Susan Wolf, “The importance of free will”筆記
1 主要目標：
1.1 論証一個行動者需要負責的道德行為不一定須要建基於自由意志之成立．
1.1.1 I shall argue that the justification of these practices need not rest on the assumption that we do have free will, and that the conclusion that we don’t have free will gives us no reason at all to abandon these practices..[1]
1.2 道德責任的根據是行動者對其行動的態度．
1.2.1 I shall argue that these attitudes, too, are safe from the threat of being undermined by reason and metaphysics.[2]
1.3 解釋兩種對自由意志與人類行為的態度：樂觀者與悲觀者．[3]
1.4 論証我們可以接受一個consequentialist的態度，解釋道德贊賞和責備．
1.4.1 I take it that this forward-looking, consequentialist type of justification of the practices of overt moral praise and blame is a good one, and therefore I take it that the intelligent pessimist will think it a good one as well. [4]
1.4.2 …even if this (the truth of determinism) implies that as matter of metaphysical fact we are not free and responsible beings, this give us no reason at all to regard ourselves as unfree, unresponsible beings.[5]
1.5 論証以對行動者的態度代替“自由意志”作為責任的根據．
1.6 我們依然可以為“人類的行動是命定的”這種觀點感到難過．一個到命定論悲觀的人，並不需放棄他的悲觀的態度，相反，他只需要放棄他的理論．
1.6.1 I shall finally attempt to express what I take to be the appropriate focus of these feelings.[6]
1.6.2 …the pessimist is likely to withdraw not his fear of determinism, but only his account of it.[7]
2 為何我們害怕命題論：
2.1 悲觀者的態度和前設：
2.1.1 前設：
2.1.1.1 自由意志是否存在，是根據特有何種形以上學觀點．
2.1.1.1.1 …, first that whether or not we have free will depends on which metaphysical hypotheses are true, …[8]
2.1.1.1.2 第一：…determinism is both incompatible with free will and very likely true.[9]（Wolf認為她是第一種悲觀者．）
2.1.1.1.3 第二：…indeterminism is both incompatible with free will and, at least, very possibly true.[10]
2.1.1.2 而且，這些否定自由意志或與自由意志不容相的理論，似乎是正確的．
2.1.1.2.1 …, second, that it is not unlikely that the wrong metaphysical hypotheses are true.[11]
2.1.2 總的來說，悲傷者不願意接受人是沒有自由意志的生命體．他們不願接受這點，因為他們認為喪失自由意志需要面對沉重的代價──人類再不是可以負責的行動者，而道德行為亦會喪失其形上學的根據．
2.2 一：
2.3 因為我們害怕以下的可能性：倘若人類對自己是缺乏自由意志的，我們將喪失為我們的行為負責任的基礎．
2.3.1 Of the practices they feel to be potentially undermined by the absence of free will, those associated with attributions of moral responsibility are most often cited.[12]
2.4 二：
2.5 而且，道德贊賞和責備也是成為缺乏理據的活動．
2.5.1 …the practices of praising and blaming people, punishing and rewarding them on the basis of the moral quality of their actions would be irrational, inappropriate, and unjustifiable if the thesis of determinism were true.[13]
2.6 換句話言，我們將喪失過去行動者之所以為行動者的自決能力．
2.7 三：
2.8 我們亦會喪失對他人作出“reactive attitudes”的理據．相反我們只能對他人，甚至於自己，作出“objective attitude”．
2.8.1 Wolf沒有清楚地定義何謂reactive attitudes．不過，大致上reactive attitudes是一種不把人當作機械的態度．認為人是有感情的，而且亦自覺到自我的價值．在她的想法中，這包括了：admiration and indignation, pride, shame, respect, contempt, gratitude, resentment等．[14]
2.8.1.1 Reactive attitudes的重要性
2.8.1.2 Reactive attitudes與大部份有價值的人類情感有關．要是我們喪失了reactive attitudes我們可能會遇到以下的處境．
2.8.1.3 所有贊賞和責備皆是不可以理喻的．
2.8.1.4 親情，友情及愛情皆變成了沒有價值的東西．
2.8.1.5 總之，似乎一切令人之所為人的尊嚴也會消散．
2.8.2 所以，生活在一個缺乏Reactive attitudes的世界，似乎是蕭瑟的和貧瘠的．[15]
2.8.3 與之相反，則是objective attitude，一般而言，是對待死物或動物的態度．[16]
3 樂觀者的辯護：
3.1 我們可以把贊賞和責備看待成生物賞罰機制，即一種生物學上的回饋機制．“贊賞”和“責備”依然可以有效力，因為它們依舊可以提升人的道德質素（moral quality）．“We already know that we can improve the moral quality of actions by maintaining institutions of reward that provide incentives.”[17]
3.1.1 We should praise or blame an individual, they may argue, if and only if by doing so we shall improve the moral quality of actions in the future.[18]
3.2 就算我們知道人類是被命定的機械，我們在心理上也不能作出多大的轉變，我們會繼續往常的生活．
3.2.1 …the optimist once again has a ready reply. One thing he can point out is that even if the truth of determinism would give us some reason to regard ourselves differently, we would be psychologically incapable of changing our attitudes in the appropriate way.[19]
3.3 由於要接受一種無情的世界觀，代價實在太多．所以，我們可以合理地自我欺騙，繼續往常的生活態度．生活上，我們可以接納unjustified attitudes．
3.3.1 Another is that even if the truth of determinism would give us some reason to regard ourselves differently, we would have an overriding reason to keep the attitudes we currently hold.[20]
3.3.2 …the pessimist might accept the optimist’s argument – but he will accept it with despair.[21]
3.3.3 …I think that it may be rational to choose not ‘to be more purely rational that we are.’ It may be rational for a man to choose not to face the fact that he has a terminal illness or for a woman to try to avoid discovering that her husband is having an affair. In the costs would be high enough, it may be rational to override the reason for a course of action that is given by the acknowledgment that only that course of action would constitute living in accordance with the facts.[22]
3.3.4 換句話說，我們可以有理性的自我欺騙．
3.4 但如果optimist只是一味說，為被免更重大的損失，我們有理由去蓋過（或漠視）事實，以一種自欺的態度生活．Susan Wolf認為，這就等如叫人滿足於“揀一個無咁臭的屎坑坐．”However, in so far as the optimist’s justification takes the form of providing reasons that override other reasons, the justification can be only as satisfying as the acceptance of the lesser of two evils can be.[23]（粗體為筆者所加．）
3.5 如果想解決這個問題，我們就有必要先理解為何就算事實上我們是命定的，也不會亦影響我們的想法：認為人類應該為自的行為負責任和我們是自由的個體．
3.5.1.1 …even if this (the truth of determinism) implies that as matter of metaphysical fact we are not free and responsible beings, this give us no reason at all to regard ourselves as unfree, unresponsible beings. […] If we have no reason at all to abandon these (reactive) attitudes, then we have nothing we need to override, no value we need to contradict in choosing to keep these attitudes. Our retention of the reactive attitudes need not be viewed as a choice between the lesser of two evils.[24]
4 就算我們是喪失自由意志，亦可以談“責任”．
4.1 以對行動者的對其行動的態度來代替“自由意志”作為責任的根據．
4.1.1 …attitude…give us a reason (perhaps the reason)… to decide whether we ought to regard him as responsible for taking the drug.[25]
4.2 道友例子：
4.2.1 假設有一個因為惹上了毒癮的道友；
4.2.2 假設他是一個日常生活中見到的理性人．
4.2.3 因為這個道友的行為是不自由的，所以不論他如何以為自己選擇，他最終都會吸毒．[26]
4.2.4 我們會認為他的責任來源於他對他吸毒的行為有多認同．
4.2.4.1 …the degree to which we hold this individual responsible for his drug-taking actions will vary in proportion to the degree to which we think he approves of – or, at least, doesn’t disapprove of – the fact that he takes these actions.[27]
4.2.5 換句話說，只要道友對承認他的第二序意欲是認同吸毒的行為，我們便可能合理地把吸毒看待成他的自願行為．於是他便要因為這自願行為而負責任．
4.2.5.1 [(D pref ~D) pref (~D pref D)]
4.2.5.2 He is affirming the fact that his efforts to obtain and to take the drug are his actions, that they effect and contribute to his character and his life in a way that may fairly enter into an assessment of what kind of person he is.[28]
4.2.5.3 …the addict’s responsibility for his actions turns on the truth or falsity of an independent claim: namely, that whether or not the addict is compelled to take the drug, he will take the drug because he chooses to do so. The addict, then, in taking an attitude toward his unfree actions, can thereby claim or disclaim responsibility for them.[29]
4.2.6 相反：
4.2.6.1 假如道友的第二序欲望並不意欲去吸毒；
4.2.6.2 [(~D pref D) pref (D pref ~D)]
4.2.6.3 我們便不怪責他吸毒，因為這是他不願意的．而他亦帶有不意願的態度．
4.3 但是神奇在，Susan Wolf竟然補多一句：“倘若我們相信道友對吸毒的接受程度的態度已經被毒品影響決定，那麼我們便沒有理由將他的態度看待成負責的理據．”（If we believed that the addict’s approval or disapproval of his actions were itself determined by the influence of the dug, we would not regard his attitude as giving us a reason by which to establish ours.）[30]
4.3.1 這豈不是偷偷地把“自由意志”的觀點混入了第二序望欲之中？她似乎假設了第二序欲望是有可能不受命定論限制．但何以見得是如此？
4.3.2 她寫：The fact that we take the addict’s own attitudes to his drug-taking actions seriously – that is, the fact that his attitudes count as a reason for us to hold him more or less responsible for these actions – rests on our belief that the addict, qua attitude-taker, is a free and responsible being.[31]（粗體為筆者所加．）
4.3.3 當中的“is a free and responsible being”似乎有前後予盾之嫌．除非之前的“our belief”是指“主觀信仰”，而非“客觀信念”，要不然之後的“free”似乎是與她的態度理論不一致的．
4.3.4 我懷疑Wolf也際覺到自己的問題，所以她斜體化了“is”，以代表這個“is”並不是邏輯同位句：“The agent is free.”（他是自由的行動者；句子ａ）而是明喻：“The agent is free.”（他是自由的行動者；句子ｂ）．句子ｂ的句式與“太陽是朵大紅花”這明喻沒有分別．
5 Bicentennial Man[32]
5.1.1 Wolf想証明“待人以reactive attitude”是與“對方是free agent”沒有直接關係的．
5.1.2 設想我們的科技可以制造一個如人一樣的機械人．
5.1.3 它亦有第二序欲望．[33]
5.1.4 但他最終也是一個沒有自由意志的個體，它的個性，價值觀，以及行動，都不由自主．[34]
5.1.5 最悲觀的處境是，我們會以objective attitude對待它．[35]
5.1.6 但因為它實在太似人，所以我們在心理上，將會越來越困難純粹以objective attitude對待它．
5.1.6.1 The robot is programmed (along with all its implications) may make it psychologically impossible for us to take the objective attitude towards him consistently.[36]
5.1.7 例如：人類會讓步，在人常生活上，待它與人無異，但不會容許女兒嫁給Bicentennial Man．[37]
5.1.8 在這個真實得出奇的假想例子中，Wolf嘗試提出，Bicentennial Man可以以objective attitude對待自己．原因不是因為這可以與現實脗合，而是因為以這態度可以減少他的苦惱．
5.1.8.1 …we are not arguing for the adoption of this attitude simply on the ground that the attitude is appropriate. That is, we are not arguing that the robot should take this (objective) attitude simply because of his (and our) value in living in accordance with facts. … rather, utilitarian ones: his life will be less painful if he takes the objective attitude toward himself.[38]
5.1.9 與之前的道友作比較．Bicentennial Man的一切決定，都是因為它的程式．連它所擁有的第二序欲望也是來自設計者的程式．所以，就算它接受自己的行動──帶有一個第二序欲望──我們亦只能把它看待成連第二序欲望也被限制，它不應為它的行為負責．
5.1.9.1 He (the robot) is in a position analogous to that of the addict whose attitude toward his addiction is itself determined by the influence of the drug. Thus the robot’s own attitude toward himself cannot have any weight for us. If the robot, as a matter of metaphysical fact, is an unfree, unresponsible being, then his acceptance of this fact gives us no extra reason to regard him as such.[39]
5.2 哪麼我們真的有必要，亦只能純粹以objective attitude生活嗎？
5.2.1 Wolf認為：不．
5.2.2 因為objective attitude也是一種attitude，它亦不合乎會與形上事實．形上事實本身是沒有attitude的．
5.2.2.1 不論我們接受何種生活態度，我們都必先得假設我們如一個自由和承責的個體．
5.2.2.1.1 In taking any attitude toward ourselves, including the attitude that we are not fee or responsible beings, we would be asserting ourselves as free and responsible beings.[40]
5.2.2.1.2 For the only way we cold give up taking either the attitudes that regard others as responsible for their actions or the attitude that regards others as not responsible for their actions would be by giving up thinking in terms of the notions of responsibility and desert at all.[41]
5.2.2.2 人類是一種有態度的生物，不論我們特有悲觀或樂觀的態度，我們就是不能放棄有態度．
5.2.3 Wolf認為，選擇生活態度（reactive 或 objective）其實是形上事實沒有關聯的．就算我們選擇“乎合形上事實地生活”這態度的証誠來源，也不是來自形上事實本身．相反，是來自我們的心理需要．
5.2.3.1 That is, even if determinism gave us some reason to give up all our attitudes, we would be psychologically incapable of meeting this demand. And even if determinism gave us some reason to give up our attitudes, we would have overriding reason to retain them.[42]
6 為什麼我們總是想乎合現實地生活？
6.1 Wolf認為這與我們想求真愛有關．
6.1.1 This desire shows up in more realistic situations when we consider how important it is to us that we not only feel ourselves to be loved, but that we truly be loved, or when we see how important it is to us that our efforts to achieve something in the world have succeeded, but that they really have succeeded.[43]
6.2 我們亦害怕我們只是快樂機關的大腦．
6.2.1 …people shudder at the thought of passing their days hooked up to a pleasure machine.[44]
6.3 第一：倘若我們放棄乎合現實地生活，我們似乎是放棄了想“正確地”生活這理想．
6.3.1 …living in accordance with the fact that we are not free and responsible beings would require us to five up our value in being right.[45]
6.4 第二：生活與真實一致，會使我們感到自我的重要性．
6.4.1 …because we want ourselves to matter in the right sort of way, to make the right sort of difference to the world and the beings who do mater and to whom we might matter.[46]
6.4.1.1 Wolf認為，或許，如果我們發現自己是一個受控的木偶，被上帝（或乜都好）玩弄於鼓掌之中，我們其實是有理由自殺的．因為你發現了一切你所重視的和一切重視你的，都與你沒有絲毫關係．
6.4.1.1.1 It might be rational for the robot to commit a kind of suicide of self as a result of the realization that he is … a robot. For …the realization that you cannot, and/or rationally ought not, matter to the people or to the world that matters to you – indeed, to the people or to the world that matter independently of you – might give you a reason to commit suicide.[47]（粗體為筆者所加．）
6.4.1.2 但發現世界是命定的，則能構成自殺的理由．因為：If this world matters, then it would be irrational to destroy it. And if this world does not matter, then it certainly doesn’t matter that we do or do not choose to destroy it.[48]
7 筆者認為：
7.1 似乎Wolf只是一個悲觀版的Charles Taylor．如果換了樂觀的Charles Taylor，他則會說這種心種的需要，並不是一種心理的無能（incapable），相反是一種心理的創造力，有能力把因果決定的冷冰世界，描述和看待成一個有愛和關心的世界．
7.2 哈！或許我們真由Wolf的字眼中得知我們的無能．例如在自殺一例中，她也要在“自殺”之前加上“a kind of”．要用“a kind of”是因為要“自殺”之為可能，我們亦要先有我們是一個行動者的態度．所謂木偶或機械人會自殺，其實是non-sense的．因為，倘若那個機械人真的絕對被命令的，半分不由他自主．他的所謂“自殺”或“保命”，也只是根據指令的必然結果．
[1] P386.4
[2] P387.3
[3] P386.8 – 387.1
[4] P388.7
[5] P394.1
[6] P387. 3
[7] P388.9
[8] P387.4
[9] P387.5
[10] P387.6
[11] P387.5
[12] P388.2
[13] P388.3
[14] P390.4
[15] P392.2
[16] P390.5
[17] P.388.7
[18] P388.5
[19] P392.3
[20] P392.4
[21] P392.5
[22] P393.4
[23] P392.7
[24] P394.1 – 394.2
[25] P394.9
[26] P394.10 – 395.1
[27] P394.5
[28] P394.7
[29] P395.2
[30] P395.6; Wolf在p394.9有以下的一句：“establish ours – that is, it give us the means by which to decide whether we ought to regard him as responsible for taking the drug.”
[31] P395.5
[32] 筆者認為，在這個例子上，我們可以幻想Wolf的Robot，就如電影Bicentennial Man
[33] P395.7
[34] P396.7
[35] P396.4
[36] P396.8
[37] P397.1
[38] P398.3
[39] P398.10 – 399.1
[40] P399.9
[41] P400.7
[42] P400.5
[43] P401.7
[44] P401.6
[45] P401.9
[46] P402.4
[47] P402.6
[48] P402.7
