Wang Yangming on the Innate Moral Knowledge (Liangzhi)筆記
Yong Huang, "A Neo-Confucian conception of wisdom: Wang Yangming on the Innate Moral Knowledge (Liangzhi)", in Journal of Chinese Philosophy, vol33, no.3, pp.393 - 408,Sept., 2006
（頁ｘ）是指王陽明全集（紅旗出版社）中的頁數
（陳榮捷§ｘ）當然是指陳榮捷編譯的傳習錄中的節數）
1 目標：
1.1 「Examine Wang’s idea of Liangzhi as moral knowledge innate in everyone;」
1.2 「Analyze Wang’s view of distinction between sages and common people despite the fact that moral knowledge is innate in both;」
1.3 Huang主要想回答，於王陽明的哲學系統中，良知究竟有幾可信．這回答主要透過一條問題展現：「如果良知必然有能力且保証道德行為的發生，為什麼人類又會有惡行？」
1.3.1 「Explore the issue of the credibility of Wang’s conception of moral knowledge.」[1]
1.3.2 「In this view, to have moral knowledge and yet be unable to act morally is a self-contradiction, for knowledge and action are one and the same thing.」[2]
2 兩種「知」
2.1 良知
2.1.1 不學而能，不學而知．（盡心上）
2.1.2 「心之本體」（陳榮捷§８）
2.1.3 「不假外求」（陳榮捷§８）
2.1.4 「…naturally urge us to search for such knowledge.」
2.2 知識（見聞之知）
2.2.1 因應實際處境而應變的知識．
2.2.2 沒有獨立地位的．
2.2.2.1 勞思光（Lao Si-guang）「…Wangs says that nonmoral knowledge should not be sought after if it is not useful for moral knowledge and therefore does not have an independent role.」[3]
2.2.2.2 「…all non moral knowledge that we think we should pursue, including the sciences, medicine arts, history, and literature, is necessary for the moral knowledge to function.」[4]
2.2.3 如果缺乏良知的引導，見聞之知的增長，不一定是好事．因為見聞之知有可能只是令人更貪婪．
2.2.3.1 「後世不知作聖人本是純乎天理，却專去知識才能上求聖人．以為聖人無所不知，無所不能，我須是將聖人許多知識才能逐一理會始得．故不務去天理上着工夫，徒弊精竭力，從冊子上鑽研，名物上考索，形跡上比拟，知識愈廣而人欲愈滋，才力愈多，而天理愈蔽．」（頁２９；陳榮捷§９９）
2.2.4 （頁１１４）
3 「惡」又是什麼？
3.1 「惡」從何來？[5]
3.1.1 「惡」只是私欲．[6]
3.1.2 類比：如雲敝日；如塵蓋鏡．[7]
3.2 P J Ivanhoe：
3.2.1 氣之清濁：「qi naturally occurs in varying degrees of “coarseness” or “turbidity” and that the quality of the qi, which different people receive at birth.」[8]
3.2.2 「… the innate moral knowledge is originally transparent. Those whose physical qi (qizhi) is not excellent are not easily enlightened to it because of the large amount of dregs and heavy layer of obscuration. Those whose physical qi excellent have few dregs and little obscuration. Thus with a little effort to regain the sight of the innate moral knowledge, this innate moral knowledge becomes transparent to them.」（頁７０）
3.2.3 中譯：「良知本來自明．氣質不美者，渣滓多，障蔽厚，不易開明．質美者渣滓少，無多障蔽，略加致知之功，此良知便自瑩徹，．．．」
3.2.4 中譯：陳榮捷§１６４．
3.2.5 「… the physical qi (qizhi) is what both houses and obscuresn the human nature (xing). The physical qi varies and the human nature follows. Human nature is like a ball. It is bright when falling into a clear pool, becomes blurred when falling into turbid water, and becomes filthy if falling into filthy water. The wise people are in the clear pool, common people are in the turbid water, and stupid people below are in the filthy water.」（頁１０３５－３６）
3.2.6 中譯：「氣質者，性之所寓也，亦性之所由蔽也．氣質異而性隨之．譬之珠焉，墮於澄淵則明，墮於濁水則昏，墮於污穢則穢．澄淵，上智也；濁水，凡庶也；污穢，下愚也．」
3.3 氣是人的媒介，如果沒有氣，性也不能顯露．
3.3.1 「…the good human nature can only be seen from qi. Without qi, good human nature cannot be seen. Feelings of commiseration, shame and dislike, deference and compliance, and right and wrong are all qi」
3.3.2 「然性善之端須在氣上始見得，若無氣亦無可見矣．」（頁６３）
3.3.3 「… human nature is qi, and qi is human nature. Originally there is no distinction between human nature and qi.」（頁６３－６４）
3.3.4 中譯：「．．．氣即是性，性即是氣，原無性氣之可分也．」
3.3.5 二程：「… to talk about human nature without talking about qi is not complete, and to talk about qi without talking about human nature is not illuminating.」[9]
3.3.6 這解釋會使問題轉向了：惡如何和「氣」中生成？
3.3.7 為何性是善的，而氣則是惡的？
4 二氣說
4.1 有形之氣「qi constitutive of human beings as beings with shape (you xing).」[10]
4.1.1 人之所以為人之氣──主氣（host qi）．
4.1.2 這種氣是不能產生惡的．
4.2 客氣（ke qi）
4.2.1 又作「alien qi」（異氣）或「guest qi」（客氣）．
4.2.1.1 「性一而已，仁義禮智，性之『性』也；聰明睿知，性之質也；喜怒哀樂，性之『情』也；私欲客氣，性之『蔽』也．『質』有清濁，故」情有過不及，而『蔽』有淺深也．私欲客氣，一病兩痛．非二物也，張、黃、諸葛及韓、范諸公，皆天質之美，自多暗合道妙；雖未可盡謂之學，盡謂之聞道，然亦自其有學，違道不遠者也．使其聞學知道，即伊、傳、周、召矣．若文中子則又不可謂之不知學者，其書雖多出於其徒．
4.2.1.2 陳榮捷§１６５
4.2.2 但陽明其實沒有處理何為客氣，Yong Huang援引張載和朱熹的話
4.2.2.1 「… the principle of rightness (yili) and the alien qi conquer each other frequently. The distinction between superior persons (junzi) and inferior persons (xiaoren) is made according to the degree of the one being conquered by another. The more the principle of rightness gains the upper hand.. the more the alien qi is extinguished.」[11]
4.2.2.2 朱熹的「外氣」：「… is not mixed with external qi (wai qi), but absorbs nourishment from the external qi. Let us take the fish in water as an analogy. The life of fish is not caused by water. However, only by absorbing nourishment from water can fish live. Human beings live between heaven and earh n the same way as fish live in water. The nourishment humans receive from drinking and food is all from external qi.」[12]
4.2.2.3 由此可見，「the qi of genuine origin is not mixed with the external qi but depends upon the latter for nourishment. Thus, if the external qi is turbid, it may contaminate the internal qi by causing it to have inappropriate material desires (wu yu，物欲)」[13]
5 二氣說之困難
5.1 缺乏文獻根據：沒有正直的文獻証據表示，王陽明有解釋過「客氣」等概念為何．
5.1.1 但說王陽明有精讀過二程的理論，也不是一個離譜的想法．
5.2 間接考証：
5.2.1 王陽明有把良知和夜氣作比較．
5.2.2 「孟子曰：「牛山之木嘗美矣。以其郊於大國也，斧斤伐之，可以為美乎﹖是其日夜之所息，雨露之所潤，非無萌蘗之生焉，牛羊又從而牧之，是以若彼濯濯也。人見其濯濯也，以為未嘗有材焉，此豈山之性也哉﹖雖存乎人者，豈無仁義之心哉﹖其所以放其良心者，亦猶斧斤之於木也。旦旦而伐之，可以為美乎﹖其日夜之所息，平旦之氣，其好惡與人相近也者幾希，則其旦晝之所為，有梏亡之矣。梏之反覆，則其夜氣不足以存。夜氣不足以存，則其違禽獸不遠矣。人見其禽獸也，而以為未嘗有才焉者，是豈人之情也哉﹖故苟得其養，無物不長；苟失其養，無物不消。孔子曰：『操則存，舍則亡。出入無時，莫知其鄉。』惟心之謂與！」」（孟子告子上；中華書局印，頁３３０）
5.2.3 「又曰：『良知在夜氣發的，方是本體，以其無物欲之雜也．學者要使事物紛擾之時，常如夜氣一般，就是通乎昼夜之道而知』．」（頁１１１；陳榮捷§２６８）
6 去除私欲的法門：
6.1 以良知控制異氣
6.1.1 不是要除掉異氣，而是要不受異氣影響
6.1.2 「After all, what is important is not to live in separation from the alien qi, but to get nourishment from and yet not be controlled by it. Living in complete separation from the alien qi, we will of course not have any selfish desires, but then we will have nowhere to get nourishment from either.」[14]
6.2 立志
6.2.1 問志至氣次：先生日：「『志之所至，氣亦至焉』之謂，非極至次貳之謂．持其志則養氣在其中，無暴其氣則亦持其志矣．孟子救告子之偏，故如此夾持說．」（頁２４）
6.2.2 「The will is the commander over qi, the life of a person, the root of a tree, and the source of water. When the source is blocked, water will cease to flow; when the root is not planted, a tree will wither; when the life is not continued, a person will die, and when the will is not established, the qi will make one lose consciousness…. Therefore, as soon as a slight selfish desire arises, immediately blame the non-establishment of the will and then private desires will recede; as soon as a slight alien qi is heard moving, immediately blame the non-establishment of the will and the alien qi will be gone.」（頁８９１）
7 對良知學說的可能反對：
7.1 良知學說其實包括了兩個對人性的形上學假設
7.1.1 普遍性原則：「…the strongest support for the theory of innate knowledge is that such knowledge is universally held.」[15]
7.1.2 內在原則：望文生義地，我們一般也把良知翻譯成「innate knowledge」．
7.2 John Locke式的反對：
7.2.1 普遍性與內在性的不必然：
7.2.1.1 我們就算同意「良知」是普遍的人性，也不能夠因此推出「良知」是內在的：「however, even if universal consensus indeed exists on such matters, it cannot be directly counted as a proof for their being innate, 「…if there can be any other way shown, how men may come to that universal agreement in the things they do consent in, which I presume may be done.」」[16]
7.2.2 由經驗觀察上証明不了良知是普遍的．例如：社會有打老豆；推老母落街；擲小孩落樓；兄弟不和．
7.3 Lockean的追擊：
7.3.1 「…by this they [innate ideas] are not distinguishable from other knowable truths.」[17]
7.4 Yong Huang的辯護：
7.4.1 所謂「內在」和「普遍」是一種形上學的預設，我們不應以經驗驗察作準．Richard Rorty：「…we can never know ourselves to have reached, and which we can never know we are closing in on rather than veering off from.」[18]
7.4.2 換句話說，Yong Huang贊成「良知學說」是一種道德理想，指導人應該住什麼方向走，才算得上是一個人．這形上學觀點為我們設定人是所以為人（human qua human）的界線．
8 知行合一
8.1 Huang認為「良知」是行德行必須要有的「Faith」．當我們行德時，便會反過來証明這個faith為真．
8.1.1 「One cannot have such a faith in human perfectibility unless one also believes in the original goodness of human heart/mind.」[19]
8.1.2 援引Nivison的觀點：「For to respond to the lesson the student must see it as a lesson to be learned; and if the student sees that, he or she is already moral.」
8.1.3 「So the object of moral belief is not something that exists prior to our action according to this belief; it is rather the effect of such an action. […] Now, in Wang’s view, if we have the belief or faith in the innate moral knowledge and act according to this faith, we will see this faith is true, for one will be a moral person.」[20]
8.2 但Nivison觀點似乎混淆是「道德觀念」（moral concept）、「德行」和「道德感」（moral sense）和之間的分別．一個可以學習道德觀念的人，當然需要有「道德感」．但有「道德感」和能夠學習「道德觀念」的人，卻不一定已經是一個有德行或道德的人．
8.2.1 例如，小明上德育課，他有能力學習為謂道德．他當要有道德感（有良知）．但這不代表，小明已經是一個有道德人．這是兩個不同層面的問題．
8.2.2 因為有德之人不等同性善之人．如Huang自己所說，良知和性善是一個形上理想．但現實上是否一個有德之人，還得看是否有德行．
8.3 再者，我們亦不能由德行去反証道德信念（如良知）為真．因為這混淆了因果關係．說「we will see this faith is true」是一種是不明確的說法．
8.4 就算引康德[21]也解釋不了，反而增加了乞題的嫌疑．因為康德的觀點是先假設了自由意志為可能．但這和Huang想証明的東西（道德行動証明良知或道德理想為真）沒有多大的關係．
9 「性」「才」之別
9.1 在這筆記中，不贅歸納．因為在很多的文章中，也有解王陽明的「金喻」．「金喻」不難理解．
10 體認
10.1 Yong Huang提到一點她還未處理的問題，頗值得我們留意．
10.2 她說在王陽明的哲學中，有一個「體認」的概念．她認為這概念等同於innate experience．究竟這個說法合理嗎？
10.3 體認（根據Huang）有以下特性：
10.3.1 第一，它不屬於智性的範疇（intellectual enterprise）．
10.3.2 第二，這是一種「自得」的狀態．「自得」是一種感到道德如悅的心理狀態．「The second is his idea of joy in acting according to one’s moral knowledge.」[22]
10.3.3 我認為，如果以「體認」去理解「如惡惡臭，如好好色」，或許可以比Cua[23]的心理類比更好．
[1] P393.8
[2] P396.8
[3] p395.7 or endnote 10
[4] p395.8
[5] P397.4
[6] P397.2
[7] P397.3
[8] P397.8; endnote 16
[9] P398.5
[10] P398.8
[11] P399.5
[12] P399.7
[13] P399.10
[14] P400.7
[15] P401.3
[16] P401.5
[17] P402.3; endnote 27
[18] P402.7; endnote 29
[19] P402.8
[20] P403.6
[21] P403.5
[22] P405.8
[23] A.S. Cua , The unity of knowledge and action : a study in Wang Yang-ming's moral psychology, (Honolulu : University Press of Hawaii), 1982
