The idea of life plan 筆記
1 主要目標：
1.1 論証一個理性的人生計劃（Rational Life Plan ）不能為人類定義出何為美滿人生（Good Life ）或善（Good）．
1.2 人沒有能力全面地把握和定義個人的善． [1]
2 歷史起源
2.1 蘇格拉底：The unexamined life is not worth living ． [2]
2.1.1 仿彿這是真理一樣．"The idea … may seem little better than truism "． [3]
2.2 拍拉圖：Er at the end of Plato's Republic ． [4]
2.3 亞里士多德：Book 1, ch.2, 1214b7-13 ． [5]
2.4 兩個Underlying assumptions:
2.4.1 我們把人生看待成單單只是同一個整體，而不是一種不斷的活動．"The most obvious among its key elements is the conviction that a life as a whole, and not simply this course of action or that trait of character, can become the object of ethical evaluation. [6]"
2.4.2 我們想以一種局外人的觀點去評鑑人生．"It is that in reflecting upon our life as a whole we are to look at it from the outside – timelessly, as it were. " [7]
3 Rawls 的觀點
3.1 Royce ："A person individual self, may be defined as a human life lived according to a plan. " [8]
3.2 Rawlsian principle ：事情對某君而言，是否美善，須藉人生計劃來定義的．Larmore 認為，這是一個嚴重的錯誤："In my view, the fatal assumption is precisely the idea that what is good for a person must hinge on his purposes. " [9]
3.2.1 "A thing's being a good X for K is treated as equivalent to its having the properties which it is rational for K to want in an X in view of his interests and aims." [10] （某事物（Ｘ）對某人（Ｋ）是美好的，意思等如說：某人（Ｋ）把某事物（Ｘ）看待成與他有關的利益和目標，並且該事物（Ｘ）帶有（Ｋ）可以合乎理性地欲求這些性質。 ）
4 Larmore的反對
4.1 困難一：Rawls 似乎推得太快．他直接把Royce的觀點"人須要藉 Life Plan去了解自我"變成他的觀點"人的美善亦須要藉 Life Plan來定義"
4.1.1 "Our self-understanding may indeed find expression in our aims. But rooted as it is in our past experience, does it not also involve the memory of things which have fortunate happened to us despite our goals at the time? … Rawls, however, seems to believe that if our self-conception is defined by our purposes, our individual good is so defined as well. " [11]
4.2 困難二：Life Plan 是須是被構成的，Rawls 的觀點不能說明Life Plan的基礎．
4.2.1 "… the life plan which determines a person's good depends on purposes he can formulate at the time of the plan's conception. Thus, there is an essential reference to the present in the reasoning by which life plans are to be constructed. " [12]很明顯，人生計劃是一種後起的計劃，我們必須先有人生，才有根據個別的人生來制定計劃．
4.3 困難三：一種對任何事情保持最開放，以使們有可能達致美好人生的態度，根本就是一種嘗試以局外人（抽空了時空考慮）的身份來鑑定人生的態度．這無助於我們藉人生計劃去定義美善．因為人的一生中，可以包括多於一個自我．
4.3.1 "According to Rawls, we are to give full consideration to all of our possibilities and to look to our future good as a whole. That means that we are not to determine the nature of our good by appealing simply to our commitments at the time, for they too must be pondered and weighed. " [13]
4.3.2 "No life plan is rational if it resorts to "pure time-preference." It may not accord greater weight to interests we have at one time – and, in particular, to the interests we have at present – than to those we would have at another, simply because of their difference in time. On the contrary, the preference given to some interests over others must reflect the belief that they contribute more to our good as a whole. " [14]
4.4 就算我們能夠回避自責自己不夠明智，也不能回避自責自己把明智放於過高的位置．
4.4.1 "In retrospect we may wish that, instead of weighing our options judiciously we had acted impulsively, letting ourselves be carried away by the passions of the moment, since then a good would have been ours whose value we only for as a matter of fact no single value is supreme. This sort of pluralism, I would say, is the very essence of my view. And it provides for on clear sense in which the prudent person cannot be certain to escape self-reproach. "（粗體為筆者所加．） [15]
5 兩種Good
5.1 Anticipated good ：一種藉理性計劃去定義的善
5.1.1 For if goodness is understood along these lines, a thing will not count as truly good unless the grounds on which the person determines what he should want can themselves be certified as rational. [16]
5.2 Unexpected good ：一種非藉計劃去定義的善
6 其他反對
6.1 Larmore 認為以下的反對都不是最有力的攻擊．
6.1.1 "Rawls has lost touch with the natural rhythm of human finitude. " [17]
6.1.1.1 人是有限的存有：只擁有有限的時間；有限的金錢；有限的生命；有限智慧云云．
6.1.1.2 幼年時期，我們根本不需要有計劃．
6.1.2 但這個反對不一定與Rawls的觀點有衝突．
6.1.2.1 "It rightly observes that a life plan has no proper role to play in the goods of childhood. But it says nothing to challenge the assumption that mature persons should bring their lives under the rule of a ration plan. " [18]
6.2 "… deliberative rationality looks beyond the present. " [19]
6.2.1 Bernard William 式的反對：
6.2.1.1 "deliberation is always situated, dependent upon the beliefs and interests which are ours at the time. " [20]
6.2.1.2 "The perspective of deliberative choice on one's life is constitutively from here. " [21]
6.2.1.3 William 嘗試區分practical和 theoretical理性，但 Larmore認為：" The only difference I discern between theoretical and practival reason involves simply their subject matter: the one governs what we are to believe, the other what we are to do. " [22]
6.2.2 Larmore 認為，這種想法，並不能如他的反對那麼强．因為這只能說是怪責我們不夠明智，而不是批判明智本身．
7 釐清
7.1 Larmore 小心地釐清，他不是反對一個Rational Life 的重要性；他只是反對Rawlsian principle ：個人的善可以完全地藉人生計劃來定義． [23]
7.2 人生可以因為某些unexpected good 而改變，我們的人生計劃也是如此．
7.2.1 例如：根據盧傑雄本來的計劃，他本來是想成為一個哲學家的．但在一次機緣巧合下，他得到了一次買賣股票的機會．本來，根據他的計劃下（配以全面的deliberative rationality ），炒股本應不是一種Good．但經歷了這次經驗之後，他發現了成為股神才能使他有一個美滿人生．
7.2.2 "In this case, the good is not being judged by reference to his purposes; rather, his purposes are justified by appeal to something he understands to have been good for him. " [24]
7.3 為何我們會把明智誤以為是最高德性：
7.3.1 因為這可以在心理上減少面對未知時數的不安．"To make our life the object of a plan, however well-informed and carefully arranged the plan might be, means closing our minds to the lessons future experience will impart. " [25]
7.3.1.1 但同時，這想法令驚喜和機遇也拒絕．
8 問題
8.1 當我們自責我們錯誤地把明智當作是最高的德性和誤以為人生計劃可以定義個人善時，我們究竟是以那種標準作出此自責？
8.2 責備自己不夠明智和責備自己把明智放得太多，並不是同一種"責備"．後一種責備，真的能夠成立嗎？當unexpected good or bad 是真是如此unexpected．
這句實在感動．
The good life outruns the reach of planning is the beginning of wisdom, for it is to understand why wisdom is something more than prudence.
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[1] P103.7
[2] P100.3
[3] P100.4
[4] P101.3; and footnote 9
[5] Footnote 10
[6] P100.5
[7] P100.7
[8] P102.10 – 103.1
[9] P109.8
[10] TJ.p523
[11] P103.4
[12] P104.4
[13] P104.7
[14] P104.10 – 105.1
[15] P108.5 – 108.7
[16] P104.2
[17] P105.6
[18] P106.6 – 106.7
[19] P106.7
[20] P107.1
[21] Footnote 25
[22] P108.3
[23] P110.5
[24] P110.10
[25] P112.4
