Alan Goldman (1991), “Plain Sex”, The Philosophy of Sex, (2nd ed.), Alan Soble(ed.),
1 目標：
1.1 反對“means-separable-end”對性的觀點．
1.2 解釋性不必然是什麼．
1.2.1 My preliminary analysis is meant to serve as a contrast to what sex is not, at least, not necessarily.[1]
1.3 Traditional writings were correct to emphasize the purely physical or animal aspect of sex; they were wrong only in condemning it.[2]
1.4 証明任何嘗試把性活動與道德掛鈎的理論都是錯的．
1.4.1 Any analysis of sex which imputes a moral character to sex acts in themselves is wrong for that reason.[3]
1.5 沒有所謂性變態的活動．
2 何謂means-separable-end（MSE）？
2.1 MSE把性活動看待成達成其他欲望的手段．倘若沒有了其他活動的作為性活動的目的，那麼性活動本身便是沒有價值的．[4]
2.1.1 其他欲望：
2.1.1.1 生育
2.1.1.2 表達愛意
2.1.1.3 表達互相的關顧
3 何謂性欲望？
3.1 一個行動者如果他有一個正常的性欲望，他最少必須要欲求與某一個特定的人有身體接觸，而他亦企圖在該身體接觸中獲得快感．
3.1.1 …I will begin is that sexual desire is desire for contact with another person’s body and for the pleasure which such contact produces; …[5]
3.1.2 The desire for physical contact with another person is a minimal criterion for (normal) sexual desire, but is both necessary and sufficient to qualify normal desire as sexual.[6]
3.2 釐清：
3.2.1 性活動的身體接觸不等如其他活動（如球類活動）的身體接觸．因為球類活動目的是爭勝．爭勝是性活動不帶有的．[7]
3.3 但這個釐清是不全面的．與其說（正常的）性活動不如球類活動般帶有爭勝心，倒不如說（正常的）性活動不具備球賽規則．
3.4 在正常情況下，性活動的媒介是身體，主要是性器官的接觸．所以，（正常）性活動是帶有特定規則的．我們不能否定，有些性變態的人，他們就是企圖藉球賽產生快感．因為性變態的人所持的性行為規則，不同於一般人．
3.5 更強的反對：
3.5.1 有些情侶可以視舞蹈活動為性活動前奏．Goldman的釐清解決不了這一點．
4 MSE的困難
4.1 MSE不能為人帶來一致的理論．例如，有些教會反對一切不以生育為目標的性行為，他們以此理據反對同性戀及口交，但他們卻不對親吻和愛撫．[8]
4.2 當作者表明反對MSE時，他只是表明否定把性欲望的正當性僅僅地歸因於達成其他欲望欲，而不是反對把性活動當作手段．性欲望或性活動既可以是手段，也可以是目的，也可以兩者兼備．
4.3 生育論的困難：
4.3.1 Nature’s purpose & Human purpose
4.3.1.1 性雖然帶有生育的功能，但生育功能只是nature’s purpose，而不是human purpose．[9]
4.3.1.2 避孕科技和人工受孕科技亦漸漸將生育功能性活動脫鈎．
4.4 溝通論的困難：
4.4.1 一：
性不是唯一表達愛意的方法．人類沒有理由把性看待為表達關愛的唯一車乘．
4.4.2 二：
就算沒有表達愛意的性行為，也可以是一次良好的性行為．[10]
4.4.3 三：
倘若我們把性與愛混為一談，那麼人類便很容易誤會發生性行為就等同愛一個人．
4.4.3.1 性慾和愛欲似乎有不一致的要求．一方面性慾要求人多元化，但另一邊廂愛欲卻要求人專一或排他．[11]
4.4.3.2 語意上，人類沒有casual love，只有casual sex．因為love本身就帶有「認真地」這意義．[12]
4.4.4 四：
性活動不僅是一堆規則、肢體活體和身體語言[13]，它本身就是會產生快感的．一般而言，身體語言並不會產生快感．而身體語言只是工具．
4.4.4.1 ...; if better sex is more successful communication by means of a more skillful use of body language, then we had all better be well schooled in the vocabulary and grammar.[14]（這句抵死對爆！）
4.5 互相覺察論：
4.5.1 這是溝通論的另一個版本，由Nagel提出．
4.5.2 互相覺察論提出一個性活動是雙方互相牽動亦留意得到對方的意圖的活動．
4.5.3 Negal認為一個正常的性行必須要互相覺察對方所進行的誘惑，再要被這覺察的處境牽動出高一層之的誘惑．在這種誘惑下物化對也是在互相明白且確認對方的主體性下進行的．換句話說，這種物化也是出於主體的意願，而且有類近合約形式的限制，暫時互相把自我交給性伴侶．
4.5.3.1 （屌！誰會這樣做愛呢？咁樣諗一諗，仲邊有mood？去讀哲學書好過啦～～）倘若性活動真的如此，當我們讀到Negal的述描時，理應有性興奮才對．但我敢保證，因這描述而有性興奮的人，絕對是一個性變態的人．
4.5.4 困難：
4.5.4.1 但似乎這理論只適用於一些很複雜的智性誘惑過程，而不常適用於性活動．
4.5.4.2 這似乎把性活過度地智性化．
4.6 保育小孩論的困難：
4.6.1 保育小孩論認為，緊密的家庭關係有助保護小孩的成長．故此，非多元的愛和非多元的性，可以強化一個家庭的關係．
4.6.2 但多元化的性不見得一定會弱化家庭關係．公開地認同婚外性行為或無愛性行為，也可以保障強化一個家庭關係．因為這可以被免伴侶因性慾而放棄恆久的愛欲關係．
5 性慾是低級的和獸性的
5.1 這種想法是由Platonic-Christian的思想傳統而來的．
5.2 有認為一但人類的承認和接受性慾是動物性的，那便會做成性氾濫的局面．
5.3 但明顯，就算是動物也不會如此濫交和獸性．[15]
5.4 這種想法忽略了性慾亦並不是任意的．就算人有如動物一般的性慾，也不代表人類不會仔細地選擇性伴侶和仔細管理性行為．
6 性與道德
6.1 性活動就如商業活動一樣，本身並不是一個道德課題．某些與性活動或性慾有關的不道德活動之所以是不道德，是因為它犯下了人類的道德要求，而不是因為該活動與性有關．
6.1.1 例如：強姦是不道德的，不是因為強姦是性活動，而是因為強姦犯剝削了受害者的專嚴和權利．[16]
6.1.2 例如：兒童性騷擾是不道德的，亦可能可以不是因為性活動本身，而是因為帶有地位不平等的控制活動．如兒童比較天真易受成年人控制；而過早的性生活通常會為兒童帶來負面影響等．
6.2 在哪些理論下，性活動才與道德課題有較大的關係？
6.2.1 效益主義進路：
6.2.1.1 性行為通常會帶來強烈的快感．
6.2.1.2 如果我們以效益主義來看，性活動便是道德上應該實踐的．
6.2.1.3 但這明顯有問題，因為我們不是有責任去滿足任何人的性慾．
6.2.2 康德式的進路：
6.2.2.1 性將會變成不道德的，因為性活當中將不能被免在某程度上控制對方的身體或思想．
6.2.2.1.1 例如：誘惑對方．
6.2.2.2 或更學究地說，在性活動當中，我們有可能於某時刻當中，把性伴侶僅僅常作工具或手段，企圖藉此滿足慾望．
6.2.2.3 當然，只要相方同意，又不是「僅僅」把對手常成功具，確認對方的主體性，便應該沒有問題．
7 何謂性反常或變態(perversion)？
7.1 有．
7.2 作何能夠談及norms的活動，都可以有反常態生發．
7.3 statistically unusual & evaluative abnormal
7.4 但性反常只帶有統計學上的意味，即statistically unusual，不是abnormal．[17]
7.4.1 例如：嘉藤鷹金槍不倒，每次可以做愛三小時．這是statistically unusual．
7.5 很多時，人類亦把性反常與不道德聯上關係．但這是沒有理由的．如有時反常的性行為可帶來更大的性快感一樣，性變態的行為也不一定比正常行更不道德．
7.5.1 例如：強姦一隻羊是比強姦一個人較為道德，只少由效益主義的角度看．
8 repetitive pleasure & cumulative pleasure
8.1 性似乎只能為人帶來repetitive pleasure．
8.2 性快感的短暫性和強烈性是掛釣的．
8.3 亦由於它的短暫，令我們很少把性放在人生計劃的重要位置．
9 好句：
9.1 The briefness of the pleasures contributes to their intensity (or perhaps their intensity makes them necessarily brief), …[18]
9.2 Sex affords us a paradigm of pleasure, but not a cornerstone of value.[19]
9.3 The romanticization of sex and the confusion of sexual desire with love operate in both directions: sex outside the context of romantic love is repressed; once it is repressed, partners become more difficult to find and sex becomes romanticized further, out of proportion to its real value for the individual.[20]
[1] P76.7
[2] P76.10
[3] P84.7
[4] P74.4
[5] P74.6
[6] P75.3
[7] P75.7
[8] P78.5
[9] P77.4
[10] P78.9
[11] P79.3
[12] P79.4
[13] 這是Robert C. Solomon的理解．他把性行為比喻作身體語言．
[14] P81.8
[15] P80.5
[16] P85.9
[17] P88.10
[18] P88.3
[19] P87.9
[20] P83.9
2008年6月27日星期五
2007年11月27日星期二
Freedom within Reason 筆記
Source:
Susan Wolf, (2005) “Freedom within Reason”, Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy, James Stacey Taylor (eds.), (
1 主要目標：
1.1 論証人需要為自己的行負責，不一定須要假設人有自由意志．
1.1.1 We have reason to hope, that is, that the metaphysical truth about the world and our relation to it is not such as to imply that we are not responsible beings.[1]
1.2 解釋三種討論“責任”之基礎及其來源的觀點：Autonomy View，Real Self View和Reason View．
2 傳統觀點中的憂慮：
2.1 要為Freewill辨護，似乎一直是一個艱鉅的難題．不只是現代，其實由古至今，對於人有否自由意志這課題，我們總是悲觀的．Wolf舉出了三個常見的版本，它分別是與自由意志不相容的理論或想法．
2.1.1 Free will seems to be threatened not only by what may be called divine determinism, but also psychological determinism – that is, by the view of human psychology that holds that one’s interests and beliefs and values, and consequently one’s decisions for action, are wholly a product of one’s heredity and environment. Moreover, […] agents whose thoughts, desires, and wills are effective in guiding our behavior can called into question by the scientific perspective that views human beings as wholly physical creatures, […], can be completely explained in terms of the interaction of atomic or subatomic particles. [2]（粗體為筆者所加．）這三個版本即是：有神論，心理學和物理學．
2.2 為何怕喪失自由意志：
2.2.1 由於我們常常假設了人有自由意志，所以，喪失自由意志將使人類的生活彷彿變成幻像．
2.2.1.1 …in ordinary day-to-day life we assume that we do have free will, and the recognition that we might be wrong about this would imply that we are living an illusion.[3]
2.2.2 再者，我們也害怕面對，我們其實不能掌握生命，喪失對行動的決定權．
2.2.2.1 They fear the absence of power and of ultimate control.[4]
2.2.3 但Wolf最擔心的是責任課題．喪失自由意志似乎會使行動者不能再為他的行為負責．
2.2.3.1 My own concern, […], has to do with issues of responsibility.[5]
3 Autonomy View（自主觀）
3.1 總之，我們認為人有自由意志，就可以“自己話事”．這種想法與“自律”（autonomy）的觀點有關．我們似乎直覺地認同，對一個自律的行為，我們才能談及責任．
3.2 什麼是autonomy
3.2.1 For autonomy requires that our actions be governed by our selves and that our selves not be governed by anything beyond our control.[6]
3.3 困難一（與經驗不乎）：
3.3.1 就算是自律的行動者，也很難避免受外在因素影響行動．
3.3.1.1 Though the factors that shape who are and what we value, and consequently that shape how we respond to the circumstances that confronts, […], it is plausible that such factors are always operative nonetheless, calling into doubt the assumption that even the strongest candidates for autonomous action really are as autonomous as they appear.[7]
3.3.2 在德道運氣的課題中，我們也會面對這種擔憂．似乎（除了被人拿鎗指頭之外，）大部份的行動也是有行動者的背景的．我們很難明確地分辨背景對人的行動的影響．
3.4 困難二：
3.4.1 就算我們有自由意志，是自律的個體，又何以見得因為能夠自律，就要負責任？
3.4.1.1 But if being autonomous means that instead on one’s self being a product of external forces, one’s self is a spontaneous, undetermined entity, it is hard to see why one should be any more responsible for the decisions, choices, and actions that flow out of that.[8]
4 Real Self View（真我觀）
4.1 由於自由意志並不能解決責任的難題，我們可以轉移到Real Self View，即我們把責任的基礎來滅歸結於行動者是否真確地認同自己的行為．
4.2 The kind of freedom necessary for responsibility, it might be suggested, is the freedom to do what one really wants – that is, the freedom to do what one’s core, deep, or real self wants, which may be different from what one’s strongest desires would urge upon one.[9]
4.3 換句話說，我們把行動者的責任歸結於行動者是否真誠地認同兼且認為其行為是有價值的．
4.4 即倘若行動者對其他動有第二序欲望，我們便可以對其提出責任要求．
4.4.1 (A pref ~A) pref (~A pref A)
4.5 困難：
4.5.1 就算一個行動是行動者的自我認同的行為，也不足以一定證明行者須要為其行動負責．因為，雖然行動者可以是自願的，也不一定是有得選擇．
4.5.1.1 例如：電影《紫雨風暴》（1999）中的吳彥祖的角色（多特），他是一個自小便被赤柬收養，並訓練成遊擊隊隊員的人．他沒有其他選擇，他一定要成為赤柬，而他認同他是赤柬遊擊隊的身份．
4.5.1.2 又例如：一個種族者主義者，可能是因為他的成長背景使沒有不成為種族主義者的可能性．[10]
4.5.1.3 這例子同樣可以用於納粹主義者等．
4.5.2 就算是第二序欲望也不一定是獨立自主的．一個人的第二序欲望、意願或價值取向，都可以受環境或受因果律則影響的．
4.5.2.1 In fact, the man’s racist values are part of his real self. […] For although these activity are governed by his values, his life … had no room in it for questioning, for coming to see the reasons why racism is wrong. He didn’t have a chance to not be a racist, and so it seems unfair to blame him for acting out and expressing a racism he had no choice but to have.[11]
4.5.2.2 I believe that suggestion (RSV) is mistaken. There is no such ultrareal or superdeep self, independent of all external influences, arising from nothing; and even if there were, it is hard to see why a being with such a self would be any more responsible than a being without it.[12]
5 Wolf的版本：Reason View（理據觀）：惡行免責論
5.1 似乎，就算是RSV也會面對一個AV的要求．如果一個RSV不是獨立真誠地自主，我們亦會十分懷疑這個RSV的責任．如果RSV不比AV好．我們似乎對一個兩難．我們以乎要退回AV．
5.2 不過，Susan Wolf認為：我們不能要求行動者對其行動負責，亦不可以怪責．
5.2.1 Reflecting on the supposition that they could not help but have those values, then, inclines us to exempt them not just of responsibility, but of blame.[13]
5.2.2 It might be noted that when we look at cases of bad-acting agents, our tendency to exempt them from responsibility (and thus from blame) rests heavily on our imagining cases in which it is posited that the agent could not but have become vicious or disturbed.[14]（粗體為筆者所加．）
5.3 相反，行善的人則可以擔起他們的善行的責任，接受贊賞．
5.3.1 We do not exempt the good acting agent because we covertly, perhaps even unconsciously, imagine the agent as one who was encouraged by good influences, but who was not compelled to become good. Rather, we assume that decision to accept these influences was more truly up to him.[15]（粗體為筆者所加．）
5.3.2 當然，我們可見Wolf所指的“truly”，不一定指“真實地”，而是“assumed as if truth”，即“假設／看待成真”
6 釐清：
6.1 Disanalogy between good-acting and bad-acting
6.1.1 Wolf好在意這個概念．因為她認為這是她的Reason View的核心．
6.1.1.1 The development of my view about responsibility laid stress on a disanalogy between good-acting and bad-acting agents.[16]
6.1.2 何謂“disanalogy”？
6.1.2.1 …the disanalogy is quite specific: It is that a good-acting agent may have been irresistibly drawn to accept good values as a result of the exercise of good reason, whereas this can never be said of the agent who acts in a blameworthy way.[17]
6.1.2.2 換句話說，責任的基礎就是來自“理據”．
6.1.3 她舉出了一些處境，幫助闡明，指出一個行善的人，其實是有機會不值得被贊賞或怪責．一個行惡的人，亦不一定不須要負責．
6.1.3.1 例如：If a person acts badly despite his ability to appreciate the reasons for acting better, then he is fully responsible and blameworthy for his choice.[18]
6.1.3.2 但筆者認為，這可能性和她的理論有不一致的地方．因為她似乎認為我們沒有理由可以行惡．所有的惡行都是因為不了解和缺乏選擇的結果．因為我們總可以把行惡者描述成受環境限制．
6.1.3.2.1 所以她在“If a person […] for his choice. [19]”這句之前，加上一句：“But it is a real and difficult question how often such cases occur.[20]”
6.1.3.2.2 亦有這句：But if a man irresistibly led to affirm bad values, this can only be because he was deprived of the ability to appreciate the reasons why those values are bad.[21]
6.1.3.2.3 換句話說，她自己很懷疑我們能否有效証明一個人可以充份地、了解地和可選擇地行惡．
6.1.3.3 真相究竟是如何，則可能要返回自由意志的討論．但不論形上真相為何，我們都可以贊同Wolf的觀點．
6.2 Reason View的精神在於把責任的基礎歸結為規範性和指導性的概念，而不是一個形上理論的結果：the difference between responsible and nonresponsible agents is not fundamentally metaphysical – it is normative. What we need in order to be responsible is not the power to form and revise our values independently of the world, but rather the power to form and revise our values well rather than badly, in light of an understanding of the world and of what is important and worthwhile in it.[22]（粗體為筆者所加．）
7 問題及回應：
7.1 一：
7.1.1 與其說RSV中的Real是等同“真我”．倒不如說Real Self是Ideal Self“理想我”或Role model“典範我”，因為Wolf在論証中，隱含了她對人性的觀點．如中國哲學一樣，她似乎認為人是必須亦必然是性善的．要不然，為惡的行動者都必然不是以受他的真我驅使以行惡．她一早就排除了人是性惡的可能性．所以她亦說這是“heavily on our imaging cases”．
7.1.1.1 …, we imagined people who could not but have acquired bad values or false beliefs and so could not but have made bad decisions on the basis of them.[23] （粗體為筆者所加．）
7.1.1.2 We do not exempt the good acting agent because we covertly, perhaps even unconsciously, imagine the agent as one who was encouraged by good influences, but who was not compelled to become good. Rather, we assume that decision to accept these influences was more truly up to him.[24] （粗體為筆者所加．）
7.1.2 可見她很想保護日常直覺：認為人是（最少是傾向）善的．
7.1.3 當然，說她與中國哲學可相通，可能言之過早．我們亦可以說她的理論，與亞里士多德的perfectionism相通．不過，大致上，不論是Wolf，Aristotle或者是各儒者，都是向共同目標進發──為人確立行善的基礎及方向．
7.1.4 倘若她的論點是發生在一個邪惡的可能世界，我們可以對她構想的種族主義者，給予另一翻的描述．
7.2 二：
7.2.1 不過，她的觀點有一個好處．我們對待惡行時，可以更寬宏．因為我們總是可以認為惡行是身不由己．[25]行惡的人是需要幫助，而不是需要被怪責．
7.2.2 蘇格拉底把惡行看待成如無知的行為；而Wolf則把惡行看待成身不由己的行為．兩者均重視啟導和教化，多於怪責．這種扶持他人的精神是一種比較正面的和關懷的精神．
7.3 三：
7.3.1 Wolf的觀點其實可以有利把責任轉變成一個程度性的概念，這亦脗合我們的日常經驗．例如：蜘蛛俠中常常有句“能力越大，責任越大”．而我們日常亦彷彿認為聖賢有需要開化民智，就如父母有需要教育子女明白做人道理．
7.3.2 如果我們僅以AV來劃定責任，我們便很大機會使責任變成非有即無的概念．要麼行動者有自由意志，所以要為一切自律行為負上全面的責任；要麼行動者沒有自由意志，所以對其行動可以全不負責．
7.3.3 相反，Wolf的理論則可以同時考慮行動的處境和自身信念．如果行動者有很合理的理由和充分地了解處境，他則有較大的責任．如果行動者受環境的影響較多，或對自我的欲望及信念理解較少，他則有較少的責任．
7.3.4 這亦可以幫助我們理解，當我們怪責他們逃避責任時，為何往往我們是在怪責他人故意地不去了解他應所了解的處境．
7.3.5 她似乎亦會贊同這個理解：The more we are able to understand and correctly and sensitively evaluate our world, the more responsible we are able to be in acting within and upon it.[26]
7.4 倘若天命不能違．由不朽的觀看，命運總是播弄或特別照顧某些人，使他們對生命有更多的了解，擁有更大的責任．由有朽的觀看，有人類會努力獲得更多的自由，肩負更多的責任；亦有人認為自由是“生命中不能承受之輕”，努力逃避責任．
[1] P259.9
[2] P258.5 – 258.7
[3] P258.10 – 258.1
[4] P259.3
[5] P259.4
[6] P261.5
[7] P261.7
[8] P262.2
[9] P265.4
[10] Wolf於文章中的例子．
[11] P266.4 – 266.5
[12] P269.3
[13] P267.7
[14] P268.6
[15] P268.10 – 269.1
[16] P271.4
[17] P271.9
[18] P272.6
[19] P272.6
[20] P272.5
[21] P271.10 – 272.1
[22] P273.6
[23] P272.5
[24] P268.10 – 269.1
[25] 換了筆者的語言：“我們總可以說某人行惡，是因為他有心理鬱結，而非自願，亦非能自控的．”
[26] P274.3
2007年11月16日星期五
"The importance of free will"筆記
Susan Wolf, “The importance of free will” Mind, Vol. 90, No. 359. (Jul., 1981), pp. 386 -405
Susan Wolf, “The importance of free will”筆記
1 主要目標：
1.1 論証一個行動者需要負責的道德行為不一定須要建基於自由意志之成立．
1.1.1 I shall argue that the justification of these practices need not rest on the assumption that we do have free will, and that the conclusion that we don’t have free will gives us no reason at all to abandon these practices..[1]
1.2 道德責任的根據是行動者對其行動的態度．
1.2.1 I shall argue that these attitudes, too, are safe from the threat of being undermined by reason and metaphysics.[2]
1.3 解釋兩種對自由意志與人類行為的態度：樂觀者與悲觀者．[3]
1.4 論証我們可以接受一個consequentialist的態度，解釋道德贊賞和責備．
1.4.1 I take it that this forward-looking, consequentialist type of justification of the practices of overt moral praise and blame is a good one, and therefore I take it that the intelligent pessimist will think it a good one as well. [4]
1.4.2 …even if this (the truth of determinism) implies that as matter of metaphysical fact we are not free and responsible beings, this give us no reason at all to regard ourselves as unfree, unresponsible beings.[5]
1.5 論証以對行動者的態度代替“自由意志”作為責任的根據．
1.6 我們依然可以為“人類的行動是命定的”這種觀點感到難過．一個到命定論悲觀的人，並不需放棄他的悲觀的態度，相反，他只需要放棄他的理論．
1.6.1 I shall finally attempt to express what I take to be the appropriate focus of these feelings.[6]
1.6.2 …the pessimist is likely to withdraw not his fear of determinism, but only his account of it.[7]
2 為何我們害怕命題論：
2.1 悲觀者的態度和前設：
2.1.1 前設：
2.1.1.1 自由意志是否存在，是根據特有何種形以上學觀點．
2.1.1.1.1 …, first that whether or not we have free will depends on which metaphysical hypotheses are true, …[8]
2.1.1.1.2 第一：…determinism is both incompatible with free will and very likely true.[9]（Wolf認為她是第一種悲觀者．）
2.1.1.1.3 第二：…indeterminism is both incompatible with free will and, at least, very possibly true.[10]
2.1.1.2 而且，這些否定自由意志或與自由意志不容相的理論，似乎是正確的．
2.1.1.2.1 …, second, that it is not unlikely that the wrong metaphysical hypotheses are true.[11]
2.1.2 總的來說，悲傷者不願意接受人是沒有自由意志的生命體．他們不願接受這點，因為他們認為喪失自由意志需要面對沉重的代價──人類再不是可以負責的行動者，而道德行為亦會喪失其形上學的根據．
2.2 一：
2.3 因為我們害怕以下的可能性：倘若人類對自己是缺乏自由意志的，我們將喪失為我們的行為負責任的基礎．
2.3.1 Of the practices they feel to be potentially undermined by the absence of free will, those associated with attributions of moral responsibility are most often cited.[12]
2.4 二：
2.5 而且，道德贊賞和責備也是成為缺乏理據的活動．
2.5.1 …the practices of praising and blaming people, punishing and rewarding them on the basis of the moral quality of their actions would be irrational, inappropriate, and unjustifiable if the thesis of determinism were true.[13]
2.6 換句話言，我們將喪失過去行動者之所以為行動者的自決能力．
2.7 三：
2.8 我們亦會喪失對他人作出“reactive attitudes”的理據．相反我們只能對他人，甚至於自己，作出“objective attitude”．
2.8.1 Wolf沒有清楚地定義何謂reactive attitudes．不過，大致上reactive attitudes是一種不把人當作機械的態度．認為人是有感情的，而且亦自覺到自我的價值．在她的想法中，這包括了：admiration and indignation, pride, shame, respect, contempt, gratitude, resentment等．[14]
2.8.1.1 Reactive attitudes的重要性
2.8.1.2 Reactive attitudes與大部份有價值的人類情感有關．要是我們喪失了reactive attitudes我們可能會遇到以下的處境．
2.8.1.3 所有贊賞和責備皆是不可以理喻的．
2.8.1.4 親情，友情及愛情皆變成了沒有價值的東西．
2.8.1.5 總之，似乎一切令人之所為人的尊嚴也會消散．
2.8.2 所以，生活在一個缺乏Reactive attitudes的世界，似乎是蕭瑟的和貧瘠的．[15]
2.8.3 與之相反，則是objective attitude，一般而言，是對待死物或動物的態度．[16]
3 樂觀者的辯護：
3.1 我們可以把贊賞和責備看待成生物賞罰機制，即一種生物學上的回饋機制．“贊賞”和“責備”依然可以有效力，因為它們依舊可以提升人的道德質素（moral quality）．“We already know that we can improve the moral quality of actions by maintaining institutions of reward that provide incentives.”[17]
3.1.1 We should praise or blame an individual, they may argue, if and only if by doing so we shall improve the moral quality of actions in the future.[18]
3.2 就算我們知道人類是被命定的機械，我們在心理上也不能作出多大的轉變，我們會繼續往常的生活．
3.2.1 …the optimist once again has a ready reply. One thing he can point out is that even if the truth of determinism would give us some reason to regard ourselves differently, we would be psychologically incapable of changing our attitudes in the appropriate way.[19]
3.3 由於要接受一種無情的世界觀，代價實在太多．所以，我們可以合理地自我欺騙，繼續往常的生活態度．生活上，我們可以接納unjustified attitudes．
3.3.1 Another is that even if the truth of determinism would give us some reason to regard ourselves differently, we would have an overriding reason to keep the attitudes we currently hold.[20]
3.3.2 …the pessimist might accept the optimist’s argument – but he will accept it with despair.[21]
3.3.3 …I think that it may be rational to choose not ‘to be more purely rational that we are.’ It may be rational for a man to choose not to face the fact that he has a terminal illness or for a woman to try to avoid discovering that her husband is having an affair. In the costs would be high enough, it may be rational to override the reason for a course of action that is given by the acknowledgment that only that course of action would constitute living in accordance with the facts.[22]
3.3.4 換句話說，我們可以有理性的自我欺騙．
3.4 但如果optimist只是一味說，為被免更重大的損失，我們有理由去蓋過（或漠視）事實，以一種自欺的態度生活．Susan Wolf認為，這就等如叫人滿足於“揀一個無咁臭的屎坑坐．”However, in so far as the optimist’s justification takes the form of providing reasons that override other reasons, the justification can be only as satisfying as the acceptance of the lesser of two evils can be.[23]（粗體為筆者所加．）
3.5 如果想解決這個問題，我們就有必要先理解為何就算事實上我們是命定的，也不會亦影響我們的想法：認為人類應該為自的行為負責任和我們是自由的個體．
3.5.1.1 …even if this (the truth of determinism) implies that as matter of metaphysical fact we are not free and responsible beings, this give us no reason at all to regard ourselves as unfree, unresponsible beings. […] If we have no reason at all to abandon these (reactive) attitudes, then we have nothing we need to override, no value we need to contradict in choosing to keep these attitudes. Our retention of the reactive attitudes need not be viewed as a choice between the lesser of two evils.[24]
4 就算我們是喪失自由意志，亦可以談“責任”．
4.1 以對行動者的對其行動的態度來代替“自由意志”作為責任的根據．
4.1.1 …attitude…give us a reason (perhaps the reason)… to decide whether we ought to regard him as responsible for taking the drug.[25]
4.2 道友例子：
4.2.1 假設有一個因為惹上了毒癮的道友；
4.2.2 假設他是一個日常生活中見到的理性人．
4.2.3 因為這個道友的行為是不自由的，所以不論他如何以為自己選擇，他最終都會吸毒．[26]
4.2.4 我們會認為他的責任來源於他對他吸毒的行為有多認同．
4.2.4.1 …the degree to which we hold this individual responsible for his drug-taking actions will vary in proportion to the degree to which we think he approves of – or, at least, doesn’t disapprove of – the fact that he takes these actions.[27]
4.2.5 換句話說，只要道友對承認他的第二序意欲是認同吸毒的行為，我們便可能合理地把吸毒看待成他的自願行為．於是他便要因為這自願行為而負責任．
4.2.5.1 [(D pref ~D) pref (~D pref D)]
4.2.5.2 He is affirming the fact that his efforts to obtain and to take the drug are his actions, that they effect and contribute to his character and his life in a way that may fairly enter into an assessment of what kind of person he is.[28]
4.2.5.3 …the addict’s responsibility for his actions turns on the truth or falsity of an independent claim: namely, that whether or not the addict is compelled to take the drug, he will take the drug because he chooses to do so. The addict, then, in taking an attitude toward his unfree actions, can thereby claim or disclaim responsibility for them.[29]
4.2.6 相反：
4.2.6.1 假如道友的第二序欲望並不意欲去吸毒；
4.2.6.2 [(~D pref D) pref (D pref ~D)]
4.2.6.3 我們便不怪責他吸毒，因為這是他不願意的．而他亦帶有不意願的態度．
4.3 但是神奇在，Susan Wolf竟然補多一句：“倘若我們相信道友對吸毒的接受程度的態度已經被毒品影響決定，那麼我們便沒有理由將他的態度看待成負責的理據．”（If we believed that the addict’s approval or disapproval of his actions were itself determined by the influence of the dug, we would not regard his attitude as giving us a reason by which to establish ours.）[30]
4.3.1 這豈不是偷偷地把“自由意志”的觀點混入了第二序望欲之中？她似乎假設了第二序欲望是有可能不受命定論限制．但何以見得是如此？
4.3.2 她寫：The fact that we take the addict’s own attitudes to his drug-taking actions seriously – that is, the fact that his attitudes count as a reason for us to hold him more or less responsible for these actions – rests on our belief that the addict, qua attitude-taker, is a free and responsible being.[31]（粗體為筆者所加．）
4.3.3 當中的“is a free and responsible being”似乎有前後予盾之嫌．除非之前的“our belief”是指“主觀信仰”，而非“客觀信念”，要不然之後的“free”似乎是與她的態度理論不一致的．
4.3.4 我懷疑Wolf也際覺到自己的問題，所以她斜體化了“is”，以代表這個“is”並不是邏輯同位句：“The agent is free.”（他是自由的行動者；句子ａ）而是明喻：“The agent is free.”（他是自由的行動者；句子ｂ）．句子ｂ的句式與“太陽是朵大紅花”這明喻沒有分別．
5 Bicentennial Man[32]
5.1.1 Wolf想証明“待人以reactive attitude”是與“對方是free agent”沒有直接關係的．
5.1.2 設想我們的科技可以制造一個如人一樣的機械人．
5.1.3 它亦有第二序欲望．[33]
5.1.4 但他最終也是一個沒有自由意志的個體，它的個性，價值觀，以及行動，都不由自主．[34]
5.1.5 最悲觀的處境是，我們會以objective attitude對待它．[35]
5.1.6 但因為它實在太似人，所以我們在心理上，將會越來越困難純粹以objective attitude對待它．
5.1.6.1 The robot is programmed (along with all its implications) may make it psychologically impossible for us to take the objective attitude towards him consistently.[36]
5.1.7 例如：人類會讓步，在人常生活上，待它與人無異，但不會容許女兒嫁給Bicentennial Man．[37]
5.1.8 在這個真實得出奇的假想例子中，Wolf嘗試提出，Bicentennial Man可以以objective attitude對待自己．原因不是因為這可以與現實脗合，而是因為以這態度可以減少他的苦惱．
5.1.8.1 …we are not arguing for the adoption of this attitude simply on the ground that the attitude is appropriate. That is, we are not arguing that the robot should take this (objective) attitude simply because of his (and our) value in living in accordance with facts. … rather, utilitarian ones: his life will be less painful if he takes the objective attitude toward himself.[38]
5.1.9 與之前的道友作比較．Bicentennial Man的一切決定，都是因為它的程式．連它所擁有的第二序欲望也是來自設計者的程式．所以，就算它接受自己的行動──帶有一個第二序欲望──我們亦只能把它看待成連第二序欲望也被限制，它不應為它的行為負責．
5.1.9.1 He (the robot) is in a position analogous to that of the addict whose attitude toward his addiction is itself determined by the influence of the drug. Thus the robot’s own attitude toward himself cannot have any weight for us. If the robot, as a matter of metaphysical fact, is an unfree, unresponsible being, then his acceptance of this fact gives us no extra reason to regard him as such.[39]
5.2 哪麼我們真的有必要，亦只能純粹以objective attitude生活嗎？
5.2.1 Wolf認為：不．
5.2.2 因為objective attitude也是一種attitude，它亦不合乎會與形上事實．形上事實本身是沒有attitude的．
5.2.2.1 不論我們接受何種生活態度，我們都必先得假設我們如一個自由和承責的個體．
5.2.2.1.1 In taking any attitude toward ourselves, including the attitude that we are not fee or responsible beings, we would be asserting ourselves as free and responsible beings.[40]
5.2.2.1.2 For the only way we cold give up taking either the attitudes that regard others as responsible for their actions or the attitude that regards others as not responsible for their actions would be by giving up thinking in terms of the notions of responsibility and desert at all.[41]
5.2.2.2 人類是一種有態度的生物，不論我們特有悲觀或樂觀的態度，我們就是不能放棄有態度．
5.2.3 Wolf認為，選擇生活態度（reactive 或 objective）其實是形上事實沒有關聯的．就算我們選擇“乎合形上事實地生活”這態度的証誠來源，也不是來自形上事實本身．相反，是來自我們的心理需要．
5.2.3.1 That is, even if determinism gave us some reason to give up all our attitudes, we would be psychologically incapable of meeting this demand. And even if determinism gave us some reason to give up our attitudes, we would have overriding reason to retain them.[42]
6 為什麼我們總是想乎合現實地生活？
6.1 Wolf認為這與我們想求真愛有關．
6.1.1 This desire shows up in more realistic situations when we consider how important it is to us that we not only feel ourselves to be loved, but that we truly be loved, or when we see how important it is to us that our efforts to achieve something in the world have succeeded, but that they really have succeeded.[43]
6.2 我們亦害怕我們只是快樂機關的大腦．
6.2.1 …people shudder at the thought of passing their days hooked up to a pleasure machine.[44]
6.3 第一：倘若我們放棄乎合現實地生活，我們似乎是放棄了想“正確地”生活這理想．
6.3.1 …living in accordance with the fact that we are not free and responsible beings would require us to five up our value in being right.[45]
6.4 第二：生活與真實一致，會使我們感到自我的重要性．
6.4.1 …because we want ourselves to matter in the right sort of way, to make the right sort of difference to the world and the beings who do mater and to whom we might matter.[46]
6.4.1.1 Wolf認為，或許，如果我們發現自己是一個受控的木偶，被上帝（或乜都好）玩弄於鼓掌之中，我們其實是有理由自殺的．因為你發現了一切你所重視的和一切重視你的，都與你沒有絲毫關係．
6.4.1.1.1 It might be rational for the robot to commit a kind of suicide of self as a result of the realization that he is … a robot. For …the realization that you cannot, and/or rationally ought not, matter to the people or to the world that matters to you – indeed, to the people or to the world that matter independently of you – might give you a reason to commit suicide.[47]（粗體為筆者所加．）
6.4.1.2 但發現世界是命定的，則能構成自殺的理由．因為：If this world matters, then it would be irrational to destroy it. And if this world does not matter, then it certainly doesn’t matter that we do or do not choose to destroy it.[48]
7 筆者認為：
7.1 似乎Wolf只是一個悲觀版的Charles Taylor．如果換了樂觀的Charles Taylor，他則會說這種心種的需要，並不是一種心理的無能（incapable），相反是一種心理的創造力，有能力把因果決定的冷冰世界，描述和看待成一個有愛和關心的世界．
7.2 哈！或許我們真由Wolf的字眼中得知我們的無能．例如在自殺一例中，她也要在“自殺”之前加上“a kind of”．要用“a kind of”是因為要“自殺”之為可能，我們亦要先有我們是一個行動者的態度．所謂木偶或機械人會自殺，其實是non-sense的．因為，倘若那個機械人真的絕對被命令的，半分不由他自主．他的所謂“自殺”或“保命”，也只是根據指令的必然結果．
[1] P386.4
[2] P387.3
[3] P386.8 – 387.1
[4] P388.7
[5] P394.1
[6] P387. 3
[7] P388.9
[8] P387.4
[9] P387.5
[10] P387.6
[11] P387.5
[12] P388.2
[13] P388.3
[14] P390.4
[15] P392.2
[16] P390.5
[17] P.388.7
[18] P388.5
[19] P392.3
[20] P392.4
[21] P392.5
[22] P393.4
[23] P392.7
[24] P394.1 – 394.2
[25] P394.9
[26] P394.10 – 395.1
[27] P394.5
[28] P394.7
[29] P395.2
[30] P395.6; Wolf在p394.9有以下的一句：“establish ours – that is, it give us the means by which to decide whether we ought to regard him as responsible for taking the drug.”
[31] P395.5
[32] 筆者認為，在這個例子上，我們可以幻想Wolf的Robot，就如電影Bicentennial Man(1999)一樣．
[33] P395.7
[34] P396.7
[35] P396.4
[36] P396.8
[37] P397.1
[38] P398.3
[39] P398.10 – 399.1
[40] P399.9
[41] P400.7
[42] P400.5
[43] P401.7
[44] P401.6
[45] P401.9
[46] P402.4
[47] P402.6
[48] P402.7
Susan Wolf, “The importance of free will”筆記
1 主要目標：
1.1 論証一個行動者需要負責的道德行為不一定須要建基於自由意志之成立．
1.1.1 I shall argue that the justification of these practices need not rest on the assumption that we do have free will, and that the conclusion that we don’t have free will gives us no reason at all to abandon these practices..[1]
1.2 道德責任的根據是行動者對其行動的態度．
1.2.1 I shall argue that these attitudes, too, are safe from the threat of being undermined by reason and metaphysics.[2]
1.3 解釋兩種對自由意志與人類行為的態度：樂觀者與悲觀者．[3]
1.4 論証我們可以接受一個consequentialist的態度，解釋道德贊賞和責備．
1.4.1 I take it that this forward-looking, consequentialist type of justification of the practices of overt moral praise and blame is a good one, and therefore I take it that the intelligent pessimist will think it a good one as well. [4]
1.4.2 …even if this (the truth of determinism) implies that as matter of metaphysical fact we are not free and responsible beings, this give us no reason at all to regard ourselves as unfree, unresponsible beings.[5]
1.5 論証以對行動者的態度代替“自由意志”作為責任的根據．
1.6 我們依然可以為“人類的行動是命定的”這種觀點感到難過．一個到命定論悲觀的人，並不需放棄他的悲觀的態度，相反，他只需要放棄他的理論．
1.6.1 I shall finally attempt to express what I take to be the appropriate focus of these feelings.[6]
1.6.2 …the pessimist is likely to withdraw not his fear of determinism, but only his account of it.[7]
2 為何我們害怕命題論：
2.1 悲觀者的態度和前設：
2.1.1 前設：
2.1.1.1 自由意志是否存在，是根據特有何種形以上學觀點．
2.1.1.1.1 …, first that whether or not we have free will depends on which metaphysical hypotheses are true, …[8]
2.1.1.1.2 第一：…determinism is both incompatible with free will and very likely true.[9]（Wolf認為她是第一種悲觀者．）
2.1.1.1.3 第二：…indeterminism is both incompatible with free will and, at least, very possibly true.[10]
2.1.1.2 而且，這些否定自由意志或與自由意志不容相的理論，似乎是正確的．
2.1.1.2.1 …, second, that it is not unlikely that the wrong metaphysical hypotheses are true.[11]
2.1.2 總的來說，悲傷者不願意接受人是沒有自由意志的生命體．他們不願接受這點，因為他們認為喪失自由意志需要面對沉重的代價──人類再不是可以負責的行動者，而道德行為亦會喪失其形上學的根據．
2.2 一：
2.3 因為我們害怕以下的可能性：倘若人類對自己是缺乏自由意志的，我們將喪失為我們的行為負責任的基礎．
2.3.1 Of the practices they feel to be potentially undermined by the absence of free will, those associated with attributions of moral responsibility are most often cited.[12]
2.4 二：
2.5 而且，道德贊賞和責備也是成為缺乏理據的活動．
2.5.1 …the practices of praising and blaming people, punishing and rewarding them on the basis of the moral quality of their actions would be irrational, inappropriate, and unjustifiable if the thesis of determinism were true.[13]
2.6 換句話言，我們將喪失過去行動者之所以為行動者的自決能力．
2.7 三：
2.8 我們亦會喪失對他人作出“reactive attitudes”的理據．相反我們只能對他人，甚至於自己，作出“objective attitude”．
2.8.1 Wolf沒有清楚地定義何謂reactive attitudes．不過，大致上reactive attitudes是一種不把人當作機械的態度．認為人是有感情的，而且亦自覺到自我的價值．在她的想法中，這包括了：admiration and indignation, pride, shame, respect, contempt, gratitude, resentment等．[14]
2.8.1.1 Reactive attitudes的重要性
2.8.1.2 Reactive attitudes與大部份有價值的人類情感有關．要是我們喪失了reactive attitudes我們可能會遇到以下的處境．
2.8.1.3 所有贊賞和責備皆是不可以理喻的．
2.8.1.4 親情，友情及愛情皆變成了沒有價值的東西．
2.8.1.5 總之，似乎一切令人之所為人的尊嚴也會消散．
2.8.2 所以，生活在一個缺乏Reactive attitudes的世界，似乎是蕭瑟的和貧瘠的．[15]
2.8.3 與之相反，則是objective attitude，一般而言，是對待死物或動物的態度．[16]
3 樂觀者的辯護：
3.1 我們可以把贊賞和責備看待成生物賞罰機制，即一種生物學上的回饋機制．“贊賞”和“責備”依然可以有效力，因為它們依舊可以提升人的道德質素（moral quality）．“We already know that we can improve the moral quality of actions by maintaining institutions of reward that provide incentives.”[17]
3.1.1 We should praise or blame an individual, they may argue, if and only if by doing so we shall improve the moral quality of actions in the future.[18]
3.2 就算我們知道人類是被命定的機械，我們在心理上也不能作出多大的轉變，我們會繼續往常的生活．
3.2.1 …the optimist once again has a ready reply. One thing he can point out is that even if the truth of determinism would give us some reason to regard ourselves differently, we would be psychologically incapable of changing our attitudes in the appropriate way.[19]
3.3 由於要接受一種無情的世界觀，代價實在太多．所以，我們可以合理地自我欺騙，繼續往常的生活態度．生活上，我們可以接納unjustified attitudes．
3.3.1 Another is that even if the truth of determinism would give us some reason to regard ourselves differently, we would have an overriding reason to keep the attitudes we currently hold.[20]
3.3.2 …the pessimist might accept the optimist’s argument – but he will accept it with despair.[21]
3.3.3 …I think that it may be rational to choose not ‘to be more purely rational that we are.’ It may be rational for a man to choose not to face the fact that he has a terminal illness or for a woman to try to avoid discovering that her husband is having an affair. In the costs would be high enough, it may be rational to override the reason for a course of action that is given by the acknowledgment that only that course of action would constitute living in accordance with the facts.[22]
3.3.4 換句話說，我們可以有理性的自我欺騙．
3.4 但如果optimist只是一味說，為被免更重大的損失，我們有理由去蓋過（或漠視）事實，以一種自欺的態度生活．Susan Wolf認為，這就等如叫人滿足於“揀一個無咁臭的屎坑坐．”However, in so far as the optimist’s justification takes the form of providing reasons that override other reasons, the justification can be only as satisfying as the acceptance of the lesser of two evils can be.[23]（粗體為筆者所加．）
3.5 如果想解決這個問題，我們就有必要先理解為何就算事實上我們是命定的，也不會亦影響我們的想法：認為人類應該為自的行為負責任和我們是自由的個體．
3.5.1.1 …even if this (the truth of determinism) implies that as matter of metaphysical fact we are not free and responsible beings, this give us no reason at all to regard ourselves as unfree, unresponsible beings. […] If we have no reason at all to abandon these (reactive) attitudes, then we have nothing we need to override, no value we need to contradict in choosing to keep these attitudes. Our retention of the reactive attitudes need not be viewed as a choice between the lesser of two evils.[24]
4 就算我們是喪失自由意志，亦可以談“責任”．
4.1 以對行動者的對其行動的態度來代替“自由意志”作為責任的根據．
4.1.1 …attitude…give us a reason (perhaps the reason)… to decide whether we ought to regard him as responsible for taking the drug.[25]
4.2 道友例子：
4.2.1 假設有一個因為惹上了毒癮的道友；
4.2.2 假設他是一個日常生活中見到的理性人．
4.2.3 因為這個道友的行為是不自由的，所以不論他如何以為自己選擇，他最終都會吸毒．[26]
4.2.4 我們會認為他的責任來源於他對他吸毒的行為有多認同．
4.2.4.1 …the degree to which we hold this individual responsible for his drug-taking actions will vary in proportion to the degree to which we think he approves of – or, at least, doesn’t disapprove of – the fact that he takes these actions.[27]
4.2.5 換句話說，只要道友對承認他的第二序意欲是認同吸毒的行為，我們便可能合理地把吸毒看待成他的自願行為．於是他便要因為這自願行為而負責任．
4.2.5.1 [(D pref ~D) pref (~D pref D)]
4.2.5.2 He is affirming the fact that his efforts to obtain and to take the drug are his actions, that they effect and contribute to his character and his life in a way that may fairly enter into an assessment of what kind of person he is.[28]
4.2.5.3 …the addict’s responsibility for his actions turns on the truth or falsity of an independent claim: namely, that whether or not the addict is compelled to take the drug, he will take the drug because he chooses to do so. The addict, then, in taking an attitude toward his unfree actions, can thereby claim or disclaim responsibility for them.[29]
4.2.6 相反：
4.2.6.1 假如道友的第二序欲望並不意欲去吸毒；
4.2.6.2 [(~D pref D) pref (D pref ~D)]
4.2.6.3 我們便不怪責他吸毒，因為這是他不願意的．而他亦帶有不意願的態度．
4.3 但是神奇在，Susan Wolf竟然補多一句：“倘若我們相信道友對吸毒的接受程度的態度已經被毒品影響決定，那麼我們便沒有理由將他的態度看待成負責的理據．”（If we believed that the addict’s approval or disapproval of his actions were itself determined by the influence of the dug, we would not regard his attitude as giving us a reason by which to establish ours.）[30]
4.3.1 這豈不是偷偷地把“自由意志”的觀點混入了第二序望欲之中？她似乎假設了第二序欲望是有可能不受命定論限制．但何以見得是如此？
4.3.2 她寫：The fact that we take the addict’s own attitudes to his drug-taking actions seriously – that is, the fact that his attitudes count as a reason for us to hold him more or less responsible for these actions – rests on our belief that the addict, qua attitude-taker, is a free and responsible being.[31]（粗體為筆者所加．）
4.3.3 當中的“is a free and responsible being”似乎有前後予盾之嫌．除非之前的“our belief”是指“主觀信仰”，而非“客觀信念”，要不然之後的“free”似乎是與她的態度理論不一致的．
4.3.4 我懷疑Wolf也際覺到自己的問題，所以她斜體化了“is”，以代表這個“is”並不是邏輯同位句：“The agent is free.”（他是自由的行動者；句子ａ）而是明喻：“The agent is free.”（他是自由的行動者；句子ｂ）．句子ｂ的句式與“太陽是朵大紅花”這明喻沒有分別．
5 Bicentennial Man[32]
5.1.1 Wolf想証明“待人以reactive attitude”是與“對方是free agent”沒有直接關係的．
5.1.2 設想我們的科技可以制造一個如人一樣的機械人．
5.1.3 它亦有第二序欲望．[33]
5.1.4 但他最終也是一個沒有自由意志的個體，它的個性，價值觀，以及行動，都不由自主．[34]
5.1.5 最悲觀的處境是，我們會以objective attitude對待它．[35]
5.1.6 但因為它實在太似人，所以我們在心理上，將會越來越困難純粹以objective attitude對待它．
5.1.6.1 The robot is programmed (along with all its implications) may make it psychologically impossible for us to take the objective attitude towards him consistently.[36]
5.1.7 例如：人類會讓步，在人常生活上，待它與人無異，但不會容許女兒嫁給Bicentennial Man．[37]
5.1.8 在這個真實得出奇的假想例子中，Wolf嘗試提出，Bicentennial Man可以以objective attitude對待自己．原因不是因為這可以與現實脗合，而是因為以這態度可以減少他的苦惱．
5.1.8.1 …we are not arguing for the adoption of this attitude simply on the ground that the attitude is appropriate. That is, we are not arguing that the robot should take this (objective) attitude simply because of his (and our) value in living in accordance with facts. … rather, utilitarian ones: his life will be less painful if he takes the objective attitude toward himself.[38]
5.1.9 與之前的道友作比較．Bicentennial Man的一切決定，都是因為它的程式．連它所擁有的第二序欲望也是來自設計者的程式．所以，就算它接受自己的行動──帶有一個第二序欲望──我們亦只能把它看待成連第二序欲望也被限制，它不應為它的行為負責．
5.1.9.1 He (the robot) is in a position analogous to that of the addict whose attitude toward his addiction is itself determined by the influence of the drug. Thus the robot’s own attitude toward himself cannot have any weight for us. If the robot, as a matter of metaphysical fact, is an unfree, unresponsible being, then his acceptance of this fact gives us no extra reason to regard him as such.[39]
5.2 哪麼我們真的有必要，亦只能純粹以objective attitude生活嗎？
5.2.1 Wolf認為：不．
5.2.2 因為objective attitude也是一種attitude，它亦不合乎會與形上事實．形上事實本身是沒有attitude的．
5.2.2.1 不論我們接受何種生活態度，我們都必先得假設我們如一個自由和承責的個體．
5.2.2.1.1 In taking any attitude toward ourselves, including the attitude that we are not fee or responsible beings, we would be asserting ourselves as free and responsible beings.[40]
5.2.2.1.2 For the only way we cold give up taking either the attitudes that regard others as responsible for their actions or the attitude that regards others as not responsible for their actions would be by giving up thinking in terms of the notions of responsibility and desert at all.[41]
5.2.2.2 人類是一種有態度的生物，不論我們特有悲觀或樂觀的態度，我們就是不能放棄有態度．
5.2.3 Wolf認為，選擇生活態度（reactive 或 objective）其實是形上事實沒有關聯的．就算我們選擇“乎合形上事實地生活”這態度的証誠來源，也不是來自形上事實本身．相反，是來自我們的心理需要．
5.2.3.1 That is, even if determinism gave us some reason to give up all our attitudes, we would be psychologically incapable of meeting this demand. And even if determinism gave us some reason to give up our attitudes, we would have overriding reason to retain them.[42]
6 為什麼我們總是想乎合現實地生活？
6.1 Wolf認為這與我們想求真愛有關．
6.1.1 This desire shows up in more realistic situations when we consider how important it is to us that we not only feel ourselves to be loved, but that we truly be loved, or when we see how important it is to us that our efforts to achieve something in the world have succeeded, but that they really have succeeded.[43]
6.2 我們亦害怕我們只是快樂機關的大腦．
6.2.1 …people shudder at the thought of passing their days hooked up to a pleasure machine.[44]
6.3 第一：倘若我們放棄乎合現實地生活，我們似乎是放棄了想“正確地”生活這理想．
6.3.1 …living in accordance with the fact that we are not free and responsible beings would require us to five up our value in being right.[45]
6.4 第二：生活與真實一致，會使我們感到自我的重要性．
6.4.1 …because we want ourselves to matter in the right sort of way, to make the right sort of difference to the world and the beings who do mater and to whom we might matter.[46]
6.4.1.1 Wolf認為，或許，如果我們發現自己是一個受控的木偶，被上帝（或乜都好）玩弄於鼓掌之中，我們其實是有理由自殺的．因為你發現了一切你所重視的和一切重視你的，都與你沒有絲毫關係．
6.4.1.1.1 It might be rational for the robot to commit a kind of suicide of self as a result of the realization that he is … a robot. For …the realization that you cannot, and/or rationally ought not, matter to the people or to the world that matters to you – indeed, to the people or to the world that matter independently of you – might give you a reason to commit suicide.[47]（粗體為筆者所加．）
6.4.1.2 但發現世界是命定的，則能構成自殺的理由．因為：If this world matters, then it would be irrational to destroy it. And if this world does not matter, then it certainly doesn’t matter that we do or do not choose to destroy it.[48]
7 筆者認為：
7.1 似乎Wolf只是一個悲觀版的Charles Taylor．如果換了樂觀的Charles Taylor，他則會說這種心種的需要，並不是一種心理的無能（incapable），相反是一種心理的創造力，有能力把因果決定的冷冰世界，描述和看待成一個有愛和關心的世界．
7.2 哈！或許我們真由Wolf的字眼中得知我們的無能．例如在自殺一例中，她也要在“自殺”之前加上“a kind of”．要用“a kind of”是因為要“自殺”之為可能，我們亦要先有我們是一個行動者的態度．所謂木偶或機械人會自殺，其實是non-sense的．因為，倘若那個機械人真的絕對被命令的，半分不由他自主．他的所謂“自殺”或“保命”，也只是根據指令的必然結果．
[1] P386.4
[2] P387.3
[3] P386.8 – 387.1
[4] P388.7
[5] P394.1
[6] P387. 3
[7] P388.9
[8] P387.4
[9] P387.5
[10] P387.6
[11] P387.5
[12] P388.2
[13] P388.3
[14] P390.4
[15] P392.2
[16] P390.5
[17] P.388.7
[18] P388.5
[19] P392.3
[20] P392.4
[21] P392.5
[22] P393.4
[23] P392.7
[24] P394.1 – 394.2
[25] P394.9
[26] P394.10 – 395.1
[27] P394.5
[28] P394.7
[29] P395.2
[30] P395.6; Wolf在p394.9有以下的一句：“establish ours – that is, it give us the means by which to decide whether we ought to regard him as responsible for taking the drug.”
[31] P395.5
[32] 筆者認為，在這個例子上，我們可以幻想Wolf的Robot，就如電影Bicentennial Man
[33] P395.7
[34] P396.7
[35] P396.4
[36] P396.8
[37] P397.1
[38] P398.3
[39] P398.10 – 399.1
[40] P399.9
[41] P400.7
[42] P400.5
[43] P401.7
[44] P401.6
[45] P401.9
[46] P402.4
[47] P402.6
[48] P402.7
2007年8月28日星期二
Wang Yangming on the Innate Moral Knowledge (Liangzhi) 筆記
Wang Yangming on the Innate Moral Knowledge (Liangzhi)筆記
Yong Huang, "A Neo-Confucian conception of wisdom: Wang Yangming on the Innate Moral Knowledge (Liangzhi)", in Journal of Chinese Philosophy, vol33, no.3, pp.393 - 408,Sept., 2006
（頁ｘ）是指王陽明全集（紅旗出版社）中的頁數
（陳榮捷§ｘ）當然是指陳榮捷編譯的傳習錄中的節數）
1 目標：
1.1 「Examine Wang’s idea of Liangzhi as moral knowledge innate in everyone;」
1.2 「Analyze Wang’s view of distinction between sages and common people despite the fact that moral knowledge is innate in both;」
1.3 Huang主要想回答，於王陽明的哲學系統中，良知究竟有幾可信．這回答主要透過一條問題展現：「如果良知必然有能力且保証道德行為的發生，為什麼人類又會有惡行？」
1.3.1 「Explore the issue of the credibility of Wang’s conception of moral knowledge.」[1]
1.3.2 「In this view, to have moral knowledge and yet be unable to act morally is a self-contradiction, for knowledge and action are one and the same thing.」[2]
2 兩種「知」
2.1 良知
2.1.1 不學而能，不學而知．（盡心上）
2.1.2 「心之本體」（陳榮捷§８）
2.1.3 「不假外求」（陳榮捷§８）
2.1.4 「…naturally urge us to search for such knowledge.」
2.2 知識（見聞之知）
2.2.1 因應實際處境而應變的知識．
2.2.2 沒有獨立地位的．
2.2.2.1 勞思光（Lao Si-guang）「…Wangs says that nonmoral knowledge should not be sought after if it is not useful for moral knowledge and therefore does not have an independent role.」[3]
2.2.2.2 「…all non moral knowledge that we think we should pursue, including the sciences, medicine arts, history, and literature, is necessary for the moral knowledge to function.」[4]
2.2.3 如果缺乏良知的引導，見聞之知的增長，不一定是好事．因為見聞之知有可能只是令人更貪婪．
2.2.3.1 「後世不知作聖人本是純乎天理，却專去知識才能上求聖人．以為聖人無所不知，無所不能，我須是將聖人許多知識才能逐一理會始得．故不務去天理上着工夫，徒弊精竭力，從冊子上鑽研，名物上考索，形跡上比拟，知識愈廣而人欲愈滋，才力愈多，而天理愈蔽．」（頁２９；陳榮捷§９９）
2.2.4 （頁１１４）
3 「惡」又是什麼？
3.1 「惡」從何來？[5]
3.1.1 「惡」只是私欲．[6]
3.1.2 類比：如雲敝日；如塵蓋鏡．[7]
3.2 P J Ivanhoe：
3.2.1 氣之清濁：「qi naturally occurs in varying degrees of “coarseness” or “turbidity” and that the quality of the qi, which different people receive at birth.」[8]
3.2.2 「… the innate moral knowledge is originally transparent. Those whose physical qi (qizhi) is not excellent are not easily enlightened to it because of the large amount of dregs and heavy layer of obscuration. Those whose physical qi excellent have few dregs and little obscuration. Thus with a little effort to regain the sight of the innate moral knowledge, this innate moral knowledge becomes transparent to them.」（頁７０）
3.2.3 中譯：「良知本來自明．氣質不美者，渣滓多，障蔽厚，不易開明．質美者渣滓少，無多障蔽，略加致知之功，此良知便自瑩徹，．．．」
3.2.4 中譯：陳榮捷§１６４．
3.2.5 「… the physical qi (qizhi) is what both houses and obscuresn the human nature (xing). The physical qi varies and the human nature follows. Human nature is like a ball. It is bright when falling into a clear pool, becomes blurred when falling into turbid water, and becomes filthy if falling into filthy water. The wise people are in the clear pool, common people are in the turbid water, and stupid people below are in the filthy water.」（頁１０３５－３６）
3.2.6 中譯：「氣質者，性之所寓也，亦性之所由蔽也．氣質異而性隨之．譬之珠焉，墮於澄淵則明，墮於濁水則昏，墮於污穢則穢．澄淵，上智也；濁水，凡庶也；污穢，下愚也．」
3.3 氣是人的媒介，如果沒有氣，性也不能顯露．
3.3.1 「…the good human nature can only be seen from qi. Without qi, good human nature cannot be seen. Feelings of commiseration, shame and dislike, deference and compliance, and right and wrong are all qi」
3.3.2 「然性善之端須在氣上始見得，若無氣亦無可見矣．」（頁６３）
3.3.3 「… human nature is qi, and qi is human nature. Originally there is no distinction between human nature and qi.」（頁６３－６４）
3.3.4 中譯：「．．．氣即是性，性即是氣，原無性氣之可分也．」
3.3.5 二程：「… to talk about human nature without talking about qi is not complete, and to talk about qi without talking about human nature is not illuminating.」[9]
3.3.6 這解釋會使問題轉向了：惡如何和「氣」中生成？
3.3.7 為何性是善的，而氣則是惡的？
4 二氣說
4.1 有形之氣「qi constitutive of human beings as beings with shape (you xing).」[10]
4.1.1 人之所以為人之氣──主氣（host qi）．
4.1.2 這種氣是不能產生惡的．
4.2 客氣（ke qi）
4.2.1 又作「alien qi」（異氣）或「guest qi」（客氣）．
4.2.1.1 「性一而已，仁義禮智，性之『性』也；聰明睿知，性之質也；喜怒哀樂，性之『情』也；私欲客氣，性之『蔽』也．『質』有清濁，故」情有過不及，而『蔽』有淺深也．私欲客氣，一病兩痛．非二物也，張、黃、諸葛及韓、范諸公，皆天質之美，自多暗合道妙；雖未可盡謂之學，盡謂之聞道，然亦自其有學，違道不遠者也．使其聞學知道，即伊、傳、周、召矣．若文中子則又不可謂之不知學者，其書雖多出於其徒．
4.2.1.2 陳榮捷§１６５
4.2.2 但陽明其實沒有處理何為客氣，Yong Huang援引張載和朱熹的話
4.2.2.1 「… the principle of rightness (yili) and the alien qi conquer each other frequently. The distinction between superior persons (junzi) and inferior persons (xiaoren) is made according to the degree of the one being conquered by another. The more the principle of rightness gains the upper hand.. the more the alien qi is extinguished.」[11]
4.2.2.2 朱熹的「外氣」：「… is not mixed with external qi (wai qi), but absorbs nourishment from the external qi. Let us take the fish in water as an analogy. The life of fish is not caused by water. However, only by absorbing nourishment from water can fish live. Human beings live between heaven and earh n the same way as fish live in water. The nourishment humans receive from drinking and food is all from external qi.」[12]
4.2.2.3 由此可見，「the qi of genuine origin is not mixed with the external qi but depends upon the latter for nourishment. Thus, if the external qi is turbid, it may contaminate the internal qi by causing it to have inappropriate material desires (wu yu，物欲)」[13]
5 二氣說之困難
5.1 缺乏文獻根據：沒有正直的文獻証據表示，王陽明有解釋過「客氣」等概念為何．
5.1.1 但說王陽明有精讀過二程的理論，也不是一個離譜的想法．
5.2 間接考証：
5.2.1 王陽明有把良知和夜氣作比較．
5.2.2 「孟子曰：「牛山之木嘗美矣。以其郊於大國也，斧斤伐之，可以為美乎﹖是其日夜之所息，雨露之所潤，非無萌蘗之生焉，牛羊又從而牧之，是以若彼濯濯也。人見其濯濯也，以為未嘗有材焉，此豈山之性也哉﹖雖存乎人者，豈無仁義之心哉﹖其所以放其良心者，亦猶斧斤之於木也。旦旦而伐之，可以為美乎﹖其日夜之所息，平旦之氣，其好惡與人相近也者幾希，則其旦晝之所為，有梏亡之矣。梏之反覆，則其夜氣不足以存。夜氣不足以存，則其違禽獸不遠矣。人見其禽獸也，而以為未嘗有才焉者，是豈人之情也哉﹖故苟得其養，無物不長；苟失其養，無物不消。孔子曰：『操則存，舍則亡。出入無時，莫知其鄉。』惟心之謂與！」」（孟子告子上；中華書局印，頁３３０）
5.2.3 「又曰：『良知在夜氣發的，方是本體，以其無物欲之雜也．學者要使事物紛擾之時，常如夜氣一般，就是通乎昼夜之道而知』．」（頁１１１；陳榮捷§２６８）
6 去除私欲的法門：
6.1 以良知控制異氣
6.1.1 不是要除掉異氣，而是要不受異氣影響
6.1.2 「After all, what is important is not to live in separation from the alien qi, but to get nourishment from and yet not be controlled by it. Living in complete separation from the alien qi, we will of course not have any selfish desires, but then we will have nowhere to get nourishment from either.」[14]
6.2 立志
6.2.1 問志至氣次：先生日：「『志之所至，氣亦至焉』之謂，非極至次貳之謂．持其志則養氣在其中，無暴其氣則亦持其志矣．孟子救告子之偏，故如此夾持說．」（頁２４）
6.2.2 「The will is the commander over qi, the life of a person, the root of a tree, and the source of water. When the source is blocked, water will cease to flow; when the root is not planted, a tree will wither; when the life is not continued, a person will die, and when the will is not established, the qi will make one lose consciousness…. Therefore, as soon as a slight selfish desire arises, immediately blame the non-establishment of the will and then private desires will recede; as soon as a slight alien qi is heard moving, immediately blame the non-establishment of the will and the alien qi will be gone.」（頁８９１）
7 對良知學說的可能反對：
7.1 良知學說其實包括了兩個對人性的形上學假設
7.1.1 普遍性原則：「…the strongest support for the theory of innate knowledge is that such knowledge is universally held.」[15]
7.1.2 內在原則：望文生義地，我們一般也把良知翻譯成「innate knowledge」．
7.2 John Locke式的反對：
7.2.1 普遍性與內在性的不必然：
7.2.1.1 我們就算同意「良知」是普遍的人性，也不能夠因此推出「良知」是內在的：「however, even if universal consensus indeed exists on such matters, it cannot be directly counted as a proof for their being innate, 「…if there can be any other way shown, how men may come to that universal agreement in the things they do consent in, which I presume may be done.」」[16]
7.2.2 由經驗觀察上証明不了良知是普遍的．例如：社會有打老豆；推老母落街；擲小孩落樓；兄弟不和．
7.3 Lockean的追擊：
7.3.1 「…by this they [innate ideas] are not distinguishable from other knowable truths.」[17]
7.4 Yong Huang的辯護：
7.4.1 所謂「內在」和「普遍」是一種形上學的預設，我們不應以經驗驗察作準．Richard Rorty：「…we can never know ourselves to have reached, and which we can never know we are closing in on rather than veering off from.」[18]
7.4.2 換句話說，Yong Huang贊成「良知學說」是一種道德理想，指導人應該住什麼方向走，才算得上是一個人．這形上學觀點為我們設定人是所以為人（human qua human）的界線．
8 知行合一
8.1 Huang認為「良知」是行德行必須要有的「Faith」．當我們行德時，便會反過來証明這個faith為真．
8.1.1 「One cannot have such a faith in human perfectibility unless one also believes in the original goodness of human heart/mind.」[19]
8.1.2 援引Nivison的觀點：「For to respond to the lesson the student must see it as a lesson to be learned; and if the student sees that, he or she is already moral.」
8.1.3 「So the object of moral belief is not something that exists prior to our action according to this belief; it is rather the effect of such an action. […] Now, in Wang’s view, if we have the belief or faith in the innate moral knowledge and act according to this faith, we will see this faith is true, for one will be a moral person.」[20]
8.2 但Nivison觀點似乎混淆是「道德觀念」（moral concept）、「德行」和「道德感」（moral sense）和之間的分別．一個可以學習道德觀念的人，當然需要有「道德感」．但有「道德感」和能夠學習「道德觀念」的人，卻不一定已經是一個有德行或道德的人．
8.2.1 例如，小明上德育課，他有能力學習為謂道德．他當要有道德感（有良知）．但這不代表，小明已經是一個有道德人．這是兩個不同層面的問題．
8.2.2 因為有德之人不等同性善之人．如Huang自己所說，良知和性善是一個形上理想．但現實上是否一個有德之人，還得看是否有德行．
8.3 再者，我們亦不能由德行去反証道德信念（如良知）為真．因為這混淆了因果關係．說「we will see this faith is true」是一種是不明確的說法．
8.4 就算引康德[21]也解釋不了，反而增加了乞題的嫌疑．因為康德的觀點是先假設了自由意志為可能．但這和Huang想証明的東西（道德行動証明良知或道德理想為真）沒有多大的關係．
9 「性」「才」之別
9.1 在這筆記中，不贅歸納．因為在很多的文章中，也有解王陽明的「金喻」．「金喻」不難理解．
10 體認
10.1 Yong Huang提到一點她還未處理的問題，頗值得我們留意．
10.2 她說在王陽明的哲學中，有一個「體認」的概念．她認為這概念等同於innate experience．究竟這個說法合理嗎？
10.3 體認（根據Huang）有以下特性：
10.3.1 第一，它不屬於智性的範疇（intellectual enterprise）．
10.3.2 第二，這是一種「自得」的狀態．「自得」是一種感到道德如悅的心理狀態．「The second is his idea of joy in acting according to one’s moral knowledge.」[22]
10.3.3 我認為，如果以「體認」去理解「如惡惡臭，如好好色」，或許可以比Cua[23]的心理類比更好．
[1] P393.8
[2] P396.8
[3] p395.7 or endnote 10
[4] p395.8
[5] P397.4
[6] P397.2
[7] P397.3
[8] P397.8; endnote 16
[9] P398.5
[10] P398.8
[11] P399.5
[12] P399.7
[13] P399.10
[14] P400.7
[15] P401.3
[16] P401.5
[17] P402.3; endnote 27
[18] P402.7; endnote 29
[19] P402.8
[20] P403.6
[21] P403.5
[22] P405.8
[23] A.S. Cua , The unity of knowledge and action : a study in Wang Yang-ming's moral psychology, (Honolulu : University Press of Hawaii), 1982
Yong Huang, "A Neo-Confucian conception of wisdom: Wang Yangming on the Innate Moral Knowledge (Liangzhi)", in Journal of Chinese Philosophy, vol33, no.3, pp.393 - 408,Sept., 2006
（頁ｘ）是指王陽明全集（紅旗出版社）中的頁數
（陳榮捷§ｘ）當然是指陳榮捷編譯的傳習錄中的節數）
1 目標：
1.1 「Examine Wang’s idea of Liangzhi as moral knowledge innate in everyone;」
1.2 「Analyze Wang’s view of distinction between sages and common people despite the fact that moral knowledge is innate in both;」
1.3 Huang主要想回答，於王陽明的哲學系統中，良知究竟有幾可信．這回答主要透過一條問題展現：「如果良知必然有能力且保証道德行為的發生，為什麼人類又會有惡行？」
1.3.1 「Explore the issue of the credibility of Wang’s conception of moral knowledge.」[1]
1.3.2 「In this view, to have moral knowledge and yet be unable to act morally is a self-contradiction, for knowledge and action are one and the same thing.」[2]
2 兩種「知」
2.1 良知
2.1.1 不學而能，不學而知．（盡心上）
2.1.2 「心之本體」（陳榮捷§８）
2.1.3 「不假外求」（陳榮捷§８）
2.1.4 「…naturally urge us to search for such knowledge.」
2.2 知識（見聞之知）
2.2.1 因應實際處境而應變的知識．
2.2.2 沒有獨立地位的．
2.2.2.1 勞思光（Lao Si-guang）「…Wangs says that nonmoral knowledge should not be sought after if it is not useful for moral knowledge and therefore does not have an independent role.」[3]
2.2.2.2 「…all non moral knowledge that we think we should pursue, including the sciences, medicine arts, history, and literature, is necessary for the moral knowledge to function.」[4]
2.2.3 如果缺乏良知的引導，見聞之知的增長，不一定是好事．因為見聞之知有可能只是令人更貪婪．
2.2.3.1 「後世不知作聖人本是純乎天理，却專去知識才能上求聖人．以為聖人無所不知，無所不能，我須是將聖人許多知識才能逐一理會始得．故不務去天理上着工夫，徒弊精竭力，從冊子上鑽研，名物上考索，形跡上比拟，知識愈廣而人欲愈滋，才力愈多，而天理愈蔽．」（頁２９；陳榮捷§９９）
2.2.4 （頁１１４）
3 「惡」又是什麼？
3.1 「惡」從何來？[5]
3.1.1 「惡」只是私欲．[6]
3.1.2 類比：如雲敝日；如塵蓋鏡．[7]
3.2 P J Ivanhoe：
3.2.1 氣之清濁：「qi naturally occurs in varying degrees of “coarseness” or “turbidity” and that the quality of the qi, which different people receive at birth.」[8]
3.2.2 「… the innate moral knowledge is originally transparent. Those whose physical qi (qizhi) is not excellent are not easily enlightened to it because of the large amount of dregs and heavy layer of obscuration. Those whose physical qi excellent have few dregs and little obscuration. Thus with a little effort to regain the sight of the innate moral knowledge, this innate moral knowledge becomes transparent to them.」（頁７０）
3.2.3 中譯：「良知本來自明．氣質不美者，渣滓多，障蔽厚，不易開明．質美者渣滓少，無多障蔽，略加致知之功，此良知便自瑩徹，．．．」
3.2.4 中譯：陳榮捷§１６４．
3.2.5 「… the physical qi (qizhi) is what both houses and obscuresn the human nature (xing). The physical qi varies and the human nature follows. Human nature is like a ball. It is bright when falling into a clear pool, becomes blurred when falling into turbid water, and becomes filthy if falling into filthy water. The wise people are in the clear pool, common people are in the turbid water, and stupid people below are in the filthy water.」（頁１０３５－３６）
3.2.6 中譯：「氣質者，性之所寓也，亦性之所由蔽也．氣質異而性隨之．譬之珠焉，墮於澄淵則明，墮於濁水則昏，墮於污穢則穢．澄淵，上智也；濁水，凡庶也；污穢，下愚也．」
3.3 氣是人的媒介，如果沒有氣，性也不能顯露．
3.3.1 「…the good human nature can only be seen from qi. Without qi, good human nature cannot be seen. Feelings of commiseration, shame and dislike, deference and compliance, and right and wrong are all qi」
3.3.2 「然性善之端須在氣上始見得，若無氣亦無可見矣．」（頁６３）
3.3.3 「… human nature is qi, and qi is human nature. Originally there is no distinction between human nature and qi.」（頁６３－６４）
3.3.4 中譯：「．．．氣即是性，性即是氣，原無性氣之可分也．」
3.3.5 二程：「… to talk about human nature without talking about qi is not complete, and to talk about qi without talking about human nature is not illuminating.」[9]
3.3.6 這解釋會使問題轉向了：惡如何和「氣」中生成？
3.3.7 為何性是善的，而氣則是惡的？
4 二氣說
4.1 有形之氣「qi constitutive of human beings as beings with shape (you xing).」[10]
4.1.1 人之所以為人之氣──主氣（host qi）．
4.1.2 這種氣是不能產生惡的．
4.2 客氣（ke qi）
4.2.1 又作「alien qi」（異氣）或「guest qi」（客氣）．
4.2.1.1 「性一而已，仁義禮智，性之『性』也；聰明睿知，性之質也；喜怒哀樂，性之『情』也；私欲客氣，性之『蔽』也．『質』有清濁，故」情有過不及，而『蔽』有淺深也．私欲客氣，一病兩痛．非二物也，張、黃、諸葛及韓、范諸公，皆天質之美，自多暗合道妙；雖未可盡謂之學，盡謂之聞道，然亦自其有學，違道不遠者也．使其聞學知道，即伊、傳、周、召矣．若文中子則又不可謂之不知學者，其書雖多出於其徒．
4.2.1.2 陳榮捷§１６５
4.2.2 但陽明其實沒有處理何為客氣，Yong Huang援引張載和朱熹的話
4.2.2.1 「… the principle of rightness (yili) and the alien qi conquer each other frequently. The distinction between superior persons (junzi) and inferior persons (xiaoren) is made according to the degree of the one being conquered by another. The more the principle of rightness gains the upper hand.. the more the alien qi is extinguished.」[11]
4.2.2.2 朱熹的「外氣」：「… is not mixed with external qi (wai qi), but absorbs nourishment from the external qi. Let us take the fish in water as an analogy. The life of fish is not caused by water. However, only by absorbing nourishment from water can fish live. Human beings live between heaven and earh n the same way as fish live in water. The nourishment humans receive from drinking and food is all from external qi.」[12]
4.2.2.3 由此可見，「the qi of genuine origin is not mixed with the external qi but depends upon the latter for nourishment. Thus, if the external qi is turbid, it may contaminate the internal qi by causing it to have inappropriate material desires (wu yu，物欲)」[13]
5 二氣說之困難
5.1 缺乏文獻根據：沒有正直的文獻証據表示，王陽明有解釋過「客氣」等概念為何．
5.1.1 但說王陽明有精讀過二程的理論，也不是一個離譜的想法．
5.2 間接考証：
5.2.1 王陽明有把良知和夜氣作比較．
5.2.2 「孟子曰：「牛山之木嘗美矣。以其郊於大國也，斧斤伐之，可以為美乎﹖是其日夜之所息，雨露之所潤，非無萌蘗之生焉，牛羊又從而牧之，是以若彼濯濯也。人見其濯濯也，以為未嘗有材焉，此豈山之性也哉﹖雖存乎人者，豈無仁義之心哉﹖其所以放其良心者，亦猶斧斤之於木也。旦旦而伐之，可以為美乎﹖其日夜之所息，平旦之氣，其好惡與人相近也者幾希，則其旦晝之所為，有梏亡之矣。梏之反覆，則其夜氣不足以存。夜氣不足以存，則其違禽獸不遠矣。人見其禽獸也，而以為未嘗有才焉者，是豈人之情也哉﹖故苟得其養，無物不長；苟失其養，無物不消。孔子曰：『操則存，舍則亡。出入無時，莫知其鄉。』惟心之謂與！」」（孟子告子上；中華書局印，頁３３０）
5.2.3 「又曰：『良知在夜氣發的，方是本體，以其無物欲之雜也．學者要使事物紛擾之時，常如夜氣一般，就是通乎昼夜之道而知』．」（頁１１１；陳榮捷§２６８）
6 去除私欲的法門：
6.1 以良知控制異氣
6.1.1 不是要除掉異氣，而是要不受異氣影響
6.1.2 「After all, what is important is not to live in separation from the alien qi, but to get nourishment from and yet not be controlled by it. Living in complete separation from the alien qi, we will of course not have any selfish desires, but then we will have nowhere to get nourishment from either.」[14]
6.2 立志
6.2.1 問志至氣次：先生日：「『志之所至，氣亦至焉』之謂，非極至次貳之謂．持其志則養氣在其中，無暴其氣則亦持其志矣．孟子救告子之偏，故如此夾持說．」（頁２４）
6.2.2 「The will is the commander over qi, the life of a person, the root of a tree, and the source of water. When the source is blocked, water will cease to flow; when the root is not planted, a tree will wither; when the life is not continued, a person will die, and when the will is not established, the qi will make one lose consciousness…. Therefore, as soon as a slight selfish desire arises, immediately blame the non-establishment of the will and then private desires will recede; as soon as a slight alien qi is heard moving, immediately blame the non-establishment of the will and the alien qi will be gone.」（頁８９１）
7 對良知學說的可能反對：
7.1 良知學說其實包括了兩個對人性的形上學假設
7.1.1 普遍性原則：「…the strongest support for the theory of innate knowledge is that such knowledge is universally held.」[15]
7.1.2 內在原則：望文生義地，我們一般也把良知翻譯成「innate knowledge」．
7.2 John Locke式的反對：
7.2.1 普遍性與內在性的不必然：
7.2.1.1 我們就算同意「良知」是普遍的人性，也不能夠因此推出「良知」是內在的：「however, even if universal consensus indeed exists on such matters, it cannot be directly counted as a proof for their being innate, 「…if there can be any other way shown, how men may come to that universal agreement in the things they do consent in, which I presume may be done.」」[16]
7.2.2 由經驗觀察上証明不了良知是普遍的．例如：社會有打老豆；推老母落街；擲小孩落樓；兄弟不和．
7.3 Lockean的追擊：
7.3.1 「…by this they [innate ideas] are not distinguishable from other knowable truths.」[17]
7.4 Yong Huang的辯護：
7.4.1 所謂「內在」和「普遍」是一種形上學的預設，我們不應以經驗驗察作準．Richard Rorty：「…we can never know ourselves to have reached, and which we can never know we are closing in on rather than veering off from.」[18]
7.4.2 換句話說，Yong Huang贊成「良知學說」是一種道德理想，指導人應該住什麼方向走，才算得上是一個人．這形上學觀點為我們設定人是所以為人（human qua human）的界線．
8 知行合一
8.1 Huang認為「良知」是行德行必須要有的「Faith」．當我們行德時，便會反過來証明這個faith為真．
8.1.1 「One cannot have such a faith in human perfectibility unless one also believes in the original goodness of human heart/mind.」[19]
8.1.2 援引Nivison的觀點：「For to respond to the lesson the student must see it as a lesson to be learned; and if the student sees that, he or she is already moral.」
8.1.3 「So the object of moral belief is not something that exists prior to our action according to this belief; it is rather the effect of such an action. […] Now, in Wang’s view, if we have the belief or faith in the innate moral knowledge and act according to this faith, we will see this faith is true, for one will be a moral person.」[20]
8.2 但Nivison觀點似乎混淆是「道德觀念」（moral concept）、「德行」和「道德感」（moral sense）和之間的分別．一個可以學習道德觀念的人，當然需要有「道德感」．但有「道德感」和能夠學習「道德觀念」的人，卻不一定已經是一個有德行或道德的人．
8.2.1 例如，小明上德育課，他有能力學習為謂道德．他當要有道德感（有良知）．但這不代表，小明已經是一個有道德人．這是兩個不同層面的問題．
8.2.2 因為有德之人不等同性善之人．如Huang自己所說，良知和性善是一個形上理想．但現實上是否一個有德之人，還得看是否有德行．
8.3 再者，我們亦不能由德行去反証道德信念（如良知）為真．因為這混淆了因果關係．說「we will see this faith is true」是一種是不明確的說法．
8.4 就算引康德[21]也解釋不了，反而增加了乞題的嫌疑．因為康德的觀點是先假設了自由意志為可能．但這和Huang想証明的東西（道德行動証明良知或道德理想為真）沒有多大的關係．
9 「性」「才」之別
9.1 在這筆記中，不贅歸納．因為在很多的文章中，也有解王陽明的「金喻」．「金喻」不難理解．
10 體認
10.1 Yong Huang提到一點她還未處理的問題，頗值得我們留意．
10.2 她說在王陽明的哲學中，有一個「體認」的概念．她認為這概念等同於innate experience．究竟這個說法合理嗎？
10.3 體認（根據Huang）有以下特性：
10.3.1 第一，它不屬於智性的範疇（intellectual enterprise）．
10.3.2 第二，這是一種「自得」的狀態．「自得」是一種感到道德如悅的心理狀態．「The second is his idea of joy in acting according to one’s moral knowledge.」[22]
10.3.3 我認為，如果以「體認」去理解「如惡惡臭，如好好色」，或許可以比Cua[23]的心理類比更好．
[1] P393.8
[2] P396.8
[3] p395.7 or endnote 10
[4] p395.8
[5] P397.4
[6] P397.2
[7] P397.3
[8] P397.8; endnote 16
[9] P398.5
[10] P398.8
[11] P399.5
[12] P399.7
[13] P399.10
[14] P400.7
[15] P401.3
[16] P401.5
[17] P402.3; endnote 27
[18] P402.7; endnote 29
[19] P402.8
[20] P403.6
[21] P403.5
[22] P405.8
[23] A.S. Cua , The unity of knowledge and action : a study in Wang Yang-ming's moral psychology, (Honolulu : University Press of Hawaii), 1982
2007年8月14日星期二
The idea of life plan 筆記
The idea of life plan 筆記
1 主要目標：
1.1 論証一個理性的人生計劃（Rational Life Plan ）不能為人類定義出何為美滿人生（Good Life ）或善（Good）．
1.2 人沒有能力全面地把握和定義個人的善． [1]
2 歷史起源
2.1 蘇格拉底：The unexamined life is not worth living ． [2]
2.1.1 仿彿這是真理一樣．"The idea … may seem little better than truism "． [3]
2.2 拍拉圖：Er at the end of Plato's Republic ． [4]
2.3 亞里士多德：Book 1, ch.2, 1214b7-13 ． [5]
2.4 兩個Underlying assumptions:
2.4.1 我們把人生看待成單單只是同一個整體，而不是一種不斷的活動．"The most obvious among its key elements is the conviction that a life as a whole, and not simply this course of action or that trait of character, can become the object of ethical evaluation. [6]"
2.4.2 我們想以一種局外人的觀點去評鑑人生．"It is that in reflecting upon our life as a whole we are to look at it from the outside – timelessly, as it were. " [7]
3 Rawls 的觀點
3.1 Royce ："A person individual self, may be defined as a human life lived according to a plan. " [8]
3.2 Rawlsian principle ：事情對某君而言，是否美善，須藉人生計劃來定義的．Larmore 認為，這是一個嚴重的錯誤："In my view, the fatal assumption is precisely the idea that what is good for a person must hinge on his purposes. " [9]
3.2.1 "A thing's being a good X for K is treated as equivalent to its having the properties which it is rational for K to want in an X in view of his interests and aims." [10] （某事物（Ｘ）對某人（Ｋ）是美好的，意思等如說：某人（Ｋ）把某事物（Ｘ）看待成與他有關的利益和目標，並且該事物（Ｘ）帶有（Ｋ）可以合乎理性地欲求這些性質。 ）
4 Larmore的反對
4.1 困難一：Rawls 似乎推得太快．他直接把Royce的觀點"人須要藉 Life Plan去了解自我"變成他的觀點"人的美善亦須要藉 Life Plan來定義"
4.1.1 "Our self-understanding may indeed find expression in our aims. But rooted as it is in our past experience, does it not also involve the memory of things which have fortunate happened to us despite our goals at the time? … Rawls, however, seems to believe that if our self-conception is defined by our purposes, our individual good is so defined as well. " [11]
4.2 困難二：Life Plan 是須是被構成的，Rawls 的觀點不能說明Life Plan的基礎．
4.2.1 "… the life plan which determines a person's good depends on purposes he can formulate at the time of the plan's conception. Thus, there is an essential reference to the present in the reasoning by which life plans are to be constructed. " [12]很明顯，人生計劃是一種後起的計劃，我們必須先有人生，才有根據個別的人生來制定計劃．
4.3 困難三：一種對任何事情保持最開放，以使們有可能達致美好人生的態度，根本就是一種嘗試以局外人（抽空了時空考慮）的身份來鑑定人生的態度．這無助於我們藉人生計劃去定義美善．因為人的一生中，可以包括多於一個自我．
4.3.1 "According to Rawls, we are to give full consideration to all of our possibilities and to look to our future good as a whole. That means that we are not to determine the nature of our good by appealing simply to our commitments at the time, for they too must be pondered and weighed. " [13]
4.3.2 "No life plan is rational if it resorts to "pure time-preference." It may not accord greater weight to interests we have at one time – and, in particular, to the interests we have at present – than to those we would have at another, simply because of their difference in time. On the contrary, the preference given to some interests over others must reflect the belief that they contribute more to our good as a whole. " [14]
4.4 就算我們能夠回避自責自己不夠明智，也不能回避自責自己把明智放於過高的位置．
4.4.1 "In retrospect we may wish that, instead of weighing our options judiciously we had acted impulsively, letting ourselves be carried away by the passions of the moment, since then a good would have been ours whose value we only for as a matter of fact no single value is supreme. This sort of pluralism, I would say, is the very essence of my view. And it provides for on clear sense in which the prudent person cannot be certain to escape self-reproach. "（粗體為筆者所加．） [15]
5 兩種Good
5.1 Anticipated good ：一種藉理性計劃去定義的善
5.1.1 For if goodness is understood along these lines, a thing will not count as truly good unless the grounds on which the person determines what he should want can themselves be certified as rational. [16]
5.2 Unexpected good ：一種非藉計劃去定義的善
6 其他反對
6.1 Larmore 認為以下的反對都不是最有力的攻擊．
6.1.1 "Rawls has lost touch with the natural rhythm of human finitude. " [17]
6.1.1.1 人是有限的存有：只擁有有限的時間；有限的金錢；有限的生命；有限智慧云云．
6.1.1.2 幼年時期，我們根本不需要有計劃．
6.1.2 但這個反對不一定與Rawls的觀點有衝突．
6.1.2.1 "It rightly observes that a life plan has no proper role to play in the goods of childhood. But it says nothing to challenge the assumption that mature persons should bring their lives under the rule of a ration plan. " [18]
6.2 "… deliberative rationality looks beyond the present. " [19]
6.2.1 Bernard William 式的反對：
6.2.1.1 "deliberation is always situated, dependent upon the beliefs and interests which are ours at the time. " [20]
6.2.1.2 "The perspective of deliberative choice on one's life is constitutively from here. " [21]
6.2.1.3 William 嘗試區分practical和 theoretical理性，但 Larmore認為：" The only difference I discern between theoretical and practival reason involves simply their subject matter: the one governs what we are to believe, the other what we are to do. " [22]
6.2.2 Larmore 認為，這種想法，並不能如他的反對那麼强．因為這只能說是怪責我們不夠明智，而不是批判明智本身．
7 釐清
7.1 Larmore 小心地釐清，他不是反對一個Rational Life 的重要性；他只是反對Rawlsian principle ：個人的善可以完全地藉人生計劃來定義． [23]
7.2 人生可以因為某些unexpected good 而改變，我們的人生計劃也是如此．
7.2.1 例如：根據盧傑雄本來的計劃，他本來是想成為一個哲學家的．但在一次機緣巧合下，他得到了一次買賣股票的機會．本來，根據他的計劃下（配以全面的deliberative rationality ），炒股本應不是一種Good．但經歷了這次經驗之後，他發現了成為股神才能使他有一個美滿人生．
7.2.2 "In this case, the good is not being judged by reference to his purposes; rather, his purposes are justified by appeal to something he understands to have been good for him. " [24]
7.3 為何我們會把明智誤以為是最高德性：
7.3.1 因為這可以在心理上減少面對未知時數的不安．"To make our life the object of a plan, however well-informed and carefully arranged the plan might be, means closing our minds to the lessons future experience will impart. " [25]
7.3.1.1 但同時，這想法令驚喜和機遇也拒絕．
8 問題
8.1 當我們自責我們錯誤地把明智當作是最高的德性和誤以為人生計劃可以定義個人善時，我們究竟是以那種標準作出此自責？
8.2 責備自己不夠明智和責備自己把明智放得太多，並不是同一種"責備"．後一種責備，真的能夠成立嗎？當unexpected good or bad 是真是如此unexpected．
這句實在感動．
The good life outruns the reach of planning is the beginning of wisdom, for it is to understand why wisdom is something more than prudence.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] P103.7
[2] P100.3
[3] P100.4
[4] P101.3; and footnote 9
[5] Footnote 10
[6] P100.5
[7] P100.7
[8] P102.10 – 103.1
[9] P109.8
[10] TJ.p523
[11] P103.4
[12] P104.4
[13] P104.7
[14] P104.10 – 105.1
[15] P108.5 – 108.7
[16] P104.2
[17] P105.6
[18] P106.6 – 106.7
[19] P106.7
[20] P107.1
[21] Footnote 25
[22] P108.3
[23] P110.5
[24] P110.10
[25] P112.4
1 主要目標：
1.1 論証一個理性的人生計劃（Rational Life Plan ）不能為人類定義出何為美滿人生（Good Life ）或善（Good）．
1.2 人沒有能力全面地把握和定義個人的善． [1]
2 歷史起源
2.1 蘇格拉底：The unexamined life is not worth living ． [2]
2.1.1 仿彿這是真理一樣．"The idea … may seem little better than truism "． [3]
2.2 拍拉圖：Er at the end of Plato's Republic ． [4]
2.3 亞里士多德：Book 1, ch.2, 1214b7-13 ． [5]
2.4 兩個Underlying assumptions:
2.4.1 我們把人生看待成單單只是同一個整體，而不是一種不斷的活動．"The most obvious among its key elements is the conviction that a life as a whole, and not simply this course of action or that trait of character, can become the object of ethical evaluation. [6]"
2.4.2 我們想以一種局外人的觀點去評鑑人生．"It is that in reflecting upon our life as a whole we are to look at it from the outside – timelessly, as it were. " [7]
3 Rawls 的觀點
3.1 Royce ："A person individual self, may be defined as a human life lived according to a plan. " [8]
3.2 Rawlsian principle ：事情對某君而言，是否美善，須藉人生計劃來定義的．Larmore 認為，這是一個嚴重的錯誤："In my view, the fatal assumption is precisely the idea that what is good for a person must hinge on his purposes. " [9]
3.2.1 "A thing's being a good X for K is treated as equivalent to its having the properties which it is rational for K to want in an X in view of his interests and aims." [10] （某事物（Ｘ）對某人（Ｋ）是美好的，意思等如說：某人（Ｋ）把某事物（Ｘ）看待成與他有關的利益和目標，並且該事物（Ｘ）帶有（Ｋ）可以合乎理性地欲求這些性質。 ）
4 Larmore的反對
4.1 困難一：Rawls 似乎推得太快．他直接把Royce的觀點"人須要藉 Life Plan去了解自我"變成他的觀點"人的美善亦須要藉 Life Plan來定義"
4.1.1 "Our self-understanding may indeed find expression in our aims. But rooted as it is in our past experience, does it not also involve the memory of things which have fortunate happened to us despite our goals at the time? … Rawls, however, seems to believe that if our self-conception is defined by our purposes, our individual good is so defined as well. " [11]
4.2 困難二：Life Plan 是須是被構成的，Rawls 的觀點不能說明Life Plan的基礎．
4.2.1 "… the life plan which determines a person's good depends on purposes he can formulate at the time of the plan's conception. Thus, there is an essential reference to the present in the reasoning by which life plans are to be constructed. " [12]很明顯，人生計劃是一種後起的計劃，我們必須先有人生，才有根據個別的人生來制定計劃．
4.3 困難三：一種對任何事情保持最開放，以使們有可能達致美好人生的態度，根本就是一種嘗試以局外人（抽空了時空考慮）的身份來鑑定人生的態度．這無助於我們藉人生計劃去定義美善．因為人的一生中，可以包括多於一個自我．
4.3.1 "According to Rawls, we are to give full consideration to all of our possibilities and to look to our future good as a whole. That means that we are not to determine the nature of our good by appealing simply to our commitments at the time, for they too must be pondered and weighed. " [13]
4.3.2 "No life plan is rational if it resorts to "pure time-preference." It may not accord greater weight to interests we have at one time – and, in particular, to the interests we have at present – than to those we would have at another, simply because of their difference in time. On the contrary, the preference given to some interests over others must reflect the belief that they contribute more to our good as a whole. " [14]
4.4 就算我們能夠回避自責自己不夠明智，也不能回避自責自己把明智放於過高的位置．
4.4.1 "In retrospect we may wish that, instead of weighing our options judiciously we had acted impulsively, letting ourselves be carried away by the passions of the moment, since then a good would have been ours whose value we only for as a matter of fact no single value is supreme. This sort of pluralism, I would say, is the very essence of my view. And it provides for on clear sense in which the prudent person cannot be certain to escape self-reproach. "（粗體為筆者所加．） [15]
5 兩種Good
5.1 Anticipated good ：一種藉理性計劃去定義的善
5.1.1 For if goodness is understood along these lines, a thing will not count as truly good unless the grounds on which the person determines what he should want can themselves be certified as rational. [16]
5.2 Unexpected good ：一種非藉計劃去定義的善
6 其他反對
6.1 Larmore 認為以下的反對都不是最有力的攻擊．
6.1.1 "Rawls has lost touch with the natural rhythm of human finitude. " [17]
6.1.1.1 人是有限的存有：只擁有有限的時間；有限的金錢；有限的生命；有限智慧云云．
6.1.1.2 幼年時期，我們根本不需要有計劃．
6.1.2 但這個反對不一定與Rawls的觀點有衝突．
6.1.2.1 "It rightly observes that a life plan has no proper role to play in the goods of childhood. But it says nothing to challenge the assumption that mature persons should bring their lives under the rule of a ration plan. " [18]
6.2 "… deliberative rationality looks beyond the present. " [19]
6.2.1 Bernard William 式的反對：
6.2.1.1 "deliberation is always situated, dependent upon the beliefs and interests which are ours at the time. " [20]
6.2.1.2 "The perspective of deliberative choice on one's life is constitutively from here. " [21]
6.2.1.3 William 嘗試區分practical和 theoretical理性，但 Larmore認為：" The only difference I discern between theoretical and practival reason involves simply their subject matter: the one governs what we are to believe, the other what we are to do. " [22]
6.2.2 Larmore 認為，這種想法，並不能如他的反對那麼强．因為這只能說是怪責我們不夠明智，而不是批判明智本身．
7 釐清
7.1 Larmore 小心地釐清，他不是反對一個Rational Life 的重要性；他只是反對Rawlsian principle ：個人的善可以完全地藉人生計劃來定義． [23]
7.2 人生可以因為某些unexpected good 而改變，我們的人生計劃也是如此．
7.2.1 例如：根據盧傑雄本來的計劃，他本來是想成為一個哲學家的．但在一次機緣巧合下，他得到了一次買賣股票的機會．本來，根據他的計劃下（配以全面的deliberative rationality ），炒股本應不是一種Good．但經歷了這次經驗之後，他發現了成為股神才能使他有一個美滿人生．
7.2.2 "In this case, the good is not being judged by reference to his purposes; rather, his purposes are justified by appeal to something he understands to have been good for him. " [24]
7.3 為何我們會把明智誤以為是最高德性：
7.3.1 因為這可以在心理上減少面對未知時數的不安．"To make our life the object of a plan, however well-informed and carefully arranged the plan might be, means closing our minds to the lessons future experience will impart. " [25]
7.3.1.1 但同時，這想法令驚喜和機遇也拒絕．
8 問題
8.1 當我們自責我們錯誤地把明智當作是最高的德性和誤以為人生計劃可以定義個人善時，我們究竟是以那種標準作出此自責？
8.2 責備自己不夠明智和責備自己把明智放得太多，並不是同一種"責備"．後一種責備，真的能夠成立嗎？當unexpected good or bad 是真是如此unexpected．
這句實在感動．
The good life outruns the reach of planning is the beginning of wisdom, for it is to understand why wisdom is something more than prudence.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] P103.7
[2] P100.3
[3] P100.4
[4] P101.3; and footnote 9
[5] Footnote 10
[6] P100.5
[7] P100.7
[8] P102.10 – 103.1
[9] P109.8
[10] TJ.p523
[11] P103.4
[12] P104.4
[13] P104.7
[14] P104.10 – 105.1
[15] P108.5 – 108.7
[16] P104.2
[17] P105.6
[18] P106.6 – 106.7
[19] P106.7
[20] P107.1
[21] Footnote 25
[22] P108.3
[23] P110.5
[24] P110.10
[25] P112.4
2007年7月19日星期四
〈Hegel's Philosophy of Mind〉筆記
主要目標
Taylor在“Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind”中的目標，是想為行動哲學，引入一種Hegelian的理解。
「精神是不息的活動」“Geist (Mind / Spirit) for Hegel is thoroughgoing Tatigkeit (activity)” [1]。Taylor以這句說話作為文章的開端，可見這句話的重要性。因為這與Hegel的行動哲學有很大的關係。
如果要了解Taylor有關這篇文章的大略，我們可以先讀最後一節“V”。他把行文的脈絡，放到了最後。
主要關心三個問題[2]
第一，行動的性質是什麼？（“what is the nature of action?”）；
第二，什麼可以區分（人的）行動和其他事件？（“What distinguishes (human) action from other kinds of events?”）；
第三，行動有什麼奇特的特性？（“What are the peculiar features of action?”）
第一部份 ── 背景交待[3]
化約論（The view of reductionism）
其中一種試途解釋人類行動的方式，是一種還原論的方式。我們嘗試找出行動的原因（sufficient cause）。例如，我們會把人類的行動歸結為欲求（desire），意向（intentions）或相念（belief）的結果。三者互相結合，產生了人類行動。又或者，我們透把行動化約成一些心理學或神經科學的因果關係，去解釋行動的原因。[4]
二元論解式（dualism）
Taylor認為，導致還原論的出現，原因在於，由笛卡兒開始，我們便嘗試以心物二元論的方式去解釋人的行動。二元論式的解釋認為，一個行動之所以是行動，是因為我們可以一種內在心靈背景去區分（mental background）行動與非行動。[5] Taylor認為，二元論導致「內外事件背景的本體論分離」。（ontological separation between outer event and inner background）[6]
「本體論分離」之所以是一個重要的，哲學上的困難，是因為當我們要解釋行動時，我們須訴諸兩個條件。第一，行動是必會與外在世界發生關係，例如：我拿吃蘋果。當我的手移向桌上的蘋果時，這便明顯是一種我與世界的一種外在事件（outer event）。另一方面，我們亦需要訴諸我的心靈狀態，例如：我想吃蘋果。我們手之所以拿蘋果，原因是我們內心發生了一種想吃蘋果的欲求，這是一種內在事件（inner event）。但如笛卡兒面對的詰難一樣，沒有廣延性的心靈，又如何可以成為有廣延性的行動的原因？所以，還原論式的解答才會出現，因為還原論其實就是一種除消了心靈實體的解答。把一切都化約成神經元的物理現象。
內在指向（The view of intrinsically directed）
針對這個困難，Taylor認為我們可以有一種，qualitative的解釋，去分辨行動與非行動。這種qualitative的解釋，可以消解「本體論上的心物分離」這困難。「種種行動，某程度上，都內含於種種目標之中，被目標指揮。如是者行動和目標是本體論上不可分割的。」“Actions are in a sense inhabited by the purposes which direct them, so that action and purpose are ontologically inseparable.”[7]在這點上，行動之所以為行動，是因為行動是帶有目的性的。而且，目的只可以在一個進行中的行動中被表達清楚。“it can only exist in animating this action; or its only articulation as a purpose is in animating the action; or perhaps a fundamental articulation of this purpose, on which all others depend, lies in the action.”[8]
如以亞里氏多德的觀點理解，“行動”和“目的”之間的關係，就如“質料”和“形式”之間的關係。兩者是不能分割的。倘若兩種東西ａ和ｂ是可分割的，那即是指，ａ可以獨立於ｂ之外存在，反之亦然。[9]以桌子為例，它是以“形式”加“質料”而存在。如果二缺其一，桌子便可成桌子。王陽明也有一個“理”“氣”的說法，可以幫助我們中國化後，行動和目的之間的關係：
「精一之精以理言。精神之精以氣言。理者氣之條理。氣者理之運用。無條理，則不能運用。無運用，則亦無以見其所謂條理者矣。精則精，精則明，精則一，精則神，精則誠。一則精，一則明，一則神，一則誠。原非有二事也。」（傳習錄，153）
行動與行動者的關（action and agents）
一個主體能被稱之為“行動者”，原因就是因為他可以有“行動”。同理，一個行動之所以為“行動”，原因就是因為他是“行動者的”說行動與非行動有質上的分別，因為行動並不是原因並是因為物理性質的，而是主體的。這便一種對行動的「內在指向性的觀點」。
第二部份 ── qualitative view所衍生的兩個結果[10]
行動者知識Agent’s knowledge
由這種內在指向性的觀點，會產生出以下的衍生結論。第一：它是一種屬於行動者的知識（Agent’s knowledge）。說它是一種行者的知識，因為行動者可以不完全了解和完全不了解外在世界的情況下，行動者亦可以知道自己的行動。
如前述一樣，這種對行動的知識是把行動者看待成一個可以帶有指向性（directedness）的生物。行動者是一種會進行articulation的生物，不是一種只會進行description的生物。
「articulation」（搞清楚）與「description」（描述）不同。當我們描述一條事情的時候，我們只是把被描述的項目當作一個完全外在於描述者的對象（object）。描述活動並不會對被描述項構成什麼影響。描述活動不會豐富被描述項的內容。
「Now these articulations are not simply descriptions, if we mean by this characterization of a fully independent object, that is, an object which is altered neither in what it is, nor in the degree or manner of its evidence to us by description.」 [11]
Articulation則不僅是一個描述活動，而是一個比描述活動更豐富的活動。當我們搞清楚一個事項時，搞清楚本身可以令對象的內容有所改變。以藝術比喻說明，我們可把articulation比喻成創造一件藝術品的過程。雕塑家創造石雕時，他所從事的活動，就是articulation。因為當雕塑家構想雕塑和動工時，他不僅描述石材的石質，線條和顏色。同時，他在改變石材的性質。他不斷地雕刻石材，直到他心目中的構想，清楚地呈現於觀眾的面前。
Taylor認為，人對自我的詮釋活，其實是一種articulation。當我們嘗試向其他人或自己解釋自己其實是什麼的時候，我們並不是單純地作出一個科學描述，把自我當作一個心理對象或物理對象去解釋。Williams把這種description說成是一種「absolute description」（絕對述描）[12]。相反，大家對自我的解釋，同樣是帶有塑造性的[13]。「詮釋」，「評鑑」或「解釋」，全都帶有這些articulation的特性。
就「Articulation」一詞外，Taylor還用「constitutive interpretation」[14]作為其性質。望文生義，「constitutive」解作「構成」。同樣是指塑造。當我們說：“我是一個好人時，這句說話，（如上述解釋一樣），不單僅是一句描述性語句，亦同是一句構成性的自我詮釋。
由於articulation是一種帶有指向性的活動，而這種指向性的活動是一種屬於主體的內在自我意識。換句話說，我們不能從一個絕對地客觀的觀（absolute standpoint）去了解行動者。
自我覺察（Self-awareness）
第二個衍生結論就是，人類的自我意識。黑格爾持一個有機體的形上觀。這種觀點認為，宇宙是一個有機（organic）的存有，最終會發展出一種有自我理解的能力。就如人體一樣，人體是由無數的細胞所組成的。這些細胞本是亦是由一些更細小的物質所組成的。一個有意志的人，其實，在物質上，並沒有比原身的所構成他的物質，多出了什麼。但人卻有自我察覺和反省的能力。又如一個國家，構成國家的，必然是所有人民和土地，但國家本身，似乎要比人民和土地加起來還要多。多出來的，不是額外的土地和人民，而是多出了一種自我監察、帶有目的性的，和自我覺察能力的結構。
「If action is qualitatively different from non-action, and this difference consists in the fact that action is directed, then action is also different when this direction takes on a crucially different character.」[15]
相反，因果解釋（Causal Theory of Action）就缺少了這種qualitative shift。[16]以智能微波爐作喻，以因果解釋的方法，我們可以為微波爐定義種種的行動原因。例如，我們輸入了一個烤鷄的程序，微波爐在煮食過程中，時時刻刻都在「留意」鷄是否烤好。但我們不能說會烤鷄的微波爐是一個行動者。因為，它不是真的在「留意」烤鷄是否合乎它的目標，而只是在作出種種客觀數據評估，當數據乎合了烤熟的條件後，微波爐的門便打開。這個烤鷄的過程，與自我覺察，完全無關。
補充一點，在解釋何為行動者的課題，我們便然想必然地把人類，亳無疑問地，當成行動者。而我們亦傾向以動物作為對照，把動物當成非行動者。但為了被免動物愛護者的責難，我們有需要放棄這個對照。因為，從種種的觀察和研究所得，不是所有動物也可以被確定為缺乏自我覺察能力的物種。
第三部份 ── qualitative view可以幫助了解兩個黑格爾的核心學說[17]
Principle of embodiment（充實生命原則）
產生agent’s knowledge和self-awareness是因為我們持有qualitative view。這種qualitative view，兩亦可以幫助我們了解和鞏固黑格爾哲學中，兩個重要的關鍵：（principle of embodiment）和正反合。
Principle of embodiment充實原則包括兩主要面向[18]：
一．理性動物是一種會思考的生命體。(first, as a ‘rational animal’, that is, as a living being who thinks;)
二．身為會表達的生命體，必然要藉某種媒介，思考才可能。(secondly, as an expressive being, that is, a being whose thinking is always and necessarily in a medium)
理解自我意識是由外在內在化的成果。“Self-conscious understanding is the fruit of an interiorization of what was originally external.[19]”一連串本來是沒有自我意識的份子和物質，產生了內在化，產生了自我意識。黑格爾的哲學，其中一個中心，就是一種有關Spirit的哲學。Frederick Beiser有一段以下的說話，解釋黑格爾對Spirit的觀點：
「According to his (Jean Hyppolite) interpretation, the main theme of Schelling’s system was the concept of life, which had an essentially naturalistic or biological meaning, whereas the central motif of Hegel’s system was the idea of spirit, which had a fundamentally historical or cultural meaning. For Hegel, spirit is not just life but something more: the self-consciousness of life.」[20]
與自然科學和生物學對比，我們可見，Hegel所指的spirit是帶有文化性的。這種文化性的了解，當然是一種「expressive」和「self-aware」的。這種觀點，與因果關係之間，有著一個很大的分別。這個分別就是，我們把人類的自我覺察能力，看待成任何人類行動的起點。“Our awareness of them is something basic, assured from the start, since it is essentially involved in our being aware at all.”[21]而行動的目標，就是達致自我的透切理解（self-transparency）。
[？ 3]
何謂medium/media？“I believe we see that it requires that we conceive self-understanding as something that is brought off in a medium, through symbols”or concepts, and formulating things in this as one of our fundamental activities.”
Taylor認為，要了解何謂心靈，我們必須要放棄把心靈理解一些由數據構成的東西（as constituted of data）[22]。除了數據式的理解外，我們還可有兩種不同層次的理解。
層次一：發生性層面「effective dimension」：
發生性層面的理解是「非自我澄明的」（non-self-transparency），它把人類行動理解成一些心理學活動。但這種理解。這種對自我的理解，藉着符號（symbols）和欲求和恐俱的形式（formulation of desires and fears）作為媒界，去解釋人類行動。雖然該行動中缺乏了人類的意願和意識，但我們依然解說行動的動機。[23]這種觀點，承接於康德一路，他把人的意識理解成一種概念活動。所以人其實是缺乏自我覺察的。
雖然康德一直反對，我們可以給予有機的宇宙觀，一種構成性的地位（constitutive status）。但到了康德之後的浪漫主義學者，都認為，倘若我們要表達出構成性的思想，我們都必先要有一種容讓表達之為可能的媒介和基礎。而這個媒介，就是我們的心靈。
Taylor提及：
“I believe we see that it requires that we conceive self-understanding as something that is brought off in a medium, through symbols”or concepts, and formulating things in this as one of our fundamental activities.”[24]
層次二：表達性層面「expressive dimension」：
我們不一定須要把欲求和感受，理解成是一些由腦部給定的東西。相反，我們可以把欲求和感受，理解成一些人類的內省過程和生命過程。[25] 起初，這看似是一個不全整的（inadequate）反省。但這種起初是不完整的理解，在經過漫長的articulation之後，將會漸漸明朗，越來越迫近self-transparency。與第一層不同，這不是一種理解生命和思想如何構成的層，而是理解和articulate人類目標的層次。
這兩路的理解過程，在黑格爾的觀中，最終會達致和諧。Taylor解釋，這是因為“it will become clear at the end that the end of the whole life-process was that Spirit come to understand itself”[26]。但Taylor其實沒有解釋，為何他相信，或黑格爾相信，最終，effective dimension和expressive dimension會和諧一致。這是一個目標，而不是兩者和諧的原因。
雖然如此,，或許我們根本不需要要求一個兩者為何會和諧的原因。因為我們在解釋兩者時，己經說明了，第二層次是一種目的論解釋，而不是因果論解釋。所以，第一層和第二層之和諧，其實也是第二層，自我意識和自我理解過程中的目標。在自我理解的過程，我們把人類行動和自我覺察，表達成一種兩層的和諧，亦即絕對的精神的終極目標。如果我們硬要求一個兩者之所以和諧的因果解釋，這便有欠同情。不是在這哲學系統之內發掘其困難。
第二個核心學說：
自我理解過程reflective consciousness transforms action
倘若我們認同qualitative view of action，則人類行為的最終目標，就是要達到完全澄明的境界，我們可以充份地表達和了解自我活動的目標。在這個過程中，我們的行動和對自我的理解，當然須要被免自相予盾，各種行動與各種信念之間的關係亦是融貫的。正如前所說，在表達式的層面內，起初它是不明確的。沒有人可以在一開始便達到完滿的自我理解。相反自我需要不斷地提升及轉化。
在這脈絡下之，所謂的“提升”和“轉化”並不是一種艱深難懂的概念。相反，這是一種日常的生活經驗。Taylor舉了奴隸制作例，奴隸制與法制在古代社會是同時並存的。所以奴隸制對人的剝削及法制對入的保障，其實是互相違背的。一但我們能夠確認出奴隸是對某些人不公平的，我們便會發展出一套並行不悖的新法制。近日在香港，我們則有中文大學情色版事件作例。前衛人士和保守宗教之間衝突，倘若被疏解，那個疏解衝突的方法，將必然會是同時把兩方都顧及的。
第四部份 ── qualitative view對意義理論的影響
New theory of meaning ---- expressive theory of meaning
Qualitative view還會為我們帶來一種expressive theory of meaning（ET）。與representational theory of meaning（RT）不同，行動並不反映背後的意義。相反，行動本身，就是意義。用Taylor的字眼，意義是並不是「by」（借）行動反映出來的，意義是「in」（乘載於）行動之中的。[27]例如：當氣壓計下跌時，就表示將會下兩。「下跌」只是一種自然訊號（sign by nature），反映出將會下雨，這一個現象。但人類的行動，如面部表情，則不同了。這是一種sign by convention當我們笑，就等如我們快樂，當我們哭，就等如我們傷心。笑──開心，哭──傷心，這兩種關係，並不是一種反映關係。因為日常生活中，我們不是一個舞台演員。面部表情本身就含有意義。
That is, our formulating ourselves would be at first a relatively unreflective bodily practice, and would attain only later to the self-clarity required for full self-consciousness.[28]
換句話說，這種對行動意義的觀點，這是一種行動先於概念知識的意義理論。理解自我活動的目的，是理解過程的終點，而不是起點。
當然，所有帶有人類意義的活動，如前所述，都必須要藉某種媒介才能實現。例如，我們可以藉面部活動，乘載情感。不同的媒介，可以有不同的表達能力。Taylor提及了Hegel認為哲學討論將會是最有效的媒介。這段歌頌哲學的文章實在令筆者心嚮神往：
Thus Hegel distinguishes art, religion and philosophy as media, in ascending order of adequacy. The perception of the absolute is embodied in the work of art, it is presented there (dargestellt). But this is in a form which is still relatively inarticulate and unreflecting. Religious doctrine and cult being us closer to adequancy, but are still clouded by images and ‘representations’ (Vorstellungen). The only fully adequate form is conceptual thought, which allows both transparency and full reflective awareness. But attaining our formulation in this medium is the result of a long struggle. It is an achievement; and one which builds on and requires the formulation in the other, less adequate media. Philosophy does not only build on its own past. For in earlier ages, the truth is more adequately presented in religion (e.g., the early ages of Christianity), or art-religion (at the height of the Greek polis). In the coming to its adequate form, philosophy as it were catches up. True speculative philosophy has to say clearly what has been there already in the images of Christian theology.[29]
第五部份 ── 人類歷史和文化，並不是個體堆叠後的總和
如果我們明白了發生性和表達性之間的分別。我們則可以不單只把這分別套用於個人行動，我們更可以把這區分，套用於社會及文化層面。如果我們以發生性的方式去理解事物，那我們只是以因果關係加上粒子去解釋及理解世界。宇宙及人類文化即只僅僅是一些粒子活動的結果，及粒子活動的堆叠。
相反，如以表達性的層面去理解世界，我們則可以得出一個（依Taylor的說法）更豐富的理解。而這種質性理解，是並不能夠化約成一種量性理解的。有些哲學家，如Slote和Velleman[30]，在討論人生意義課題時，常常會舉出一些例子。例如：假設兩個人的一生運氣等同。但一個人經歷先苦後甜，另一個人經歷先甜後苦。哪他們的人生是一樣的嗎？我們又會如何選擇想過哪個人生？
先苦後甜和先甜後苦的人生，如果以發生性的觀點去解釋，那將是無差別的。但如果以質性的，和表達性的觀點去理解，我們則可以於任何人身上，得到不同的答案。文化和人類歷史，亦如是。
舉個再簡單一點的例子。當我們在睇電視劇（如：《強劍》），我們會較願意順序看畢劇集？還是，我們會較願意先看第三集，再看第十二集，再看大結局，再看第十八集，再看第一集；把次序打亂來看？如果你支持人生，文化和宇宙只是片段的堆叠，那兩種收看方法對你而言是無分別的。但相信大部份人也不會這樣收看劇集，因為第二種方法，破壞了故事的序事方法，是一個較差的表達。不能更有效地幫助我們對劇情得到一個澄明的理解。
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[12] Williams, Descartes, (
[13] 在這裡，我想區分“塑造性”和“創造性”兩詞的詞義。日常我們說一件事情帶有“創造性”時，我們住住會把該事物的本質忽略了。“創造”是可以由無中生有。相反“塑造性”或“可塑性”則要同事顧及被塑物本身的性質和特性。例如：一堆陶泥可以帶有豐富的可塑性，這不代表我們可任意創造。我們絕不能把陶泥塑造成一塊銅。銅和泥根據其各自的特性，帶有不同的可塑性。
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[20] Beiser, Frederick, Hegel, (Routledge: Taylor and Francis Group), p.110.8 – .10
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[30] 請參閱：J. David Velleman, The possibility of practical reason, (
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