [7]
3 Rawls 的觀點
3.1 Royce ："A person individual self, may be defined as a human life lived according to a plan. " [8]
3.2 Rawlsian principle ：事情對某君而言，是否美善，須藉人生計劃來定義的．Larmore 認為，這是一個嚴重的錯誤："In my view, the fatal assumption is precisely the idea that what is good for a person must hinge on his purposes. " [9]
3.2.1 "A thing's being a good X for K is treated as equivalent to its having the properties which it is rational for K to want in an X in view of his interests and aims." [10] （某事物（Ｘ）對某人（Ｋ）是美好的，意思等如說：某人（Ｋ）把某事物（Ｘ）看待成與他有關的利益和目標，並且該事物（Ｘ）帶有（Ｋ）可以合乎理性地欲求這些性質。 ）
4 Larmore的反對
4.1 困難一：Rawls 似乎推得太快．他直接把Royce的觀點"人須要藉 Life Plan去了解自我"變成他的觀點"人的美善亦須要藉 Life Plan來定義"
4.1.1 "Our self-understanding may indeed find expression in our aims. But rooted as it is in our past experience, does it not also involve the memory of things which have fortunate happened to us despite our goals at the time? … Rawls, however, seems to believe that if our self-conception is defined by our purposes, our individual good is so defined as well. " [11]
4.2 困難二：Life Plan 是須是被構成的，Rawls 的觀點不能說明Life Plan的基礎．
4.2.1 "… the life plan which determines a person's good depends on purposes he can formulate at the time of the plan's conception. Thus, there is an essential reference to the present in the reasoning by which life plans are to be constructed. " [12]很明顯，人生計劃是一種後起的計劃，我們必須先有人生，才有根據個別的人生來制定計劃．
4.3 困難三：一種對任何事情保持最開放，以使們有可能達致美好人生的態度，根本就是一種嘗試以局外人（抽空了時空考慮）的身份來鑑定人生的態度．這無助於我們藉人生計劃去定義美善．因為人的一生中，可以包括多於一個自我．
4.3.1 "According to Rawls, we are to give full consideration to all of our possibilities and to look to our future good as a whole. That means that we are not to determine the nature of our good by appealing simply to our commitments at the time, for they too must be pondered and weighed. " [13]
4.3.2 "No life plan is rational if it resorts to "pure time-preference." It may not accord greater weight to interests we have at one time – and, in particular, to the interests we have at present – than to those we would have at another, simply because of their difference in time. On the contrary, the preference given to some interests over others must reflect the belief that they contribute more to our good as a whole. " [14]
4.4 就算我們能夠回避自責自己不夠明智，也不能回避自責自己把明智放於過高的位置．
4.4.1 "In retrospect we may wish that, instead of weighing our options judiciously we had acted impulsively, letting ourselves be carried away by the passions of the moment, since then a good would have been ours whose value we only for as a matter of fact no single value is supreme. This sort of pluralism, I would say, is the very essence of my view. And it provides for on clear sense in which the prudent person cannot be certain to escape self-reproach. "（粗體為筆者所加．） [15]
5 兩種Good
5.1 Anticipated good ：一種藉理性計劃去定義的善
5.1.1 For if goodness is understood along these lines, a thing will not count as truly good unless the grounds on which the person determines what he should want can themselves be certified as rational. [16]
5.2 Unexpected good ：一種非藉計劃去定義的善
6 其他反對
6.1 Larmore 認為以下的反對都不是最有力的攻擊．
6.1.1 "Rawls has lost touch with the natural rhythm of human finitude. " [17]
6.1.1.1 人是有限的存有：只擁有有限的時間；有限的金錢；有限的生命；有限智慧云云．
6.1.1.2 幼年時期，我們根本不需要有計劃．
6.1.2 但這個反對不一定與Rawls的觀點有衝突．
6.1.2.1 "It rightly observes that a life plan has no proper role to play in the goods of childhood. But it says nothing to challenge the assumption that mature persons should bring their lives under the rule of a ration plan. " [18]
6.2 "… deliberative rationality looks beyond the present. " [19]
6.2.1 Bernard William 式的反對：
6.2.1.1 "deliberation is always situated, dependent upon the beliefs and interests which are ours at the time. " [20]
6.2.1.2 "The perspective of deliberative choice on one's life is constitutively from here. " [21]
6.2.1.3 William 嘗試區分practical和 theoretical理性，但 Larmore認為：" The only difference I discern between theoretical and practival reason involves simply their subject matter: the one governs what we are to believe, the other what we are to do. " [22]
6.2.2 Larmore 認為，這種想法，並不能如他的反對那麼强．因為這只能說是怪責我們不夠明智，而不是批判明智本身．
7 釐清
7.1 Larmore 小心地釐清，他不是反對一個Rational Life 的重要性；他只是反對Rawlsian principle ：個人的善可以完全地藉人生計劃來定義． [23]
7.2 人生可以因為某些unexpected good 而改變，我們的人生計劃也是如此．
7.2.1 例如：根據盧傑雄本來的計劃，他本來是想成為一個哲學家的．但在一次機緣巧合下，他得到了一次買賣股票的機會．本來，根據他的計劃下（配以全面的deliberative rationality ），炒股本應不是一種Good．但經歷了這次經驗之後，他發現了成為股神才能使他有一個美滿人生．
7.2.2 "In this case, the good is not being judged by reference to his purposes; rather, his purposes are justified by appeal to something he understands to have been good for him. " [24]
7.3 為何我們會把明智誤以為是最高德性：
7.3.1 因為這可以在心理上減少面對未知時數的不安．"To make our life the object of a plan, however well-informed and carefully arranged the plan might be, means closing our minds to the lessons future experience will impart. " [25]
7.3.1.1 但同時，這想法令驚喜和機遇也拒絕．
8 問題
8.1 當我們自責我們錯誤地把明智當作是最高的德性和誤以為人生計劃可以定義個人善時，我們究竟是以那種標準作出此自責？
8.2 責備自己不夠明智和責備自己把明智放得太多，並不是同一種"責備"．後一種責備，真的能夠成立嗎？當unexpected good or bad 是真是如此unexpected．
這句實在感動．
The good life outruns the reach of planning is the beginning of wisdom, for it is to understand why wisdom is something more than prudence.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] P103.7
[2] P100.3
[3] P100.4
[4] P101.3; and footnote 9
[5] Footnote 10
[6] P100.5
[7] P100.7
[8] P102.10 – 103.1
[9] P109.8
[10] TJ.p523
[11] P103.4
[12] P104.4
[13] P104.7
[14] P104.10 – 105.1
[15] P108.5 – 108.7
[16] P104.2
[17] P105.6
[18] P106.6 – 106.7
[19] P106.7
[20] P107.1
[21] Footnote 25
[22] P108.3
[23] P110.5
[24] P110.10
[25] P112.4
1 主要目標：
1.1 論証一個理性的人生計劃（Rational Life Plan ）不能為人類定義出何為美滿人生（Good Life ）或善（Good）．
1.2 人沒有能力全面地把握和定義個人的善． [1]
2 歷史起源
2.1 蘇格拉底：The unexamined life is not worth living ． [2]
2.1.1 仿彿這是真理一樣．"The idea … may seem little better than truism "． [3]
2.2 拍拉圖：Er at the end of Plato's Republic ． [4]
2.3 亞里士多德：Book 1, ch.2, 1214b7-13 ． [5]
2.4 兩個Underlying assumptions:
2.4.1 我們把人生看待成單單只是同一個整體，而不是一種不斷的活動．"The most obvious among its key elements is the conviction that a life as a whole, and not simply this course of action or that trait of character, can become the object of ethical evaluation. [6]"
2.4.2 我們想以一種局外人的觀點去評鑑人生．"It is that in reflecting upon our life as a whole we are to look at it from the outside – timelessly, as it were. " [7]
3 Rawls 的觀點
3.1 Royce ："A person individual self, may be defined as a human life lived according to a plan. " [8]
3.2 Rawlsian principle ：事情對某君而言，是否美善，須藉人生計劃來定義的．Larmore 認為，這是一個嚴重的錯誤："In my view, the fatal assumption is precisely the idea that what is good for a person must hinge on his purposes. " [9]
3.2.1 "A thing's being a good X for K is treated as equivalent to its having the properties which it is rational for K to want in an X in view of his interests and aims." [10] （某事物（Ｘ）對某人（Ｋ）是美好的，意思等如說：某人（Ｋ）把某事物（Ｘ）看待成與他有關的利益和目標，並且該事物（Ｘ）帶有（Ｋ）可以合乎理性地欲求這些性質。 ）
4 Larmore的反對
4.1 困難一：Rawls 似乎推得太快．他直接把Royce的觀點"人須要藉 Life Plan去了解自我"變成他的觀點"人的美善亦須要藉 Life Plan來定義"
4.1.1 "Our self-understanding may indeed find expression in our aims. But rooted as it is in our past experience, does it not also involve the memory of things which have fortunate happened to us despite our goals at the time? … Rawls, however, seems to believe that if our self-conception is defined by our purposes, our individual good is so defined as well. " [11]
4.2 困難二：Life Plan 是須是被構成的，Rawls 的觀點不能說明Life Plan的基礎．
4.2.1 "… the life plan which determines a person's good depends on purposes he can formulate at the time of the plan's conception. Thus, there is an essential reference to the present in the reasoning by which life plans are to be constructed. " [12]很明顯，人生計劃是一種後起的計劃，我們必須先有人生，才有根據個別的人生來制定計劃．
4.3 困難三：一種對任何事情保持最開放，以使們有可能達致美好人生的態度，根本就是一種嘗試以局外人（抽空了時空考慮）的身份來鑑定人生的態度．這無助於我們藉人生計劃去定義美善．因為人的一生中，可以包括多於一個自我．
4.3.1 "According to Rawls, we are to give full consideration to all of our possibilities and to look to our future good as a whole. That means that we are not to determine the nature of our good by appealing simply to our commitments at the time, for they too must be pondered and weighed. " [13]
4.3.2 "No life plan is rational if it resorts to "pure time-preference." It may not accord greater weight to interests we have at one time – and, in particular, to the interests we have at present – than to those we would have at another, simply because of their difference in time. On the contrary, the preference given to some interests over others must reflect the belief that they contribute more to our good as a whole. " [14]
4.4 就算我們能夠回避自責自己不夠明智，也不能回避自責自己把明智放於過高的位置．
4.4.1 "In retrospect we may wish that, instead of weighing our options judiciously we had acted impulsively, letting ourselves be carried away by the passions of the moment, since then a good would have been ours whose value we only for as a matter of fact no single value is supreme. This sort of pluralism, I would say, is the very essence of my view. And it provides for on clear sense in which the prudent person cannot be certain to escape self-reproach. "（粗體為筆者所加．） [15]
5 兩種Good
5.1 Anticipated good ：一種藉理性計劃去定義的善
5.1.1 For if goodness is understood along these lines, a thing will not count as truly good unless the grounds on which the person determines what he should want can themselves be certified as rational. [16]
5.2 Unexpected good ：一種非藉計劃去定義的善
6 其他反對
6.1 Larmore 認為以下的反對都不是最有力的攻擊．
6.1.1 "Rawls has lost touch with the natural rhythm of human finitude. " [17]
6.1.1.1 人是有限的存有：只擁有有限的時間；有限的金錢；有限的生命；有限智慧云云．
6.1.1.2 幼年時期，我們根本不需要有計劃．
6.1.2 但這個反對不一定與Rawls的觀點有衝突．
6.1.2.1 "It rightly observes that a life plan has no proper role to play in the goods of childhood. But it says nothing to challenge the assumption that mature persons should bring their lives under the rule of a ration plan. " [18]
6.2 "… deliberative rationality looks beyond the present. " [19]
6.2.1 Bernard William 式的反對：
6.2.1.1 "deliberation is always situated, dependent upon the beliefs and interests which are ours at the time. " [20]
6.2.1.2 "The perspective of deliberative choice on one's life is constitutively from here. " [21]
6.2.1.3 William 嘗試區分practical和 theoretical理性，但 Larmore認為：" The only difference I discern between theoretical and practival reason involves simply their subject matter: the one governs what we are to believe, the other what we are to do. " [22]
6.2.2 Larmore 認為，這種想法，並不能如他的反對那麼强．因為這只能說是怪責我們不夠明智，而不是批判明智本身．
7 釐清
7.1 Larmore 小心地釐清，他不是反對一個Rational Life 的重要性；他只是反對Rawlsian principle ：個人的善可以完全地藉人生計劃來定義． [23]
7.2 人生可以因為某些unexpected good 而改變，我們的人生計劃也是如此．
7.2.1 例如：根據盧傑雄本來的計劃，他本來是想成為一個哲學家的．但在一次機緣巧合下，他得到了一次買賣股票的機會．本來，根據他的計劃下（配以全面的deliberative rationality ），炒股本應不是一種Good．但經歷了這次經驗之後，他發現了成為股神才能使他有一個美滿人生．
7.2.2 "In this case, the good is not being judged by reference to his purposes; rather, his purposes are justified by appeal to something he understands to have been good for him. " [24]
7.3 為何我們會把明智誤以為是最高德性：
7.3.1 因為這可以在心理上減少面對未知時數的不安．"To make our life the object of a plan, however well-informed and carefully arranged the plan might be, means closing our minds to the lessons future experience will impart. " [25]
7.3.1.1 但同時，這想法令驚喜和機遇也拒絕．
8 問題
8.1 當我們自責我們錯誤地把明智當作是最高的德性和誤以為人生計劃可以定義個人善時，我們究竟是以那種標準作出此自責？
8.2 責備自己不夠明智和責備自己把明智放得太多，並不是同一種"責備"．後一種責備，真的能夠成立嗎？當unexpected good or bad 是真是如此unexpected．
這句實在感動．
The good life outruns the reach of planning is the beginning of wisdom, for it is to understand why wisdom is something more than prudence.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] P103.7
[2] P100.3
[3] P100.4
[4] P101.3; and footnote 9
[5] Footnote 10
[6] P100.5
[7] P100.7
[8] P102.10 – 103.1
[9] P109.8
[10] TJ.p523
[11] P103.4
[12] P104.4
[13] P104.7
[14] P104.10 – 105.1
[15] P108.5 – 108.7
[16] P104.2
[17] P105.6
[18] P106.6 – 106.7
[19] P106.7
[20] P107.1
[21] Footnote 25
[22] P108.3
[23] P110.5
[24] P110.10
[25] P112.4
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