Freedom within Reason 筆記

Source:

Susan Wolf, (2005) “Freedom within Reason”, Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy, James Stacey Taylor (eds.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp258 - 274.

1 主要目標：

1.1 論証人需要為自己的行負責，不一定須要假設人有自由意志．

1.1.1 We have reason to hope, that is, that the metaphysical truth about the world and our relation to it is not such as to imply that we are not responsible beings.[1]

1.2 解釋三種討論“責任”之基礎及其來源的觀點：Autonomy View，Real Self View和Reason View．



2 傳統觀點中的憂慮：

2.1 要為Freewill辨護，似乎一直是一個艱鉅的難題．不只是現代，其實由古至今，對於人有否自由意志這課題，我們總是悲觀的．Wolf舉出了三個常見的版本，它分別是與自由意志不相容的理論或想法．

2.1.1 Free will seems to be threatened not only by what may be called divine determinism, but also psychological determinism – that is, by the view of human psychology that holds that one’s interests and beliefs and values, and consequently one’s decisions for action, are wholly a product of one’s heredity and environment. Moreover, […] agents whose thoughts, desires, and wills are effective in guiding our behavior can called into question by the scientific perspective that views human beings as wholly physical creatures, […], can be completely explained in terms of the interaction of atomic or subatomic particles. [2]（粗體為筆者所加．）這三個版本即是：有神論，心理學和物理學．

2.2 為何怕喪失自由意志：

2.2.1 由於我們常常假設了人有自由意志，所以，喪失自由意志將使人類的生活彷彿變成幻像．

2.2.1.1 …in ordinary day-to-day life we assume that we do have free will, and the recognition that we might be wrong about this would imply that we are living an illusion.[3]

2.2.2 再者，我們也害怕面對，我們其實不能掌握生命，喪失對行動的決定權．

2.2.2.1 They fear the absence of power and of ultimate control.[4]

2.2.3 但Wolf最擔心的是責任課題．喪失自由意志似乎會使行動者不能再為他的行為負責．

2.2.3.1 My own concern, […], has to do with issues of responsibility.[5]



3 Autonomy View（自主觀）

3.1 總之，我們認為人有自由意志，就可以“自己話事”．這種想法與“自律”（autonomy）的觀點有關．我們似乎直覺地認同，對一個自律的行為，我們才能談及責任．

3.2 什麼是autonomy

3.2.1 For autonomy requires that our actions be governed by our selves and that our selves not be governed by anything beyond our control.[6]

3.3 困難一（與經驗不乎）：

3.3.1 就算是自律的行動者，也很難避免受外在因素影響行動．

3.3.1.1 Though the factors that shape who are and what we value, and consequently that shape how we respond to the circumstances that confronts, […], it is plausible that such factors are always operative nonetheless, calling into doubt the assumption that even the strongest candidates for autonomous action really are as autonomous as they appear.[7]

3.3.2 在德道運氣的課題中，我們也會面對這種擔憂．似乎（除了被人拿鎗指頭之外，）大部份的行動也是有行動者的背景的．我們很難明確地分辨背景對人的行動的影響．

3.4 困難二：

3.4.1 就算我們有自由意志，是自律的個體，又何以見得因為能夠自律，就要負責任？

3.4.1.1 But if being autonomous means that instead on one’s self being a product of external forces, one’s self is a spontaneous, undetermined entity, it is hard to see why one should be any more responsible for the decisions, choices, and actions that flow out of that.[8]



4 Real Self View（真我觀）

4.1 由於自由意志並不能解決責任的難題，我們可以轉移到Real Self View，即我們把責任的基礎來滅歸結於行動者是否真確地認同自己的行為．

4.2 The kind of freedom necessary for responsibility, it might be suggested, is the freedom to do what one really wants – that is, the freedom to do what one’s core, deep, or real self wants, which may be different from what one’s strongest desires would urge upon one.[9]

4.3 換句話說，我們把行動者的責任歸結於行動者是否真誠地認同兼且認為其行為是有價值的．

4.4 即倘若行動者對其他動有第二序欲望，我們便可以對其提出責任要求．

4.4.1 (A pref ~A) pref (~A pref A)

4.5 困難：

4.5.1 就算一個行動是行動者的自我認同的行為，也不足以一定證明行者須要為其行動負責．因為，雖然行動者可以是自願的，也不一定是有得選擇．

4.5.1.1 例如：電影《紫雨風暴》（1999）中的吳彥祖的角色（多特），他是一個自小便被赤柬收養，並訓練成遊擊隊隊員的人．他沒有其他選擇，他一定要成為赤柬，而他認同他是赤柬遊擊隊的身份．

4.5.1.2 又例如：一個種族者主義者，可能是因為他的成長背景使沒有不成為種族主義者的可能性．[10]

4.5.1.3 這例子同樣可以用於納粹主義者等．

4.5.2 就算是第二序欲望也不一定是獨立自主的．一個人的第二序欲望、意願或價值取向，都可以受環境或受因果律則影響的．

4.5.2.1 In fact, the man’s racist values are part of his real self. […] For although these activity are governed by his values, his life … had no room in it for questioning, for coming to see the reasons why racism is wrong. He didn’t have a chance to not be a racist, and so it seems unfair to blame him for acting out and expressing a racism he had no choice but to have.[11]

4.5.2.2 I believe that suggestion (RSV) is mistaken. There is no such ultrareal or superdeep self, independent of all external influences, arising from nothing; and even if there were, it is hard to see why a being with such a self would be any more responsible than a being without it.[12]



5 Wolf的版本：Reason View（理據觀）：惡行免責論

5.1 似乎，就算是RSV也會面對一個AV的要求．如果一個RSV不是獨立真誠地自主，我們亦會十分懷疑這個RSV的責任．如果RSV不比AV好．我們似乎對一個兩難．我們以乎要退回AV．

5.2 不過，Susan Wolf認為：我們不能要求行動者對其行動負責，亦不可以怪責．

5.2.1 Reflecting on the supposition that they could not help but have those values, then, inclines us to exempt them not just of responsibility, but of blame.[13]

5.2.2 It might be noted that when we look at cases of bad-acting agents, our tendency to exempt them from responsibility (and thus from blame) rests heavily on our imagining cases in which it is posited that the agent could not but have become vicious or disturbed.[14]（粗體為筆者所加．）

5.3 相反，行善的人則可以擔起他們的善行的責任，接受贊賞．

5.3.1 We do not exempt the good acting agent because we covertly, perhaps even unconsciously, imagine the agent as one who was encouraged by good influences, but who was not compelled to become good. Rather, we assume that decision to accept these influences was more truly up to him.[15]（粗體為筆者所加．）

5.3.2 當然，我們可見Wolf所指的“truly”，不一定指“真實地”，而是“assumed as if truth”，即“假設／看待成真”



6 釐清：

6.1 Disanalogy between good-acting and bad-acting

6.1.1 Wolf好在意這個概念．因為她認為這是她的Reason View的核心．

6.1.1.1 The development of my view about responsibility laid stress on a disanalogy between good-acting and bad-acting agents.[16]

6.1.2 何謂“disanalogy”？

6.1.2.1 …the disanalogy is quite specific: It is that a good-acting agent may have been irresistibly drawn to accept good values as a result of the exercise of good reason, whereas this can never be said of the agent who acts in a blameworthy way.[17]

6.1.2.2 換句話說，責任的基礎就是來自“理據”．

6.1.3 她舉出了一些處境，幫助闡明，指出一個行善的人，其實是有機會不值得被贊賞或怪責．一個行惡的人，亦不一定不須要負責．

6.1.3.1 例如：If a person acts badly despite his ability to appreciate the reasons for acting better, then he is fully responsible and blameworthy for his choice.[18]

6.1.3.2 但筆者認為，這可能性和她的理論有不一致的地方．因為她似乎認為我們沒有理由可以行惡．所有的惡行都是因為不了解和缺乏選擇的結果．因為我們總可以把行惡者描述成受環境限制．

6.1.3.2.1 所以她在“If a person […] for his choice. [19]”這句之前，加上一句：“But it is a real and difficult question how often such cases occur.[20]”

6.1.3.2.2 亦有這句：But if a man irresistibly led to affirm bad values, this can only be because he was deprived of the ability to appreciate the reasons why those values are bad.[21]

6.1.3.2.3 換句話說，她自己很懷疑我們能否有效証明一個人可以充份地、了解地和可選擇地行惡．

6.1.3.3 真相究竟是如何，則可能要返回自由意志的討論．但不論形上真相為何，我們都可以贊同Wolf的觀點．

6.2 Reason View的精神在於把責任的基礎歸結為規範性和指導性的概念，而不是一個形上理論的結果：the difference between responsible and nonresponsible agents is not fundamentally metaphysical – it is normative. What we need in order to be responsible is not the power to form and revise our values independently of the world, but rather the power to form and revise our values well rather than badly, in light of an understanding of the world and of what is important and worthwhile in it.[22]（粗體為筆者所加．）



7 問題及回應：

7.1 一：

7.1.1 與其說RSV中的Real是等同“真我”．倒不如說Real Self是Ideal Self“理想我”或Role model“典範我”，因為Wolf在論証中，隱含了她對人性的觀點．如中國哲學一樣，她似乎認為人是必須亦必然是性善的．要不然，為惡的行動者都必然不是以受他的真我驅使以行惡．她一早就排除了人是性惡的可能性．所以她亦說這是“heavily on our imaging cases”．

7.1.1.1 …, we imagined people who could not but have acquired bad values or false beliefs and so could not but have made bad decisions on the basis of them.[23] （粗體為筆者所加．）

7.1.1.2 We do not exempt the good acting agent because we covertly, perhaps even unconsciously, imagine the agent as one who was encouraged by good influences, but who was not compelled to become good. Rather, we assume that decision to accept these influences was more truly up to him.[24] （粗體為筆者所加．）

7.1.2 可見她很想保護日常直覺：認為人是（最少是傾向）善的．

7.1.3 當然，說她與中國哲學可相通，可能言之過早．我們亦可以說她的理論，與亞里士多德的perfectionism相通．不過，大致上，不論是Wolf，Aristotle或者是各儒者，都是向共同目標進發──為人確立行善的基礎及方向．

7.1.4 倘若她的論點是發生在一個邪惡的可能世界，我們可以對她構想的種族主義者，給予另一翻的描述．



7.2 二：

7.2.1 不過，她的觀點有一個好處．我們對待惡行時，可以更寬宏．因為我們總是可以認為惡行是身不由己．[25]行惡的人是需要幫助，而不是需要被怪責．

7.2.2 蘇格拉底把惡行看待成如無知的行為；而Wolf則把惡行看待成身不由己的行為．兩者均重視啟導和教化，多於怪責．這種扶持他人的精神是一種比較正面的和關懷的精神．



7.3 三：

7.3.1 Wolf的觀點其實可以有利把責任轉變成一個程度性的概念，這亦脗合我們的日常經驗．例如：蜘蛛俠中常常有句“能力越大，責任越大”．而我們日常亦彷彿認為聖賢有需要開化民智，就如父母有需要教育子女明白做人道理．

7.3.2 如果我們僅以AV來劃定責任，我們便很大機會使責任變成非有即無的概念．要麼行動者有自由意志，所以要為一切自律行為負上全面的責任；要麼行動者沒有自由意志，所以對其行動可以全不負責．

7.3.3 相反，Wolf的理論則可以同時考慮行動的處境和自身信念．如果行動者有很合理的理由和充分地了解處境，他則有較大的責任．如果行動者受環境的影響較多，或對自我的欲望及信念理解較少，他則有較少的責任．

7.3.4 這亦可以幫助我們理解，當我們怪責他們逃避責任時，為何往往我們是在怪責他人故意地不去了解他應所了解的處境．

7.3.5 她似乎亦會贊同這個理解：The more we are able to understand and correctly and sensitively evaluate our world, the more responsible we are able to be in acting within and upon it.[26]



7.4 倘若天命不能違．由不朽的觀看，命運總是播弄或特別照顧某些人，使他們對生命有更多的了解，擁有更大的責任．由有朽的觀看，有人類會努力獲得更多的自由，肩負更多的責任；亦有人認為自由是“生命中不能承受之輕”，努力逃避責任．

[1] P259.9

[2] P258.5 – 258.7

[3] P258.10 – 258.1

[4] P259.3

[5] P259.4

[6] P261.5

[7] P261.7

[8] P262.2

[9] P265.4

[10] Wolf於文章中的例子．

[11] P266.4 – 266.5

[12] P269.3

[13] P267.7

[14] P268.6

[15] P268.10 – 269.1

[16] P271.4

[17] P271.9

[18] P272.6

[19] P272.6

[20] P272.5

[21] P271.10 – 272.1

[22] P273.6

[23] P272.5

[24] P268.10 – 269.1

[25] 換了筆者的語言：“我們總可以說某人行惡，是因為他有心理鬱結，而非自願，亦非能自控的．”

[26] P274.3

為國為民自殺的結果

(在電視告廣上, 見到名嘴說香港人自殺只是為情和錢, 沒有人為國為民. 所以, 我決定打電話到撒瑪利亞, 告訴他們有人對人性灰心, 想尋死.)

電話:
...Do...Do......Do...Do...

我:
...(等了三分鐘)....

電話:
...Do...Do......Do...Do...

我:
...(就快想放棄)...(通了)...

電話錄音:
...Do......撒瑪利亞, 請記住, 生命是很保貴的, 請不要輕易放棄....[下刪一大段廢話]...如果你想立刻救助, 請到就近的急症室或警處... [...] ...或者你可以到辨工時間, 到石硤尾....找社工...[...] Bye Bye.

結論:
1.撒瑪利亞除了有資源處理為情和財自殺的人已經夠忙, 哪有資源處理憂國憂民的譚嗣同?

2.這個電話錄音, 年中激死唔少人.

"The importance of free will"筆記

Susan Wolf, “The importance of free will” Mind, Vol. 90, No. 359. (Jul., 1981), pp. 386 -405

Susan Wolf, “The importance of free will”筆記

1 主要目標：
1.1 論証一個行動者需要負責的道德行為不一定須要建基於自由意志之成立．
1.1.1 I shall argue that the justification of these practices need not rest on the assumption that we do have free will, and that the conclusion that we don’t have free will gives us no reason at all to abandon these practices..[1]
1.2 道德責任的根據是行動者對其行動的態度．
1.2.1 I shall argue that these attitudes, too, are safe from the threat of being undermined by reason and metaphysics.[2]
1.3 解釋兩種對自由意志與人類行為的態度：樂觀者與悲觀者．[3]
1.4 論証我們可以接受一個consequentialist的態度，解釋道德贊賞和責備．
1.4.1 I take it that this forward-looking, consequentialist type of justification of the practices of overt moral praise and blame is a good one, and therefore I take it that the intelligent pessimist will think it a good one as well. [4]
1.4.2 …even if this (the truth of determinism) implies that as matter of metaphysical fact we are not free and responsible beings, this give us no reason at all to regard ourselves as unfree, unresponsible beings.[5]
1.5 論証以對行動者的態度代替“自由意志”作為責任的根據．
1.6 我們依然可以為“人類的行動是命定的”這種觀點感到難過．一個到命定論悲觀的人，並不需放棄他的悲觀的態度，相反，他只需要放棄他的理論．
1.6.1 I shall finally attempt to express what I take to be the appropriate focus of these feelings.[6]
1.6.2 …the pessimist is likely to withdraw not his fear of determinism, but only his account of it.[7]

2 為何我們害怕命題論：
2.1 悲觀者的態度和前設：
2.1.1 前設：
2.1.1.1 自由意志是否存在，是根據特有何種形以上學觀點．
2.1.1.1.1 …, first that whether or not we have free will depends on which metaphysical hypotheses are true, …[8]
2.1.1.1.2 第一：…determinism is both incompatible with free will and very likely true.[9]（Wolf認為她是第一種悲觀者．）
2.1.1.1.3 第二：…indeterminism is both incompatible with free will and, at least, very possibly true.[10]
2.1.1.2 而且，這些否定自由意志或與自由意志不容相的理論，似乎是正確的．
2.1.1.2.1 …, second, that it is not unlikely that the wrong metaphysical hypotheses are true.[11]
2.1.2 總的來說，悲傷者不願意接受人是沒有自由意志的生命體．他們不願接受這點，因為他們認為喪失自由意志需要面對沉重的代價──人類再不是可以負責的行動者，而道德行為亦會喪失其形上學的根據．

2.2 一：
2.3 因為我們害怕以下的可能性：倘若人類對自己是缺乏自由意志的，我們將喪失為我們的行為負責任的基礎．
2.3.1 Of the practices they feel to be potentially undermined by the absence of free will, those associated with attributions of moral responsibility are most often cited.[12]
2.4 二：
2.5 而且，道德贊賞和責備也是成為缺乏理據的活動．
2.5.1 …the practices of praising and blaming people, punishing and rewarding them on the basis of the moral quality of their actions would be irrational, inappropriate, and unjustifiable if the thesis of determinism were true.[13]
2.6 換句話言，我們將喪失過去行動者之所以為行動者的自決能力．
2.7 三：
2.8 我們亦會喪失對他人作出“reactive attitudes”的理據．相反我們只能對他人，甚至於自己，作出“objective attitude”．
2.8.1 Wolf沒有清楚地定義何謂reactive attitudes．不過，大致上reactive attitudes是一種不把人當作機械的態度．認為人是有感情的，而且亦自覺到自我的價值．在她的想法中，這包括了：admiration and indignation, pride, shame, respect, contempt, gratitude, resentment等．[14]
2.8.1.1 Reactive attitudes的重要性
2.8.1.2 Reactive attitudes與大部份有價值的人類情感有關．要是我們喪失了reactive attitudes我們可能會遇到以下的處境．
2.8.1.3 所有贊賞和責備皆是不可以理喻的．
2.8.1.4 親情，友情及愛情皆變成了沒有價值的東西．
2.8.1.5 總之，似乎一切令人之所為人的尊嚴也會消散．
2.8.2 所以，生活在一個缺乏Reactive attitudes的世界，似乎是蕭瑟的和貧瘠的．[15]
2.8.3 與之相反，則是objective attitude，一般而言，是對待死物或動物的態度．[16]

3 樂觀者的辯護：
3.1 我們可以把贊賞和責備看待成生物賞罰機制，即一種生物學上的回饋機制．“贊賞”和“責備”依然可以有效力，因為它們依舊可以提升人的道德質素（moral quality）．“We already know that we can improve the moral quality of actions by maintaining institutions of reward that provide incentives.”[17]
3.1.1 We should praise or blame an individual, they may argue, if and only if by doing so we shall improve the moral quality of actions in the future.[18]
3.2 就算我們知道人類是被命定的機械，我們在心理上也不能作出多大的轉變，我們會繼續往常的生活．
3.2.1 …the optimist once again has a ready reply. One thing he can point out is that even if the truth of determinism would give us some reason to regard ourselves differently, we would be psychologically incapable of changing our attitudes in the appropriate way.[19]
3.3 由於要接受一種無情的世界觀，代價實在太多．所以，我們可以合理地自我欺騙，繼續往常的生活態度．生活上，我們可以接納unjustified attitudes．
3.3.1 Another is that even if the truth of determinism would give us some reason to regard ourselves differently, we would have an overriding reason to keep the attitudes we currently hold.[20]
3.3.2 …the pessimist might accept the optimist’s argument – but he will accept it with despair.[21]
3.3.3 …I think that it may be rational to choose not ‘to be more purely rational that we are.’ It may be rational for a man to choose not to face the fact that he has a terminal illness or for a woman to try to avoid discovering that her husband is having an affair. In the costs would be high enough, it may be rational to override the reason for a course of action that is given by the acknowledgment that only that course of action would constitute living in accordance with the facts.[22]
3.3.4 換句話說，我們可以有理性的自我欺騙．
3.4 但如果optimist只是一味說，為被免更重大的損失，我們有理由去蓋過（或漠視）事實，以一種自欺的態度生活．Susan Wolf認為，這就等如叫人滿足於“揀一個無咁臭的屎坑坐．”However, in so far as the optimist’s justification takes the form of providing reasons that override other reasons, the justification can be only as satisfying as the acceptance of the lesser of two evils can be.[23]（粗體為筆者所加．）
3.5 如果想解決這個問題，我們就有必要先理解為何就算事實上我們是命定的，也不會亦影響我們的想法：認為人類應該為自的行為負責任和我們是自由的個體．
3.5.1.1 …even if this (the truth of determinism) implies that as matter of metaphysical fact we are not free and responsible beings, this give us no reason at all to regard ourselves as unfree, unresponsible beings. […] If we have no reason at all to abandon these (reactive) attitudes, then we have nothing we need to override, no value we need to contradict in choosing to keep these attitudes. Our retention of the reactive attitudes need not be viewed as a choice between the lesser of two evils.[24]

4 就算我們是喪失自由意志，亦可以談“責任”．
4.1 以對行動者的對其行動的態度來代替“自由意志”作為責任的根據．
4.1.1 …attitude…give us a reason (perhaps the reason)… to decide whether we ought to regard him as responsible for taking the drug.[25]
4.2 道友例子：
4.2.1 假設有一個因為惹上了毒癮的道友；
4.2.2 假設他是一個日常生活中見到的理性人．
4.2.3 因為這個道友的行為是不自由的，所以不論他如何以為自己選擇，他最終都會吸毒．[26]
4.2.4 我們會認為他的責任來源於他對他吸毒的行為有多認同．
4.2.4.1 …the degree to which we hold this individual responsible for his drug-taking actions will vary in proportion to the degree to which we think he approves of – or, at least, doesn’t disapprove of – the fact that he takes these actions.[27]
4.2.5 換句話說，只要道友對承認他的第二序意欲是認同吸毒的行為，我們便可能合理地把吸毒看待成他的自願行為．於是他便要因為這自願行為而負責任．
4.2.5.1 [(D pref ~D) pref (~D pref D)]
4.2.5.2 He is affirming the fact that his efforts to obtain and to take the drug are his actions, that they effect and contribute to his character and his life in a way that may fairly enter into an assessment of what kind of person he is.[28]
4.2.5.3 …the addict’s responsibility for his actions turns on the truth or falsity of an independent claim: namely, that whether or not the addict is compelled to take the drug, he will take the drug because he chooses to do so. The addict, then, in taking an attitude toward his unfree actions, can thereby claim or disclaim responsibility for them.[29]
4.2.6 相反：
4.2.6.1 假如道友的第二序欲望並不意欲去吸毒；
4.2.6.2 [(~D pref D) pref (D pref ~D)]
4.2.6.3 我們便不怪責他吸毒，因為這是他不願意的．而他亦帶有不意願的態度．
4.3 但是神奇在，Susan Wolf竟然補多一句：“倘若我們相信道友對吸毒的接受程度的態度已經被毒品影響決定，那麼我們便沒有理由將他的態度看待成負責的理據．”（If we believed that the addict’s approval or disapproval of his actions were itself determined by the influence of the dug, we would not regard his attitude as giving us a reason by which to establish ours.）[30]
4.3.1 這豈不是偷偷地把“自由意志”的觀點混入了第二序望欲之中？她似乎假設了第二序欲望是有可能不受命定論限制．但何以見得是如此？
4.3.2 她寫：The fact that we take the addict’s own attitudes to his drug-taking actions seriously – that is, the fact that his attitudes count as a reason for us to hold him more or less responsible for these actions – rests on our belief that the addict, qua attitude-taker, is a free and responsible being.[31]（粗體為筆者所加．）
4.3.3 當中的“is a free and responsible being”似乎有前後予盾之嫌．除非之前的“our belief”是指“主觀信仰”，而非“客觀信念”，要不然之後的“free”似乎是與她的態度理論不一致的．
4.3.4 我懷疑Wolf也際覺到自己的問題，所以她斜體化了“is”，以代表這個“is”並不是邏輯同位句：“The agent is free.”（他是自由的行動者；句子ａ）而是明喻：“The agent is free.”（他是自由的行動者；句子ｂ）．句子ｂ的句式與“太陽是朵大紅花”這明喻沒有分別．

5 Bicentennial Man[32]
5.1.1 Wolf想証明“待人以reactive attitude”是與“對方是free agent”沒有直接關係的．
5.1.2 設想我們的科技可以制造一個如人一樣的機械人．
5.1.3 它亦有第二序欲望．[33]
5.1.4 但他最終也是一個沒有自由意志的個體，它的個性，價值觀，以及行動，都不由自主．[34]
5.1.5 最悲觀的處境是，我們會以objective attitude對待它．[35]
5.1.6 但因為它實在太似人，所以我們在心理上，將會越來越困難純粹以objective attitude對待它．
5.1.6.1 The robot is programmed (along with all its implications) may make it psychologically impossible for us to take the objective attitude towards him consistently.[36]
5.1.7 例如：人類會讓步，在人常生活上，待它與人無異，但不會容許女兒嫁給Bicentennial Man．[37]
5.1.8 在這個真實得出奇的假想例子中，Wolf嘗試提出，Bicentennial Man可以以objective attitude對待自己．原因不是因為這可以與現實脗合，而是因為以這態度可以減少他的苦惱．
5.1.8.1 …we are not arguing for the adoption of this attitude simply on the ground that the attitude is appropriate. That is, we are not arguing that the robot should take this (objective) attitude simply because of his (and our) value in living in accordance with facts. … rather, utilitarian ones: his life will be less painful if he takes the objective attitude toward himself.[38]
5.1.9 與之前的道友作比較．Bicentennial Man的一切決定，都是因為它的程式．連它所擁有的第二序欲望也是來自設計者的程式．所以，就算它接受自己的行動──帶有一個第二序欲望──我們亦只能把它看待成連第二序欲望也被限制，它不應為它的行為負責．
5.1.9.1 He (the robot) is in a position analogous to that of the addict whose attitude toward his addiction is itself determined by the influence of the drug. Thus the robot’s own attitude toward himself cannot have any weight for us. If the robot, as a matter of metaphysical fact, is an unfree, unresponsible being, then his acceptance of this fact gives us no extra reason to regard him as such.[39]

5.2 哪麼我們真的有必要，亦只能純粹以objective attitude生活嗎？
5.2.1 Wolf認為：不．
5.2.2 因為objective attitude也是一種attitude，它亦不合乎會與形上事實．形上事實本身是沒有attitude的．
5.2.2.1 不論我們接受何種生活態度，我們都必先得假設我們如一個自由和承責的個體．
5.2.2.1.1 In taking any attitude toward ourselves, including the attitude that we are not fee or responsible beings, we would be asserting ourselves as free and responsible beings.[40]
5.2.2.1.2 For the only way we cold give up taking either the attitudes that regard others as responsible for their actions or the attitude that regards others as not responsible for their actions would be by giving up thinking in terms of the notions of responsibility and desert at all.[41]
5.2.2.2 人類是一種有態度的生物，不論我們特有悲觀或樂觀的態度，我們就是不能放棄有態度．
5.2.3 Wolf認為，選擇生活態度（reactive 或 objective）其實是形上事實沒有關聯的．就算我們選擇“乎合形上事實地生活”這態度的証誠來源，也不是來自形上事實本身．相反，是來自我們的心理需要．
5.2.3.1 That is, even if determinism gave us some reason to give up all our attitudes, we would be psychologically incapable of meeting this demand. And even if determinism gave us some reason to give up our attitudes, we would have overriding reason to retain them.[42]

6 為什麼我們總是想乎合現實地生活？
6.1 Wolf認為這與我們想求真愛有關．
6.1.1 This desire shows up in more realistic situations when we consider how important it is to us that we not only feel ourselves to be loved, but that we truly be loved, or when we see how important it is to us that our efforts to achieve something in the world have succeeded, but that they really have succeeded.[43]
6.2 我們亦害怕我們只是快樂機關的大腦．
6.2.1 …people shudder at the thought of passing their days hooked up to a pleasure machine.[44]
6.3 第一：倘若我們放棄乎合現實地生活，我們似乎是放棄了想“正確地”生活這理想．
6.3.1 …living in accordance with the fact that we are not free and responsible beings would require us to five up our value in being right.[45]
6.4 第二：生活與真實一致，會使我們感到自我的重要性．
6.4.1 …because we want ourselves to matter in the right sort of way, to make the right sort of difference to the world and the beings who do mater and to whom we might matter.[46]
6.4.1.1 Wolf認為，或許，如果我們發現自己是一個受控的木偶，被上帝（或乜都好）玩弄於鼓掌之中，我們其實是有理由自殺的．因為你發現了一切你所重視的和一切重視你的，都與你沒有絲毫關係．
6.4.1.1.1 It might be rational for the robot to commit a kind of suicide of self as a result of the realization that he is … a robot. For …the realization that you cannot, and/or rationally ought not, matter to the people or to the world that matters to you – indeed, to the people or to the world that matter independently of you – might give you a reason to commit suicide.[47]（粗體為筆者所加．）
6.4.1.2 但發現世界是命定的，則能構成自殺的理由．因為：If this world matters, then it would be irrational to destroy it. And if this world does not matter, then it certainly doesn’t matter that we do or do not choose to destroy it.[48]

7 筆者認為：
7.1 似乎Wolf只是一個悲觀版的Charles Taylor．如果換了樂觀的Charles Taylor，他則會說這種心種的需要，並不是一種心理的無能（incapable），相反是一種心理的創造力，有能力把因果決定的冷冰世界，描述和看待成一個有愛和關心的世界．
7.2 哈！或許我們真由Wolf的字眼中得知我們的無能．例如在自殺一例中，她也要在“自殺”之前加上“a kind of”．要用“a kind of”是因為要“自殺”之為可能，我們亦要先有我們是一個行動者的態度．所謂木偶或機械人會自殺，其實是non-sense的．因為，倘若那個機械人真的絕對被命令的，半分不由他自主．他的所謂“自殺”或“保命”，也只是根據指令的必然結果．
[1] P386.4
[2] P387.3
[3] P386.8 – 387.1
[4] P388.7
[5] P394.1
[6] P387. 3
[7] P388.9
[8] P387.4
[9] P387.5
[10] P387.6
[11] P387.5
[12] P388.2
[13] P388.3
[14] P390.4
[15] P392.2
[16] P390.5
[17] P.388.7
[18] P388.5
[19] P392.3
[20] P392.4
[21] P392.5
[22] P393.4
[23] P392.7
[24] P394.1 – 394.2
[25] P394.9
[26] P394.10 – 395.1
[27] P394.5
[28] P394.7
[29] P395.2
[30] P395.6; Wolf在p394.9有以下的一句：“establish ours – that is, it give us the means by which to decide whether we ought to regard him as responsible for taking the drug.”
[31] P395.5
[32] 筆者認為，在這個例子上，我們可以幻想Wolf的Robot，就如電影Bicentennial Man(1999)一樣．
[33] P395.7
[34] P396.7
[35] P396.4
[36] P396.8
[37] P397.1
[38] P398.3
[39] P398.10 – 399.1
[40] P399.9
[41] P400.7
[42] P400.5
[43] P401.7
[44] P401.6
[45] P401.9
[46] P402.4
[47] P402.6
[48] P402.7